People v. Pecoraro

(No. 67289. ILLINOIS, Appel- THE STATE OF

THE PEOPLE OF PECORARO, lee, v. Appellant. JOHN Rehearing Opinion June 1991. filed 30, 1991. September denied CALVO,J., part. took no

CLARK, J., dissenting. Schiedel, Defender, of Springfield, M. Deputy Charles Clark, Defender, Chicago, Assistant both and Steven Defender, for appel- of the State Appellate of the Office lant. se. Menard, Pecoraro,

John General, of Hartigan, Springfield, Neil F. Attorney Partee, of Chicago and Cecil A. State’s Attorney, General, of Chi- Madsen, M. Assistant (Terence Attorney Goldfarb, Renee Assistant State’s cago, Attorney, and Sublett, Assistant Attorney, and Jeanette State’s Special for the counsel), People. HEIPLE delivered the opinion JUSTICE court: in the circuit court of Cook

Following a trial jury defendant, Pecoraro, John was found County, guilty murder. He to death. Defendant’s execu was sentenced tion this court (Ill. direct review stayed pending VI, Const. art. 134 Ill. 2d Rules §4(b); 609(a)). We affirm.

FACTS The State evidence. On Au- presented following 6, 1986, a.m., Police Of- gust Chicago approximately ficer in marked Jeffrey driving police Becker was a Pecoraro, defendant, car when John down squad flagged Officer Becker’s car. Officer Becker vehicle stopped requested and defendant the car. Defendant approached Station, as he in- directions to the 14th District Police that he had killed someone formed Officer Becker to Officer According wanted to make a confession. Becker, appear defendant had but did drinking been defendant of intoxicated. Officer Becker advised be his Miranda him to the station. police and drove rights

En route to the station, police Officer Becker asked defendant if he was willing to answer questions defendant to do agreed so. Officer Becker learned whom defendant killed and when the incident occurred. They station, arrived at the whereupon Officer Becker read defendant his rights again and asked information specific about the incident. He then contacted the appropriate unit. follow-up

At 11 a.m. that approximately two morning, detec tives, Detective Peter Araipa Detective William Kaupert, arrived at the station and with the police spoke defendant. Defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights and answered voluntarily questions regarding murder. defendant Although informed the detectives that he had not for two that slept nights and he had l3k taken approximately grams of cocaine that same it morning, appeared both detectives defendant was not trader the influence of alcohol or any drugs. to their

Subsequent defendant, conversation with office, detectives notified the State’s where- Attorney’s upon Assistant State’s Attorney Joseph Barbaro came to station police and interviewed defendant. Mr. Bar- baro asked if he would give court-reported statement and defendant to do so. initially agreed How- ever, defendant his Mr. changed mind and Barbaro re- duced defendant’s statement into a handwrit- five-page ten statement. statement, Upon completion Mr. Barbaro read the statement with defendant through asked him to refused, it. Defendant sign that he claiming chest, to off simply get this matter his he did not wanted it, want to to a go jail as result of and he did not want to time in spend anymore Defendant wanted to see jail. and, his children and girlfriend, again therefore, father would sign not the statement.

In the handwritten statement Mr. Bar- prepared by in baro and his conversations with the officer and detec- Chris- Jimmy Ray confessed to tives, killing defendant on 1982. Apparently, tian December (Jimmy) close with Nadine Christian very defendant had become in a wife, and were involved they the victim’s (Nadine), wit- to State’s According testimony by relationship. kill Jimmy, stated that he was nesses, going defendant he treated Nadine and they as he did not like the way then their relationship openly. could enjoy went 6, 1982, defendant morning On the December for him to come out- to the home of and waited Jimmy home, a side. As was defendant Jimmy leaving pulled victim and instructed him to into Jim- gun get on the an car. Defendant drove the victim to area near my’s California and Addison Streets and shot once Jimmy trial, he not the chest. at did According testimony shoot the victim in the head for fear that passersby After he shot would notice blood on window. left the Jimmy, defendant boarded bus and vicinity. evening, Chicago Later that defendant went to the River and Ashland Streets and threw the bridge Webster gun into the river.

