*1 v. PENNSYLVANIA SATTAZAHN January November 2002 Decided No. 01-7574. Argued *2 J., of the Court and judgment opin- delivered Scalia, announced the and ion of the Court with to Parts which Rehn- respect I, II, IV, V, Thomas, JJ., J., joined, and and and Kennedy, C. an quist, O’Connor, in which C. and opinion respect Rehnquist, J., with to Part III, Thomas, J., J., concurring in joined. opinion part an and filed con- O’Connor, J., filed a Ginsburg, in the 116. curring judgment, post, p. dissenting JJ., joined, and post, p. Breyer, in which 118. opinion, Souter, Stevens, the cause for Robert Brett Dunham petitioner. argued Anne L. him on the were Saunders and With briefs John T. Adams. respondent. Dougherty With argued the cause
Iva C. R. and Alisa Hobart. were Mark Baldwin her on brief C. argued pro hoc vice for the cause
Sri Srinivasan urging With affirmance. as amicus curiae United States Olson, Assistant him the brief General were Solicitor Deputy Attorney General Solicitor General Chertoff, Dreeben, Robert J. and Erickson. of the Court and announced Scalia Justice opinion respect I, with to Parts
delivered the of the Court respect opinion III, with to Part II, V, IV, join.* and Justice which Thomas Justice Chief again applicability of the case, we consider once In this Jeopardy Clause in the context *3 Fifth Amendment’s Double proceedings. capital-sentencing
I Sunday evening, petitioner April 12,1987, Allen On David Jeffrey accomplice, in a Hammer, and his hid Sattazahn waiting Boyer, manager Richard of the to rob wooded area Family a .22- Heidelberg Restaurant. Sattazahn carried pistol Ruger and .41-caliber semiautomatic Hammer a caliber park- Boyer They in the restaurant’s revolver. accosted closing guns they ing demanded drawn, time. With lot at Boyer containing day’s bag receipts. deposit the bank Petitioner bag of the restaurant. threw the toward the roof comply- bag, Boyer to retrieve but instead commanded away. petitioner ing Boyer Both Hammer to run and tried grabbed The Boyer two shots, fell dead. men then fired deposit bag and fled. prosecuted Pennsylvania petitioner The Commonwealth May jury re- sought penalty. 10, 1991, the death On third-degree mur- second-, and first-, a conviction of turned charges. Penn- with der, accordance and various other Kennedy III of opinion. but Part this *Justice joins all sylvania proceeding penalty phase. law the then moved into a 1102(a)(1) (Purdon § 1998); See Pa. Ann., Stat. Tit. Pa. 9711(a)(1) (Purdon 2002). § Supp. Ann., Stat. Tit. presented statutory aggra- Commonwealth one evidence of vating circumstance: commission of murder while in the 9711(d)(6). § perpetration felony. pre- of a See Petitioner mitigating significant sented as his lack circumstances of a history prior age criminal convictions and his at the time (4). §§9711(e)(1), of the crime. See 533, 539, Pa. A. 2d 359, 362 provides penalty phase that, law in the
capital proceedings:
“(iv) the verdict must a sentence of death if the unanimously aggravating finds at least one circum- mitigating stance no .. . and circumstance or if the unanimously aggravating finds one more circum- outweigh any stances mitigating which circumstances. The verdict must be a imprisonment sentence of life all other cases.
“(v) may, discharge court in its discretion, opinion if it is of the that further deliberation will not agreement result in a unanimous sentence, as to the which case the court shall sentence the defendant to life 9711(c)(Purdon 2002)'. § imprisonment.” Supp. *4 presented After jury both sides evidence, their the deliber App. ated for hours, some 3½ after which 23, it returned signed by note the foreman which the “We, read: are hopelessly imprisonment. deadlocked at 9-3 for life Each deeply [sic] one is position. entrenched in their We do not expect anyone change position.” Id., his or her at 25. 9711(e),subparagraph Petitioner then moved “under 1, sub- paragraph discharged Roman the 5, Numeral [the court] imprisonment.” and that enter of life sentence judge, Pennsylvania Id., at 22. The trial with accordance
105 hung, discharged that he would the as and indicated law, required sentence, id,., 23-24, which he later the life at enter id., at did, 30-33. Pennsylvania Superior appealed to the
Petitioner Court. in- that the trial had erred in That court concluded structing jury in with various offenses with connection first-degree petitioner charged, including murder. which petitioner’s first-degree murder accordingly con- It reversed viction for a new trial. Commonwealth v. and remanded (1993). Super. 2d 597 Sattazahn, 413, 428 Pa. 631 A. Pennsylvania intent remand, filed a notice of to seek On penalty. aggravating to the circum the death addition alleged sentencing hearing, the notice also stance at the first sig petitioner’s alleged aggravating circumstance, a second involving history felony the use or nificant convictions (This guilty person. threat violence to was based robbery pleas burglaries, multiple murder, entered to a and a trial.) Pennsyl prevent after the first Petitioner moved to seeking penalty adding vania from from the death aggravating second retrial. The circumstance on trial court Superior motion, denial, denied the Court affirmed the App. Pennsylvania Supreme 73, and the declined to Court ruling, Sattazahn, 742, review 547 Pa. Commonwealth v. (1997). jury again 690 A. trial, 2d At the second petitioner first-degree convicted time im murder, but this posed a death. appeal, Pennsylvania Supreme af-
On direct
Court
firmed both the
of death on
verdict of
the sentence
Relying
Pa.,
retrial.
at
on its
2d,
763 A.
369.
