Peralta Sauceda v. Lynch
819 F.3d 526
| 1st Cir. | 2016Background
- Peralta Sauceda, a Honduran national who entered the U.S. unlawfully in 1993, pleaded guilty in Maine (2006) to assault against his then-wife under Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A § 207(1)(A) (covers either bodily injury or offensive physical contact).
- He conceded removability in 2007 but applied for cancellation of removal, claiming extreme hardship to his U.S.-citizen wife (disabled) and son (with medical/emotional issues).
- The IJ found he met hardship and continuous-presence elements but questioned whether his 2006 conviction was a federal "crime of domestic violence," which would bar cancellation under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C).
- The Maine record produced (Shepard documents: complaint and judgment) did not identify which prong of the statute he was convicted under; no additional state records were available.
- The BIA affirmed the IJ’s pretermission of relief for failure to prove he was not convicted of a disqualifying domestic-violence offense; Peralta Sauceda petitioned for review and obtained rehearing relying on Moncrieffe.
- The First Circuit held that, under Moncrieffe and related categorical/modified-categorical precedent, where only Shepard documents exist and they are ambiguous, the presumption favoring the least-included conduct applies and the conviction does not qualify as a federal crime of domestic violence as a matter of law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Peralta Sauceda) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Peralta Sauceda was "convicted of" a federal "crime of domestic violence" given an ambiguous divisible Maine statute and only Shepard documents | Moncrieffe presumption applies; Shepard record is exhaustive and unrebutted, so conviction cannot be treated as a disqualifying domestic-violence crime | Even if Shepard docs are ambiguous, petitioner bears statutory burden to prove he was not convicted of a disqualifying offense; agency may consider other evidence beyond Shepard docs | Held for Peralta Sauceda: where Shepard documents exhaust the record and are ambiguous, Moncrieffe presumption applies and, as a matter of law, he was not convicted of the disqualifying offense |
| Whether immigration courts may expand the record beyond Shepard-approved documents to determine the specific prong of a divisible state statute | Courts should be limited to Shepard-approved documents; allowing broader evidence would defeat categorical approach and invite mini-trials | Agency can rely on other evidence (testimony, attorney/judge statements) to ascertain what offense was pleaded to | Held: Only Shepard-approved documents can be used to rebut the least-of-the-acts presumption; courts may not convert the inquiry into evidentiary mini-trials |
| Whether Moncrieffe applies to cancellation-of-removal eligibility (an exception to removability) as opposed to removability determinations generally | Moncrieffe’s legal presumption governs both removal and relief contexts because statutory hook is identical and question is legal | Moncrieffe concerns removability; here burden of proof for relief is on the alien, so Moncrieffe does not control | Held: Moncrieffe applies equally; the legal definition of "convicted of" is uniform across contexts |
| Whether the modified categorical approach changes the presumption when Shepard documents are ambiguous | Modified categorical approach is a tool to implement the categorical approach; if Shepard docs cannot identify the prong, presumption stands | Modified approach allows looking to varied evidence to identify the specific offense | Held: Modified categorical approach does not overcome Moncrieffe presumption when the permissible record is exhausted and ambiguous |
Key Cases Cited
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (presumption that conviction rests on least-included conduct; analysis applies where Shepard documents do not identify divisible statute prong)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (describes modified categorical approach as a tool for divisible statutes)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (identifies the limited class of court-documents usable to identify the offense of conviction)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (least-of-the-acts presumption in comparing state convictions to generic federal offenses)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (foundational justification for categorical approach to prior convictions)
- Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009) (practical purposes of categorical approach to avoid relitigation of past convictions)
- Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010) (discusses significance of the statutory hook "convicted of")