At trial, Jackson, Martha a friend of Nadine Chris- tian, con- testified Nadine and defendant spent occasion, time Mrs. Jackson together. siderable On one noticed a .45- carrying appeared defendant what be On or Mrs. Jack- gun. caliber about September son at a with and Nadine where lounge if defendant made comments to the effect that he could not then would. nobody have Nadine witnesses, to State’s defendant had

According husband, he her he had although seen Nadine since killed $120,000 through heard that she received approximately her husband’s life insurance policy. confession, defendant was arrested to his

Subsequent counts of murder and one count of with two charged trial, the court denied defend- armed violence. Prior ant’s motion to suppress statements made in his confes- sion, in in granted and and denied defendant’s part part motion in limine regarding the use defendant’s prior convictions at trial.

The defendant raised numerous issues- on appeal, none of which have merit.

DEFENDANT’S CONFESSION Defendant argues through both his attorney se brief that confes unsigned, handwritten sion failed to murder a prove guilty beyond reasonable and denied him a fair trial. A doubt convic tion founded a confession must be “corroborated upon evidence, confession, some of the exclusive tending show that a crime did occur and that the defendant com v. Neal (People mitted it.” 111 Ill. 2d (1985), 194.) delicti, In Illinois, corpus which of the fact consists of death and the fact that death was caused the crim inal of some is person, corroboration agency adequate (People v. Holmes sustain a conviction. 67 Ill. 2d 239.) that a confession Additionally, requirement corpus be is satisfied by proof corroborated delicti. (People Willingham 89 Ill. 2d 358- murdered, 59.) Christian was Jimmy undisputedly the incident was committed the criminal act of some delicti. Further corpus person, thereby establishing more, defendant’s detailed confession was sufficiently corroborated both evidence and by physical testimony trial to conviction on his con defendant’s based uphold fession. Becker,

The of Officer Detectives testimony Araipa the circum- regarding and Mr. Barbaro Kaupert, stances of defendant’s confession and the murder was motion and at identical, at the basically suppress both further trial. Martha Jackson corroborated Testimony by confession, defendant’s as did Elizabeth testimony by Lester, sister-in-law, Konacki, and Dr. the medi- Jimmy’s examiner conducted the on the victim. autopsy cal who Also, the statement’s is further evidenced reliability by the fact that details in the confession could not have confession known the to defendant’s police prior been such defendant’s reason for (1) shooting as: Jimmy head; the chest as to the the fact that opposed (2) Jimmy son; her (3) abused both Nadine and defend- physically murder; ant’s route and mode of after the transportation and the of the the inci- (4) place gun of after disposal dent.

In on defendant’s hearing testimony pretrial motion confession, the the trial found defend suppress judge ant’s testimony “exaggerated” be “untruthful.” The trial court into properly admitted evidence defend confession, ant’s written which was found to have been made voluntarily review, On we will not knowingly. such question "a determination unless the court has com mitted an of abuse discretion or the decision is mani People v. Di the festly against weight evidence. Gerlando 30 (1964), Ill. 2d 550. the heard

Additionally, jury testimony regarding confession, defendant’s as well as the de testimony by fense regarding alleged inaccuracies in defendant’s con fession. The of credibility defendant’s confession was to be the weighed by jury as the trier of fact and the jury all, could accepted have or none of the confession. part (DiGerlando, 30 Ill. 2d at The 551.) all the jury weighed evidence and found of murder. defendant guilty

It is not this court’s function in evidence to reviewing the it case nor is it to determine whether believes retry that the at guilt evidence trial established a rea beyond (People v. Collins Ill. 2d sonable doubt. 106 the 261.) court, As we accord due consider reviewing ation to the in this case the trier of fact to as assess jury witnesses, evidence, the credibility weigh from

draw reasonable inferences the evidence. Young Ill. 2d 51. record,

From our review of the defendant’s confes- sion was allowed at trial and properly adequately corrob- orated evidence and for the physical testimony jury find murder a sufficiently guilty beyond Furthermore, reasonable doubt. motions ad- issue, this dressing the court found that the evidence did Thus, guilt establish reasonable doubt. we find beyond of the trial court holding contrary evidence, the manifest weight of and we will not set aside determination made the fact finder.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL Defendant that he received ineffective as- complains from, sistance of resulting among counsel other claims: (1) failure to make trial counsel’s various objections, review; to the record for thereby failing preserve (2) witnesses; counsel’s failure to the State’s and impeach counsel’s failure to call various witnesses on (3) testify defendant’s behalf. Defendant filed motions for new trial se and in his alleging through attorney both own motions that defendant denied effective assistance was of counsel. Defendant further that because the alleges trial failed other counsel judge appoint represent at the the motions with hearings claims, to the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel respect this case should be remanded for a to determine hearing whether defendant received effective of coun- assistance sel. that his coun- allegations

With to defendant’s respect sel did not make the trial call appropriate objections, more witnesses various State wit- testify, impeach on nesses, and other claims which were not preserved of Strickland v. record, an begin analysis the we with Washington 674, 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 104 466 U.S.