Martorano,
earlier
535 Pa.
decision
Commonwealth
(1993),
A. 2d
concluded that neither
court
barred
Clause nor
Due Process Clause
petitioner’s
seeking
penalty at
from
the death
We
Pa.,
545-551,
2d,
retrial. 563
A.
at 366-369.
granted certiorari.
106
II A com- Jeopardy Amendment of the Fifth The Double Clause subject “[n]o the same person shall be mands that ... put jeopardy or limb.” Under of life offence to be twice jeopardy placed for an Clause, this once a defendant is respect jeopardy to that of- offense, and terminates with punished may a fense, the neither tried nor Pearce, v. second time for the same offense. North Carolina (1969). a defendant is Where, here, S. 717 as imprisonment, to life but convicted of and sentenced murder having appeals aside, and succeeds in it set conviction terminated, have has not so that we held that imposed in with conviction life connection the initial sentence double-jeopardy death on retrial. raises no bar to a States, 251 U. Stroud v. United only Stroud, murder, that of offense issue was imposed judge who not have
and the sentence was a did any findings impose make further order to the death penalty. Bullington Missouri, Id., at 18. In S.U. (1981), Jeopardy we held that however, apply capital-sentencing proceedings Clause does where proceedings such “have hallmarks of the trial on aspects Id., or innocence.” at 439. We identified several sentencing proceeding a trial, Missouri’s that resembled including requirement prosecution prove that the certain statutorily beyond sup- defined facts reasonable doubt to port a procedure, Id., sentence of 438. death. Such a explained, “explicitly requires we to determine prosecution ‘proved whether the Id., has its case.’” at 444. imprisonment signifies Since, concluded, we life sentence of “ already acquitted ‘the has the defendant of what- ” necessary impose ever was sentence,’ the death the Dou- seeking pen- ble Clause bars State from the death alty (quoting Id., on retrial. at 445 State ex rel. Westfall *6 (Mo. 1980) J., (Bardgett, C. Mason, 594 W. 2d v. S. dissenting)). emphasize not the that it is were, however, careful to
We a double- imposition of that raises a life sentence mere Stroud, which a de jeopardy in bar. We discussed case first-degree murder had fendant who been convicted con imprisonment of his to life obtained reversal sentenced confessed a new trial when Solicitor General viction and unanimously Dou Stroud, the that the held In Court error. imposition pen the death Clause did not bar ble S., at What distin alty new 251 U. 17-18. at the trial. guished Bullington fact that Stroud, said, we was the from sentencing proceeding at separate was "there no in Stroud required prove beyond prosecution a rea which the — jus in or otherwise —additional facts order sonable doubt Bullington, tify particular S., at 439. sentence.” 451 U. sentencing “acquittal” at a clear that an trial-like made We imposition phase, sentence, is than the mere of a life rather double-jeopardy protections. give Id., required to rise to at 446. Bullington’s In rationale. Ari decisions refined
Later (1984), Rumsey, argued had State zona phase, presented during sentencing based on evidence in the statutory aggravating guilt phase, that three circum present. court, The trial found that however, stances were statutory aggravator accordingly existed, and entered no judgment favor on the of death. in the issue On accused’s cross-appeal, Supreme Court of Arizona con the State’s interpretation in erred that the trial court had cluded statutory aggravating circumstances, and re one of the sentencing proceeding, produced which a new manded for setting that sen Id., of death. at 205-206. explained princi “[t]he aside, we double tence [Rumsey’s] ple the same as that invoked relevant to case is by Bullington: acquittal the sole deci merits sionmaker is final and bars retrial on the proceeding Id., at 211. same charge.”
