People v. Wilson, 14 Cal.5th 839

Background

In June 1997 Lester Wilson kidnapped, tortured, and murdered Uwe Durbin, kidnapped and terrorized Durbin’s family, and raped a victim; evidence included extreme physical injuries, a .380-caliber bullet, and forensic and scene evidence tying Wilson to the crimes.
A 2000 jury convicted Wilson of first degree murder, forcible rape counts, and found special circumstances (murder during kidnapping and intentional infliction of torture) and firearm-use enhancements; the jury originally imposed death.
On automatic appeal the California Supreme Court affirmed guilt but reversed the death sentence because the trial court improperly discharged a penalty‑phase juror (Wilson v. People, 44 Cal.4th 758 (2008)), requiring a new penalty trial.
Wilson was retried on penalty in 2010, again sentenced to death; he appealed multiple claims arising from the retrial and related proceedings.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, rejecting challenges based on double jeopardy, due process/reliability of a penalty retrial, counsel conflict/Marsden procedures, various death‑penalty statute challenges, restitution fine contentions, and a retroactive claim under Senate Bill No. 1437 (felony‑murder reform) as harmless error.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (Wilson)	Held
Double jeopardy — may the state retry the penalty phase after reversal for juror dismissal?	Retrial is permitted; discharge of a juror is a trial error, not an acquittal, so double jeopardy does not bar a new penalty trial.	Retrial is barred because dismissal of a holdout juror (and subsequent actions) effectively deprived Wilson of his chosen jury and gave the prosecution an unfair advantage, amounting to being twice put in jeopardy.	Affirmed retrial allowed. The Court followed Hernandez and related precedent: erroneous juror discharge is trial error, not an acquittal, so double jeopardy does not bar penalty retrial.
Due process / heightened reliability in capital cases	Retrial does not violate due process; retrial gives a fair opportunity to litigate penalty free of earlier prejudicial error.	Retrial undermines reliability required in capital sentencing and prejudices defendant (delay, lost witnesses, prosecutor advantage).	Due process claim rejected: reliability concerns do not convert the double‑jeopardy argument into a due process bar; retrial permissible and defendant had full opportunity at retrial.
Conflict of counsel / Marsden inquiry	No reversible error: court had no clear indication defendant sought new counsel and no showing of an actual adverse effect from any conflict; counsel investigated mitigation and neuropsych testing.	The trial court should've inquired into a conflict when told habeas claims alleged ineffective assistance; defendant also made an ‘‘objection’’ to appointed counsel that should have triggered a Marsden hearing.	Denied relief. Court held defendant never clearly requested substitute counsel; any duty to inquire did not prejudice defendant because record shows counsel pursued mitigation and no actual conflict adversely affected performance was proved.
Senate Bill 1437 (felony‑murder reform) — retroactive effect on guilt verdict	People conceded SB 1437 could create possible alternative‑theory error but argued any retroactive error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the facts (major participant + reckless indifference; torture and firearm findings).	Wilson argued his first‑trial verdict may have rested on pre‑SB189 felony‑murder theory; under SB 1437 he might not be guilty and is entitled to reversal/resentencing.	Court assumed the claim could be raised on appeal but held any retroactive error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: evidence and special‑circumstance findings compelled a valid theory (major participant with reckless indifference and torture/firearm findings).

Key Cases Cited

People v. Hernandez, 30 Cal.4th 1 (Cal. 2003) (erroneous discharge of a juror is treated as trial error and generally permits retrial)
Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (U.S. 1988) (retrial permissible after conviction reversed for trial error, not for insufficiency)
DiFrancesco v. United States, 449 U.S. 117 (U.S. 1980) (distinguishing acquittal from reversal and retrial implications)
Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (U.S. 1981) (double jeopardy considerations in capital sentencing—life verdict can be functional acquittal if it reflects required factual findings)
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (U.S. 2003) (double‑jeopardy touchstone in capital sentencing is whether an acquittal occurred)
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (U.S. 1980) (presumption of prejudice when counsel actively represents conflicting interests, if shown to have adversely affected performance)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (standard for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967) (harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt standard)
People v. Aledamat, 8 Cal.5th 1 (Cal. 2018) (standard for assessing alternative‑theory instructional error under Chapman)
In re Lopez, 14 Cal.5th 562 (Cal. 2023) (rigorous review for whether jury could have reached same verdict under valid theory)
People v. Gentile, 10 Cal.5th 830 (Cal. 2020) (procedural framework for Senate Bill 1437 relief)
Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (U.S. 1986) (retrial after reversal of death sentence not barred unless evidence insufficient to justify death)
People v. Hamilton, 60 Cal.2d 105 (Cal. 1963) (retrial of penalty phase directed after juror error in capital case)
People v. Jackson, 67 Cal.2d 96 (Cal. 1967) (finality of guilt judgment during penalty retrial context)