13 v. Albanese Ill. 2d (See 104 S. Ct. 2052. Strickland Strickland 504, standard).) 526-27 (adopting that “counsel’s (1) per that defendant requires prove it was deficient” in that “fell below an objec formance (2) tive standard of “defi reasonableness” cient such that the defense” performance prejudiced trial result defendant was of a fair whose deprived (Strickland, 687, at Ed. 2d at reliable. 466 U.S. 80 L. at However, 104 S. Ct. this two- 2064.) analyzing Strickland test, court stated that a part specifically court need not “determine counsel’s whether perform ance was deficient examining before suf prejudice defendant, fered” but of an ineffective may dispose ness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice (Strickland, before reaching deficiency analysis. Al 2069; U.S. at 80 L. Ed. 2d at 104 S. Ct. at banese, 527.) Thus, Ill. we believe that defend ant must establish both that his attorney’s representa tion was deficient that he suffered substantial as a prejudice result of these deficiencies. find that We defendant did not either establish requirement.

The trial heard both defense counsel’s judge defendant’s motions for new trial on in based claims of effective assistance of counsel. The trial denied the judge motions. The judge determined that several issues raised defendant, such as trial making objections and calling witnesses, more dealt with matters of defense strategy. As rule, trial decisions general strategy encompasses such as what matters to to and when to object object. v. (People Grant Further (1976), 70.) 38 Ill. 3d App. more, motion, counsel’s failure to a to to bring object or to to testimony, object portions closing arguments Grant, does not 38 representation. establish incompetent v. People Stewart 70; Ill. 3d at see also App.

Ill. 612. App. sum, In the court that found defendant was “de- fended and a and excellently” given “vigorous intelligent defense” counsel at trial. The trial judge considered all in arguments accordance with the posed by Strickland standards. He concluded that the evidence did, fact, in show guilt beyond reasonable doubt that defendant received From competent representation. record, our agree review we with trial court. Defendant has not either in established ac- requirement cordance with Strickland. Defendant has neither shown that his was deficient nor that attorney’s performance he suffered as a result of counsel’s de- prejudice alleged ficiencies.

In further of our nowhere in the support position, record does it reflect that defendant other requested counsel to him. Defendant did after represent request the trial and as co-coun- prior sentencing proceed sel, which the trial informed defendant upon judge he either had a right be himself or represented an but he could not take a in the mid- attorney, position dle The trial then allowed defendant ground. judge to write motions which his counsel could opportunity then Defendant this present. chose did option, elect to himself or retain other counsel. represent

Defendant claims that in accordance with Krankel 102 Ill. 2d this matter should be re ef manded to determine whether defendant was denied counsel, fective assistance as defendant should have mo had other counsel his appointed argue post-trial ineffective assistance of coun tions regarding alleged find Krankel to be sel. from factually distinguishable We thus, and, the instant case inapplicable. argu- Krankel to make his own requested

Defendant se motion, did so after ment on his re- trial denied defendant’s counsel’s judge appointed to allow other appointed for a continuance order quest

15 counsel to aid The defendant. court remanded the case for a hearing with counsel to assert newly appointed defendant’s post-trial ineffective-assistance-of-counsel Krankel, claim. Unlike where defendant was represented an by appointed public defender at both trial post- motions, trial defendant Pecoraro retained private coun sel to him represent at trial and in post-trial motions. It was not the within trial court’s rubric of to ad authority vise or exercise influence or any control over the selec tion of counsel defendant, who by to, did, was able choose counsel on his own accord. v. Walsh (People 28 Ill. 2d 409.) Moreover, the trial judge could not force defendant to retain counsel other than that chosen defendant. (People Johnson Ill. 2d 185.) Defendant and his counsel were the only parties who could have their altered attorney-client relationship. Defendant could have retained other coun sel to represent him prior the of his hearing post-trial motions.