“The trial entered court findings the existence denying each the seven statutory circum- aggravating stances, and as law, state the court then required entered favor on the issue of respondent’s findings based on death. That judgment, sufficient legal establish sentence, entitlement to the amounts life to an on the merits and, as such, bars re- acquittal any Ibid. trial of the of the death appropriateness penalty.” *7 added). (emphasis
Rumsey thus reaffirmed that the for relevant inquiry was not whether the re- double-jeopardy purposes ceived a life sentence the first around, time but rather whether a life first sentence was an based on “acquittal” sufficient to establish entitlement to the life' findings legal e., sentence —i. that findings failed to government prove one or more circumstances reason- aggravating beyond able doubt. Arizona, Poland
A later
in
line,
case
B ‘hungjury’ following does not violate Normally, “a retrial States, Richardson v. United the Double Clause.” however, contends, Petitioner 317, 324 468 U. S. capital-sentencing given unique afforded treatment protections Bullington, double-jeopardy proceedings under at his first sentenc- triggered deadlocked were when prescribed of life a sentence ing proceeding court and the pursuant to law. imprisonment just Bullington line of cases disagree. We Under double-jeopardy protection in discussed, the touchstone proceedings is whether there has been capital-sentencing “acquittal.” establish that here cannot Petitioner capital- during “acquitted” him first his or the court jury: form sentencing proceeding. The verdict As to the deadlocked stated that returned the foreman penalty; no impose it made the death on whether to 9-to-3 o alleged aggravating circum findings respect t with appropriately, that non- more That result —or stance. *8 acquittal fairly on find an “based be called result —cannot legal life ings entitlement to the sufficient to establish Rumsey, supra, at 211. sentence.” “acquit- judge was not entry of a life sentence The explained: Pennsylvania Supreme Court tal,” As the either. sentencing Pennsylvania’s scheme, “‘Under he finds that sentence once to fashion has no discretion him to enter The statute directs jury is deadlocked. (. §9711(c)(1)(v) . . if . . . 42 Pa. sentence. C. S. a life unanimous in a will not result further deliberation shall sen court sentence, . . to the . agreement as (emphasis imprisonment.) life the defendant tence no added). resolves findings and judge makes no The 110 judgment findings not based on
factual matter. Since sufficient to matter, which resolve some factual it is not legal A default to a life sentence. establish entitlement trigger to the does not a double bar ” upon penalty Pa., 548, 2d, at 763 A. death retrial.’ (quoting 2d,A. Martorano, Pa., at at 1070). at required perhaps, statutorily argued, that the
It could be entry of a life sentence “entitlement” even without creates an “acquittal,” Pennsylvania Legis an because that is what e., it the life sentence lature intended —i. intended underlying of the should survive vacation conviction. Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, in did not find such eminently good in there cause not tent the statute —and simple might to do so. A State’s interest in closure make it accept penalty willing imprisonment the default of life except is, when the conviction is affirmed the case unwilling end—but so issue, do when case anyway. must be retried And its interest conservation of might willing sentencing resources make it to leave the issue (and place) unresolved the default life sentence in where the resolving empaneling cost of it is the of a and, new repetition all guilt phase likelihood, a of much of the of the though eager first it is to attend to that unfinished trial — trial anyway. business if is to be a there new and new III When Bullington,Rumsey, A and Poland decided, were capital-sentencing proceedings just were to be understood sentencing proceedings. [a] that: Whatever “hallmarks of might they Bullington, borne, trial” have they respect differed from purposes trials crucial for They only the Double Clause: dealt with the sen- *9 imposed capital tence to be for the of “offence” murder. Thus, support Bullington in its search for a rationale to and tripped continually “progeny,” the the text of Court over Jeopardy the Double Clause. developments, part however,
Recent illuminated this have Apprendi jurisprudence. of our decision in v. New Jer- Our (2000), sey, 530 U. clarified what constitutes “ele- S. purposes ment” of an offense for Sixth of the Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee. simply, any Put if the existence of fact (other conviction) prior pun- than a the maximum increases may imposed ishment that be defendant, on a that fact—no element, matter how the State labels it—constitutes an and by jury beyond a Id., must be found reasonable doubt. at 482-484, 490. recognized import Apprendi
Just last Term we of capital-sentencing proceedings. Ring the context of v. (2002), aggravating Arizona, we that S. 584 held cir- eligible pen- cumstances that make a for the death alty “operate equivalent as ‘the functional of an element of a added). greater (emphasis Id., at 609 That is to offense.”’ say, purposes jury-trial guar- of the Amendment’s Sixth underlying antee, the of distinct, offense “murder” is a lesser plus of aggravating included offense “murder one more exposes circumstances”: Whereas the former a defendant to penalty imprisonment, a maximum life latter increases permissible Accordingly, maximum sentence to death. we held requires jury, that the Sixth Amendment not a judge, any find the aggravating existence circum- they stances, found, preponder- mere beyond ance of evidence, but a reasonable Id., doubt. at 608-609.
We principled can think no to distinguish, reason in this context, between what purposes constitutes an offense for jury-trial guarantee the Sixth Amendment’s and what consti- tutes an purposes “offence” for Fifth Amendment’s Monge Clause. Cf. California, (1998) (“The 721, 738 dissenting) J., fundamental (Scalia, distinction between facts that are elements of a criminal *10 go only only offense and facts that sentence” important “delimits the . boundaries of . . constitutional rights, by jury,” right like the Sixth Amendment to trial but “provides also for our foundation entire double jurisprudence”). post-f?my Jeop- In the world, the Double ardy apply capital-sentencing can, must, Clause to some proceedings consistent with the text of the Fifth Amend- jury unanimously ment. If a concludes that a State has proving failed to meet its burden of the existence of one or aggravating more double-jeopardy protec- circumstances, “acquittal” tions attach to that plus on the offense of “murder circumstance(s).” aggravating Rumsey Thus, was correct findings focus on whether factfinder had made that con- “acquittal” stituted an aggravating of the circumstances; but the reason that issue was capital- central is not that a sentencing proceeding “comparable to a trial,” (citing 438), Bullington, at 209 supra, at but rather that plus “murder aggravating one or more circumstances” is a separate offense simpliciter. from “murder”
B
purposes
For
of the Clause, then, “first-
degree murder”
Pennsylvania
under
law—the offense of
petitioner
which
during
guilt phase
convicted
of his
proceedings
properly understood to be a lesser included
—is
offense
“first-degree
plus
murder
aggravating circum-
stance(s).”
