People v. Willis
2013 IL App (1st) 110233
Ill. App. Ct.2013Background
- Willis and Hill, both 16, were charged in Cook County with multiple counts of first degree murder and related offenses; Willis was tried as an adult under 705 ILCS 405/5-130, the automatic transfer provision for 15- and 16-year-olds charged with certain Class X felonies.
- Willis was convicted of first degree murder with a firearm and aggravated battery with a firearm (accountability) by a jury; he received consecutive 33-year murder plus 15-year firearm enhancement and 15-year aggravated battery terms (total 63 years).
- Eyewitnesses identified Willis and Hill as the shooters; multiple witnesses testified that both arrived with guns and that Willis and Hill fired during the back-yard shooting.
- Posttrial, Willis challenged the automatic transfer statute as unconstitutional in light of modern adolescent development cases; he also challenged trial counsel’s effectiveness and raised sufficiency, closing-argument, and proportionality issues.
- The appellate court upheld the constitutionality of the automatic transfer provision, affirmed the convictions and sentences, and remanded for a Krankel hearing to address Willis’s posttrial ineffective-assistance claims, noting the trial court failed to conduct an adequate Krankel inquiry.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality of automatic transfer provision | Willis argues 5-130 violates due process and Eighth/Illinois provisions given Roper/Graham/Miller. | Willis asserts youth requires individualized consideration before transfer. | Facially constitutional; follows J.S. and Salas; remand not required for facial challenge. |
| Sufficiency of evidence on accountability | Evidence insufficient to prove Willis fired or shared a common design. | Eyewitnesses show Willis participated and shared common design with Hill. | Sufficient evidence supports accountability for murder and aggravated battery. |
| Propriety of closing arguments | Prosecutor prejudicially misstated proof level and disparaged defense. | Arguments were grounded in evidence and responded to defense strategy. | No reversible error; arguments within bounds of discretion. |
| Sentencing disparity with codefendant | 63-year sentence disproportionate to Hill’s 53-year sentence. | Court considered differing histories and participation; disparity justified. | Disparity affirmed; sentences within statutory ranges and individualized analysis supported. |
| Krankel inequiry adequacy | Trial court failed to conduct Krankel inquiry after withdrawal of claim. | Pecoraro restricts Krankel when counsel is privately retained; issue not properly raised. | Remand for limited Krankel inquiry to address posttrial ineffective-assistance claims. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. J.S., 103 Ill.2d 395 (Ill. 1984) (due process in juvenile transfer analyzed under prior standards; precedential for facial validity)
- People v. Salas, 2011 IL App (1st) 091880 (Ill. App. (1st) 2011) (upheld automatic transfer against due process challenge (cited by court))
- People v. Jackson, 2012 IL App (1st) 100398 (Ill. App. (1st) 2012) (reiterated continued validity of J.S. and due process approach to transfer)
- Batchelor v. Williams, 171 Ill. 2d 367 (Ill. 1996) (common design and accountability principles apply to accomplice liability)
- People v. Williams, 193 Ill.2d 306 (Ill. 2000) (standard for accountability sufficiency and common design analysis)
- Cooks v. People, 253 Ill. App. 3d 184 (Ill. App. 1993) (accountability sufficiency where shooter identity may be unknown)
- Moore v. People, 207 Ill. 2d 68 (Ill. 2003) (Krankel procedure—initial inquiry required for pro se ineffective-assistance claims)
- Pecoraro, 144 Ill.2d 1 (Ill. 1991) (private-counsel representation affects Krankel applicability)
- People v. Lawton, 212 Ill. 2d 285 (Ill. 2004) (recognition of inherent conflict when counsel may not argue own ineffectiveness)