Further differences should be noted between Krankel and the instant case. Defense counsel a contin- requested uance to obtain new counsel for defendant prior hear- ing motion and the request denied. such No re- quest was made in the present Also, action. prosecution and defense in Krankel agreed that defend- ant should have had other counsel argue motion. No agreement of this type existed in the present litigation. Finally, Krankel is a fairly fact-specific case, and the circumstances hand, the case at where defendant retained his own counsel private and did not request that he be represented counsel, other do not warrant find application of Krankel. Therefore, we this argument meritless.

THE PROSECUTION’S CLOSING ARGUMENT Defendant contends that statements presented misstated the arguments during closing State to the jury The to the defense. shifted the burden proof law and stated: prosecution come with you say you back you go back “[I]f — say- finding you’re what something guilty, other than a *** Officer is, Barbaro, you. we didn’t

ing Mr. believe Becker, either.” you we don’t believe statements no to these objections Defendant made his motions. them in trial nor did he address from the remarks arising error As a consequence, any v. Enoch People Ill. 185- 122 2d (1988), was waived. 87. consideration, for this issue been preserved

Even had the to those presented similar closing arguments not where prejudicial allowed and found State have been the incident varies substan version of the prosecution’s v. People the defense. given by from the version tially Smith Ill. 3d 600. 158 (1987), App. Smith, of the to objected portions

In counsel defense counsel stated where arguments closing prosecution’s defendant, would the jury to the that order believe The court found else lying. to was everyone have believe true, as the versions was basically that such a statement the prosecu between substantially varied of the incident Thus, appropriately the trial court defense. tion and the implying the prosecution statements allowed the other. one over the side have believe the would jury v. Alexander 3d People 127 Ill. App. See also re statement closing to hold 1007, 1015 declined (court nec it would be it stated that error where was versible in order the State witnesses each of disbelieve essary con testimony defendant’s where believe and the was jury the State’s witnesses tradicted that of comments). not misled such oc- case, version the defendant’s In the instant wit- that given by from considerably currence differed Therefore, the of prosecution. regardless nesses for waiver, comments not and not re- prejudicial such were versible error. further that such statements consti urges

Defendant tuted error and that failure to plain preserve counsel’s the of record denied him effective assistance counsel. The closing State’s of here would arguments complained doctrine, not error as justify implication plain is evidence balanced nor is the alleged closely statement of such magnitude have ac deprived cused fair trial. v. Mack impartial (People 125; Ill. 2d 122 Ill. Smalley (1984), App. 70, 76-77.) have disposed We previously defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

TESTIMONY AND ARGUMENT REGARDING

DEFENDANT’S PRIOR CONVICTIONS Defendant on own argues his behalf his through se brief and through that the attorney jury erro allowed to neously consider defendant’s prior criminal history through Detective testimony given by Kaupert through State’s closing argument. Defendant ob jects to testimony that not sign he would his confession prepared Mr. by Barbaro he did want to because not “go However, back to prison.” we find defendant that waived this issue for review to to by failing these object statements at trial. defendant a Although post-trial filed motion new issue, for trial this trial raising both a objec tion and motion a written are to post-trial required pre (Enoch, serve an for this issue review court. 122 Ill. 2d at 185-87.) to to Defendant’s failure this issue object at trial waived his to effectively right review this court.

In to defendant’s that response suggestion even though his counsel to object failed such testimony, trial should judge have entered instruction cautionary references, to strike

or moved on its own motion such it have for the trial found would been judge improper so, the court to have done as it did want to interfere of the case. We find theory with defendant’s and defense the lower did not its discretion denying court abuse defendant’s for new trial this issue. regarding motion that to the defendant’s he allegations

With respect denied to his was effective assistance counsel due statements, we find object counsel’s failure to these it merit has no as discussed previously. FAMILY

TESTIMONY REGARDING THE VICTIM’S Defendant contends that victim’s testimony by brother the victim’s denied defendant a regarding family issue for fair trial. We find that defendant waived this trial object to such by failing testimony review this in his written failing include issue Furthermore, (Enoch, 185-87.) motion. 122 Ill. 2d at to pre defendant that defense counsel’s failure claims as this ineffective serve issue on record constituted claim, su sistance of addressed this counsel. We already pra, it no found had merit. for determining plain the criterion whether

Finally, with to this or testimony error has occurred respect to it not apply counsel’s failure to does alleged object nor in this is not balanced since the evidence case closely is the error of such that magnitude contended Mack, trial. 105 Ill. 2d at impartial was denied a fair and Smalley, 125; Ill. at 76-77. App. THE REGARDING VICTIM’S