Ring, supra,
See
petitioner’s
Thus,
at 609.
if
sentencing
first
unanimously
had
concluded that Penn-
sylvania
prove any
failed to
aggravating circumstances, operate
conclusion
“acquittal”
would
as an
greater
of the
of-
fense—which
Pennsylvania
would bar
retrying peti-
from
(and
greater
tioner on that
offense
thus,
seeking
from
penalty)
death
Rumsey,
retrial.
supra,
Cf.
at 211.
But that is
happened.
not what
Petitioner was convicted
phase
of his first trial of the lesser offense of
first-degree
During
sentencing
murder.
phase,
life, and
reaching a
on death or
decision
without
deliberated
findings regarding aggravating or miti
making any
without
judge dismissed
gating
After 3½ hours the
circumstances.
hung
in accordance
as
entered a life sentence
explained,
supra,
109-110,
with
law. As
greater
jury “acquitted” petitioner
neither
nor
plus
“first-degree
aggravating circum
offense of
stance(s).”
murder
petitioner appealed
Thus, when
and succeeded
*11
invalidating his conviction of
there
offense,
the lesser
Pennsylvania’s
petitioner
double-jeopardy
retrying
no
bar to
greater
“jeopardy”
offense;
both the lesser and the
his
on
respect
with
Cf. Green v.
never terminated
to either.
(1957) (citing
States,
184, 189
United States
United
355 U. S.
(1896));
States,
Ball,
IV The in United dissent reads the Court’s decision States (1978), supporting proposition Scott, 437 U. S. 82 as the fully where, here, “case was tried and as a defendant’s judgment court, motion, on its own entered final life —a proceedings,” post, terminating trial at 126 sentence — J.), (opinion Clause bars the Double Ginsburg, reasoning. problems retrial. There with this are several say First, to it is an that “Scott . . did understatement . post, not home [petitioner’s],” in on a at 123. The case like upon jeop- statement relies—that double which the dissent ardy “may” judge pro- attach when the “trial terminates ceedings favorably on a related to to the defendant basis not guilt factual or at at least where innocence,” 437 guilty . . . had “had found either been at least having insisted issue on submitted added) trier (emphasis id., noth- fact,” —was first ing (“may”) more than at that. dictum, a tentative one It would be a thin to rest a on hitherto unknown reed which prohibition entirely constitutional rational course of the making hung jury’s provisionally failure to final, convict subject change if anyway. the case must be retried
Second, the dictum in Scott does not even embrace present petitioner case. upon here did not “insist” contrary merits determination, but to the asked that the hung. be recognizes, dismissed as As the dissent when the “move[d] announced that it petitioner was deadlocked, discharged’ ‘that the and that a life be en §9711(c)(1)(v).” [Pa. tered under Ann., Stat. 42,] Tit. Post, response “[t]he n. say 125, 5. It is no judge did not grant [the] motion,” but legal instead made a determination petitioner whether judgment sought. was entitled to the he Surely Ibid. double-jeopardy protections hinge cannot whether a trial court characterizes its action as self-initiated response or in supra, to motion. Scott, Cf. at 96. What ac tually happened in this case happened is the same as what (1) in Scott, where double-jeopardy protection: we denied entry defendant moved for of a in his favor on procedural (there, grounds delay in hung indictment; here, a (2) jury); (there, measured facts length *12 delay; verdict) jury’s here, the producing likelihood of the a against legal standard to determine whether such relief (3) appropriate; concluding and granted that it was, the relief.
Nor, in these prospect circumstances, does the of a second capital-sentencing proceeding implicate any “perils of against which the protect.” Clause seeks to Post, dissenting). at 124 (Ginsburg, J., The dissent stresses that a defendant in “subject such circumstances is to the ‘or- “ deal’ of a second full-blown life or trial,” death which ‘com- pels] [him] continuing anxiety to live in a state of and insecu- ” Ibid, rity.’ (quoting 187); supra, Green States, v. United at post, see also at But 127. as even the dissent admit, must post, at 125, we have found this not concern determinative of double in all circumstances. And it should not be hardly presents so specter here. This case of “an pursuing a defendant who relentlessly had all-powerful state guilty who at least insisted had either been found first trier of having submitted fact.” the issue which, see a State supra, we here for Scott, Instead, at 96. supra, perfectly reasons, at any number understandable pen- reasonably accept agreed to the default quite 110, has and alty imprisonment the conviction affirmed life when pursue except issue, an end—but to is, the case “ complete opportunity not-yet-vindicated in ‘one interest its ” who have violated laws’ where case to convict those post, anyway, (quoting Arizona at 124 must retried (1978)). Washington, 497, 509 434 U. S.
V double-jeopardy petitioner raises claim, his addition freestanding deprivation process in alleging claim due that, He violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. contends regardless imposition sentence of whether of the death Jeopardy Clause, it trial violated the Double second “liberty” unfairly deprived of his “life” interests him and resulting sentencing proceed- his life from first ing. argument in these terms: He frames constitutionally protected
“Pennsylvania life created liberty finality in the of the life interest jury. [deadlocked] statutorily as a result mandated of a right dead- when the court That vested found Subject- mandatory imposed a life sentence. locked right capital ing [petitioner resentencing to a once [P]rocess.” [D]ue Reply Brief for has vested violated Petitioner 18-19.
We think not. Fourteenth Amendment Section *13 deprive person any “[n]o . . . commands that State shall process . . liberty, . .” property, dm law without life, added.) any “lib- Nothing “life” or (Emphasis indicates that peti- Pennsylvania may given law erty” have interest imposed capital- after his first tioner in the life sentencing proceeding he was somehow immutable. And any by operation “deprived” only such was interest “process” underlying he invoked to first- invalidate degree murder on which it was conviction based. due-process petitioner’s nothing
At claim is more bottom, double-jeopardy clothing. than his claim in As we different have said: many Rights speaks explicit
“The Bill in as- terms procedure, pects expansion of criminal and the of those guarantees open-ended constitutional under the rubric of the Due Process invites undue Clause interference judgments legislative with both considered and the care- liberty ful balance that the strikes between Constitution California, Medina order.” U. S. petitioner’s We decline invitation to hold that the Due Proc- greater provides double-jeopardy protection ess than Clause Jeopardy does Clause.
[*] [*] [*] Pennsylvania Supreme correctly Court concluded that neither the Fifth Amendment’s Double nor Clause the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause barred seeking penalty peti- against from the death tioner on retrial. The is, of that court therefore,
Affirmed. Justice O’Connor, part concurring concurring the judgment. join
I
opinion
II,
Parts I,
IV, and V of
Court’s
this
join
case.
I do not
Part III, which would further extend the
Apprendi
(2000),
reach of
Jersey,
v. New
117 (2002) (O’Connor, J., 536 619-620 dis- Arizona, 584, U. v. S. any “Apprendi’s my that senting), that rule It view remains penalty must as maximum be treated that increases the fact by required Constitution, the is not an of the crime element by history, prior Id., at 619. by or our cases.” jeopardy petitioner’s on the would resolve double claim I Bullington Missouri, 430 ground v. 451 U. S. that under sole (1981), by imposed operation progeny a its life sentence sentencing jury capital fails to deadlocks and of law after “acquittal is not on the merits” verdict reach a unanimous sentencing proceed- barring penalty death retrial. Because v. trial, we held in Arizona ings of bear the hallmarks (1984), acquittal Rumsey, “an on the 211 that 203, 467 U. S. proceeding is final in the the sole decisionmaker merits “ac- charge.” A defendant is retrial the same and bars on jeopardy quitted” penalty purposes double the death prosecution “decide[s] has not that the when the sentencer penalty appropriate.” proved Po- case death its that the (1986) (emphasis Arizona, deleted v. 155 land omitted). quotation of a In the absence and internal marks recognized rule penalty “clean slate” acquittal, death the (1969), ap- 719-721 Pearce, Carolina U. S. North plies and no bar arises. double penalty jury deadlocks
When, case, as this prosecu phase capital it does “decide” trial, not penalty. prove its for the death tion has failed case all. Petitioner’s Rather, no decision at makes ha[d] prosecution proved “agre[e] not not did ... added). did Bullington, (emphasis It supra, at case.” aggravating any of the findings make about existence Rumsey, mitigating supra, circumstances. See (where findings denying exist the trial “entered aggravating statutory circum ence of each seven findings “judgment, suffi resulting stances,” the based sentence, legal to the life cient to establish entitlement any and, such, as acquittal to an on merits bars amounts appropriateness retrial penalty”). of the death “acquit” petitioner pen short, the did not of the death alty Bullington Rumsey. under
That law mandates a when a life sentence capital *15 jury sentencing not, deadlocks does reasons for the given by Court, ante, at 110,transform that life sentence penalty acquittal. petitioner into a death Because was nei- acquitted ther penalty nor convicted of the death in his first Jeopardy trial, by the Double Clause was not offended a re- appropriate pun- trial to determine whether death was the say ishment for his offenses. There is no need to more. Ginsburg, Justice with whom Justice Stevens, Breyer Justice Justice Souter, join, dissenting. “terminat[e] jeopardy” This case concerns the events that purposes Jeopardy of the Double Clause. Richardson v. specific States, 317, 325 United 468 U. S. contro versy entry judgment, before the Court involves final by jury ques as mandated state after a law, deadlock. The presented judgment quali tion is whether a final so entered jeopardy-terminating fies as a event. The Court concludes it does I it not. would hold that does. capital
When a deadlocks at the sen tencing stage proceeding, requires state law a the trial judgment imposing a a life court to enter sentence. Pa. See (Purdon 9711(e)(1)(v) 2002). § Supp. Ann., 42, Stat. Tit. Ordi narily, imposed government a is final. The thus may appeal retry sentencing nor neither the sentence question jury. 7; See Brief for before a second Petitioner sentencing question Arg. Tr. of can re Oral 26. The Jeopardy tried —if the Double retrial is not barred successfully appeals only if the the un Clause— again derlying on conviction and is convicted retrial.1 1 verdict, on agree When a criminal is unable in con typical trast, prosecutor declares mistrial and has the immediate g., e. Rich See, jury hung. which the the counts on right reprosecute
119 entry of a today holds that the state-mandated The Court against deadlock, measured life after of the life block retrial Clause, does not life because the sen question. The so rules death Court although law, id., 25-26, see is not under final state tence, ante, at acquittal merits,” 107- equivalent “an (1984)). Rumsey, 203, 211 (quoting 467 Arizona v. U. S. “attac[h] particu jeopardy indeed case law does Our double Scott, acquittal,” significance lar to an States United (1978); jurisprudence accords “absolute fi U. S. nality acquittal[,] no errone jury’s matter how to a verdict of States, decision,” v. United ous its (1978). Burks hung jury stresses, Satta And, as the Court “acqui[t]” “on sentencing proceeding did not him zahn’s omitted). (internal quotation marks Ante, at 107 merits.” inevitably disposi- points are not But these two undebatable recognize case, this for our decisions tive of *16 acquittal. an circumstances other than can terminate in (“[T]he Jeopardy Richardson, S., at 325 Double 468 U. Cf. only some applies if has been by its there Clause terms original acquittal, which terminates the as an event, such added.)). (Emphasis jeopardy.” jeopardy is ter- prior
In we decided whether have no case entry by sentence when the of a state-mandated minated the sentencing question. it, I see As on the has deadlocked argument question genuinely debatable, with tenable the is jeopardy Comprehending supporting our double each side. underlying purposes light of Double of the decisions in the Jeopardy does terminate in Clause, I conclude explained, as hold, herein circumstances. I would such judgment Satta- a final life for the trial court entered once Jeopardy Clause barred from zahn, the Double seeking penalty the a second time. death States, 317, United States (1984); v. v. United ardson Co., Supply Linen Martin U. S. way final judg for defendant to The standard a secure a gain acquittal.2 in her an This case ment favor is involves by atypical prevails in a situation which defendant final judgment acquittal. is, without the situation Unusual as jeopardy jurisprudence recognizes our double existence. “primary purpose” Scott, In the Court stated that the of the “protect integrity’’ Double Clause is to of final guilt or determinations innocence. 437 at 92. We acknowledged, developed however, has that “this Court also body guarding separate law but related interest of avoiding multiple prosecutions in defendant even where no guilt final determination innocence has been made.” “may “Such interests,” observed, Ibid. we involved judge two different first, situations: the which the trial mistrial; declares second, in which the trial ter proceedings favorably minates the to the defendant on a not related to basis factual or innocence.” Ibid. category although instructive, The first —mistrials—is deciding category. case at hand does not fit within that reprosecution permissible whether a mistrial, after “this right Court has balanced the valued of a to have completed by his trial particular tribunal summoned to against sit public insuring on him interest in 2The Court many has times said that Double Jeopardy Clause pro Bretz, See, tects the g., e. integrity “final judgments.”. Crist S.U. (1978) (“A 28, 33 primary purpose” by served Jeopardy Clause is “akin to that served judicata res doctrines of and collateral estop *17 pel preserve the finality of judgments.”); Scott, United States v. —to (1978) (“the 82, U. S. primary of the Double purpose Jeopardy Clause protect to of integrity a final In judgment”). declarations, such appears Court to have used “final judgment” interchangeably with Crist, “acquittal.” S., See 437 U. at 33 to the (referring English common- law rule “a defendant put has been in jeopardy only when there has been or a conviction Scott, trial”); an acquittal complete S., 437 U. —after at 92 the term (equating “final judgment” with a “final of determination innocence”). guilt or (internal quo Ibid. justice is meted out offenders.” omitted). Weighing inter these and citation tation marks motion that mistrials declared on the we have decided ests, by jeop sponte the court terminate prosecution sua or proceedings required by stopping the is “mani ardy unless g., necessity.” Id., 93-94; see, e. Downum v. United at fest (1963). hung jury, A 734, the Court States, 372 S. 737-738 necessity” recognized, meets the “manifest crite long has justifies trial of a mistrial e., i. it court’s declaration rion, subsequent reprosecution. the defendant’s Arizona per Washington, Retrial is also 434 U. successfully to avoid his where “a seeks missible prior by Scott, mistrial,” to its conclusion a motion for trial intentionally provoked is unless the motion “[s]uch by government’s Ordinarily, id., at 94. actions, a motion the defendant is deemed to be a deliberate elec forgo guilt part right his or tion on his his valued to have Id., innocence determined before the first trier of fact.” at 93. category
The second described in Scott—“termination of [a] [a defendant’s] any trial in favor before determination of distinguished innocence,” id., factual at 94—is from quality finality the first based on the order termination imports. mistrial, “When a trial court it all declares a but invariably contemplates permit- prosecutor will that the proceed notwithstanding plea ted to anew the defendant’s jeopardy.” double Id., at 92. When a motion to terminate granted, “obviously in contrast, the trial court contem- plates proceedings that the will terminate then and there favor of example, Id., the defendant.” Scott, 94. granted the trial court to dismiss defendant’s motion one prior jury, count of the indictment, submission to the ground preindictment delay. prosecution If the had proceedings wanted to “reinstate the in the face such a ruling,” simply it could have in- indictment; refiled *18 the decision
stead, it would have had to “seek reversal of appeal. pursuing Ibid.3 the trial court” category. within second Sattazahn’s case falls Scott’s stage, sentencing mis the no After the deadlocked at Pennsylvania provided that the trial law declared, for proceedings “then trial would terminate and there” Satta simply retry government could the zahn’s The not favor. hung jury sentencing case issue at will. Sattazahn’s “mak[e] completion” proceeding first “im did . . . the (1949); possible,” instead, Hunter, 684, Wade v. bring proceed required law to ing judgment imposing by entering to a conclusion a final a §9711(c)(1)(v)(Pur life sentence, Ann., 42, see Pa. Tit. Stat. 2002). Supp. don respect jeopardy law with to Scott’s second cate- relatively
gory undeveloped. outset, As observed at the supra, 119, see at we have before decided never whether jeopardy upon entry terminates of a state-mandated final to a favorable defendant deadlocks. after prior have, however, We addressed termination of a trial jury. to submission of the case was such a Scott case and, underscores, ante, as the Court that decision allowing protection. denied double second prosecution Scott, however, stressed that the Court ch[ose] “deliberately defendant to seek termination of the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual delay, prosecution’s preindictment innocence,” e., i. “successfully persuade undertook to 98-99: Scott guilt or trial court not submit the issue of innocence to Although empaneled try him,” id., at 99. . . . 3When this Court has considered dismissals of contem indictments that it has plate reprosecution appeal, of immediate without an possibility States, See Lee United analyzed them as mistrials. 432 U. S. (1977) (dismissal on insufficient indictment treated as mistrial based in double because Government could file new jeopardy purposes simply dismissal). dictment without appealing not relieve “does holding the Double Clause consequences voluntary choice,” of his from *19 underlying purpose of the ibid., the Court reiterated making at- “repeated prevent to the State from Clause: alleged offense, an individual for an tempts to convict expense or- subjecting embarrassment, and thereby him to continuing compelling of anxi- him to live in a state and deal States, (quoting at 95 v. United ety insecurity,” id., Green and (1957)). 355 U. S. ruling placing in that case out- in the defendant Scott jeopardy protection, sum, in was tied the zone of double
side completed episode to the a first trial to the absence of proceedings. trial to abort the initial choice defendant’s willing explained, quite to “[T]he Government,” we “was production ., .. but the defend- with evidence continue grounds the trial on un- termination of ant elected to seek guilt “This is to innocence.” at 96. related or 437 U. relentlessly pursu- scarcely picture all-powerful state a of an guilty ing either been found not or who a who had having guilt the issue of submitted at least had insisted Ibid. first fact.” to the trier of Scott, it a case like s. is not home in on Sattazahn true, did
II reasoning, nevertheless, lends credence to The Court’s prompted trial-terminating judgment life, that a for view by procedural part, legal defendant’s a a on the creates move by Jeopardy protected entitlement Clause. Rumsey, (judgment based S., on factual Cf. findings “legal establish entitlement” to a life to sufficient retrial). recognized that bars defendants Scott multiple prosecu- avoiding have double in interest tions even has been determination of when there no by implicated preverdict innocence, and this interest judgments terminating atS.,U. 92. The inter- trials. 437 following avoiding prosecution judg- in a final est a renewed surely engaged ment is had here. life sentence Sattazahn’s significantly greater finality preindict- than the dismissal for delay Scott, law, ment noted under as supra, government earlier, see could not have sought retry question sentencing through even appeal. analysis
Moreover—and discrete from Court’s against perils Scott—the which the Double Clause protect plainly implicated seeks are prospect of a capital sentencing proceeding. second A determination that position subject defendants in Sattazahn’s are to the “ordeal” “compelfs][them] second life or full-blown death trial continuing anxiety insecurity.” live state of Green, S.,U. at 187.4 *20 Despite generation anxiety insecurity, the attendant we hung jury have allowed retrial after mistrials in to order give complete the opportunity State “one to convict those who Washington, have violated its laws.” S., 434 U. at 509; (“a Wade, see 336 right S.,U. at 689 defendant’s valued to completed by particular have his trial tribunal must in some public’s instances be subordinated to the interest in fair designed just judgments”). trials to in end But here, already the opportunity: Commonwealth has had such The prosecution presented jury, its evidence to the and after the jury judgment deadlocked, final was entered at the direction legislature of the state itself. This was not an instance in quite which willing “the Government was to continue with production by of evidence,” but was thwarted defense- proffered Scott, motion. S., at 96.
4 The Court identifies policy reasons awhy legislature might prefer provide for the entry of a judgment that could be reopened should the ante, defendant mount a 110, 115. appeal. successful See It does not follow, automatically however, provisional that such a would compatible with the Double infra, Cf. Clause. at 127 (urging that the prospect of a second death penalty proceeding heightens double concerns). Scott, that case retrial even We also sanctioned though there, But vol- the defendant a final involved adjudication. to a himself determination avoided subjecting untarily first so suc- in the he did or innocence proceeding; guilt to the submission of case jury, prior cessfully moving, of the eount because for dismissal question preindict- Ibid.; Green, S.,U. see (suggesting ment delay. if defendant does not that double jeopardy protection apply his not first That was to dismissal jury). consents Scott, did Sattazahn situation here: Unlike successfully of his submitted innocence question avoid having “issue of in his case indeed was to the first The jury. guilt” Scott, S., at 96. first trier of fact.” 437 U. to the “submitted thus once” death. “forced run Sattazahn gantlet Green, Nor did himself at 190. Sattazahn bring dead- about termination of his first trial.5 Once jury trial end. In mandated locked, state law directly discretion, court in its may, that “the provides statute governing further deliberation will not if discharge jury opinion it is of the sentence, in which case the as to the result agreement a unanimous Aim., Pa. Stat. imprisonment.” to life court shall the defendant (Purdon 2002). case, §9711(e)(1)(v) after Sattazahn’s Supp. Tit. hours, announced that he had about 3Vfc deliberated for this foreperson indicating from the had “received a communication “I bring stated: will 22. He then hopelessly App. deadlocked.” *21 any whether or not fur of and the foreperson down and the inquire point at that did Only Ibid. ther would be productive.” deliberations life be and that a sentence discharged” Sattazahn “that move the 9711(e)(1)(v). did grant § not Sattazahn’s The entered Ibid. under the jury determine whether Instead, inquiry an to motion. he conducted was, discharged that it deadlocked”; he then found “hopelessly was a life law” he would enter and virtue of the “by announced jury, Id., never back to stage, referred at that judge, sentence. 23-24. record, to conduct judge’s this decision motion. I read Sattazahn’s As prompted was not life sentence a discharge and enter inquiry, jury, an motion, announcement that it was jury’s by the simply a defensive but deadlocked, as the instructs. just statute
126 jeopardy protection did thought short, the reasons we double absent not attach in are here.6 Scott recognize question: I that this is a Satta- novel close “acquitted” penalty, his case zahn was not of the death but fully a court, tried and the on own entered motion, judgment terminating pro- final the trial life—a sentence— ceedings. I decide the double would issue Satta- weight giving favor, stated, zahn’s for the reasons herein holding First, to two ultimate considerations. the Court’s perilous choice, confronts with have defendants a one we previously impose declined to in other circumstances. See Green, decision, at 193-194. if Under Court’s a to a deadlock chooses defendant sentenced life after appeal underlying possibility conviction, to her she faces the appeal death of if on but convicted on re- she successful appeal, If, trial. hand, on other the defendant loses her forgo to appeal, or chooses life final words, stands. In other position defendant Sattazahn’s relinquish right potentially must either her file a to meritori- appeal, state-granted ous her entitlement avoid penalty. death
6We have
held that
Jeopardy
impo
also
the Double
does not bar
Clause
sition
greater
retrial
if
appeals
defendant successfully
g.,
Pearce,
e. North
See,
(1969);
a conviction.
Carolina
v.
U. S.
DiFrancesco,
United
(1980).
States
v.
design
“[T]he
449 U. S.
basic
double jeopardy
a bar
provision
against repeated
...
as
attempts
convict,
consequent
embarrassment,
with
subjection of
expense, anxiety, and
“no
insecurity,”
significant
has
application to the
Id.,
prosecution’s
. . . right
to review a sentence.”
at 136. This Court
determined,
has
however,
for purposes of the
Clause, capital
sentencing proceedings involving proof
one or more ag
gravating factors are to be treated as
offenses,
trials
separate
not mere
ante,
ante,
106-109;
sentencing
proceedings.
See
at 110-112 (opinion
Scalia,
Arizona,
J.);
Ring
(2002);
Bullington
v. Mis
souri,
127 Jeop- interpret the previously declined haveWe in this bind. puts defendants ardy in a manner that Clause appealing a argument rejected the Green, we jeopardy on a re- prolonged second-degree murder conviction ruling that a charge. We noted first-degree murder lated require de- prosecutor would question in favor of this against protection [their] a constitutional “barter fendants to punishable death as offense prosecution for an second conviction appeal from an erroneous price of a successful concluded, we law,” “The Id., at 193. offense.” another [defendants] incredible di- place in such . . not . “should required to barter Although was Sattazahn Ibid. lemma.” appeal, right to against his to life entitlement a state-law be- protection, I nevertheless a constitutional rather than our inform in should advanced Green lieve the considerations here. decision on retrial punishment again faced
Second, the Sattazahn severity fi- and its “unique penalty in both death, a (in- (1998) Monge nality.” 721, 524 U. v. California, omitted). heighten qualities quotation marks These ternal avoiding second interest double Sattazahn’s possible [a second] and prosecution. trial The “hazards “continuing state S., U. conviction,” Green, insecurity” subjects defendant, anxiety which retrial burden” as well as the ibid., and the “financial” “emotional Washington, are all S., 503-504, trial, second may subsequent proceeding terminate exacerbated when the a defend- Death, moreover, death. makes the “dilemma” appeal all more ant faces when she decides whether Green, at 193. As our elaboration “incredible.” (1976) (joint opinion Gregg Georgia, 428 U. S. JJ.), cases dem- Stewart, and later Powell, Stevens, penalty from “different” all onstrates, death indeed a others.
For stated, the reasons I would hold termi- nated as to Sattazahn’s sentence after entered a final judg- for life. I would therefore reverse the Supreme Pennsylvania. ment of the Court of