TESTIMONY LIFE INSURANCE the vic- regarding testimony Defendant claims evi- into life admitted erroneously tim’s insurance motive the murder. a financial for dence establish fail- for review by this issue Defendant failed preserve of Mr. Barbare and fail ing to the object testimony issue, to raise entire those of ing including portions this trial, the he to at in his mo objected testimony Therefore, for tions. defendant waived this issue review. (Enoch, 122 at 185-87.) again Ill. 2d We decline to con of sider defendant’s claim ineffective assistance of coun

sel based on our discussion. previous TESTIMONY,

FALSE DEFICIENT EVIDENCE AND

DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS Defendant further in his se brief that complains the an the (1) State indictment for incorrect sought day murder; of the (2) victim’s said indictment form was trial; withheld from the until (3) defense after the State introduced false at trial testimony evidence and al lowed such evidence be considered the jury; (4) the State violated rules of These issues were discovery. not preserved for review. are they waived. Accordingly, (Enoch, 122 Ill. 185-87.) 2d at Even if defendant had not review, waived these for issues we find that error any the date of murder regarding was harmless and all other claims meritless.

The indictment grand jury listed incorrectly Decem 8, 1982, ber as the date on which defendant committed the murder of Jimmy Christian. Evidence established at trial that the actual date was murder December 1982, and the date the victim’s was discovered body December Defendant 1982. was sufficiently apprised in precise charged offense the indictment and has not shown to in the prejudiced have been preparation in defense the error the date of murder on in Moreover, dictment. any inconsistency regarding date of murder error, was harmless as time precise of the murder an was not essential element of the crime. See v. Alexander 93 Ill. 77-78 (date alleged instrument need charging be ordinarily 20 the indict- between any irregularity

proved precisely offense was committed proof establishing ment and is not a fatal alleged other than that precisely on a date variance). that allegations no basis for

Defendant provides from the defense or form withheld said indictment was alleged withholding preju- that such any evidence any such error his defense. preparing Any diced defendant error plain and would not invoke would be harmless testimony by false argument regarding rule. Defendant’s the date of the murder is Kaupert concerning Detective in Detective error alleged meritless as well. Any of the date murder regarding testimony Kaupert’s harmless. clearly that defendant notwithstanding

Finally, to comply the State’s failure the issue regarding waived void rules, argument totally find this with we discovery to do so. the State failed or that proof evidence any violated, or not which rules were specify Defendant does defense counsel was requested by that such evidence v. Illi Moore (See the State. subsequently suppressed 706, 713, nois 794-95, 33 L. Ed. 2d (1972), 408 U.S. did not Furthermore, 2562, 2568.) 92 S. Ct. -withheld material discovery purportedly show that to defend have been favorable from the defense would (Moore, 408 guilt punishment. to his or ant or material 2568.) 92 S. Ct. at 794-95, L. Ed. at 33 U.S. 2d and, re have waived claims to been We find defendant’s waiver, unfounded. gardless OF1LLINOIS CONSTITUTIONALITY ACT DEATH PENALTY is statute the death penalty Defendant asserts of per- the burden (1) places in that it: unconstitutional should not be that death to prove suasion on defendant allows (2) prosecutors he is found eligible; after imposed

21 unguided discretion to select candidates for the death does penalty; (3) minimize the risk of sufficiently arbitrary and capricious sentences. Defendant’s argu ments have been considered previously and rejected by court, this and we continue to adhere to those stated po sitions on these issues. See v. Kubat (1983), 437, 503-04; Ill. 2d People v. Jones 123 Ill. 387, 426-27; People Whitehead Ill. 2d 462-65; People v. Albanese (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 54.

CONCLUSION For the reasons above, set forth we affirm defend- ant’s conviction and sentence of death. We hereby direct the clerk of this court to an order enter setting Tuesday, November 1991, as the date on which the sentence of death entered circuit court of Cook County shall be carried out. The defendant shall be executed in the manner provided by section 119—5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (111.Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. par. 5). The clerk of this court shall send a copy 119— the mandate to the Director of Corrections, the warden of Stateville Correctional Center, and the warden of the institution where the defendant is confined.

Affirmed. JUSTICE CALVO took no in part the consideration or decision of this case. CLARK,

JUSTICE dissenting: I Because believe the majority opinion an- incorrectly alyzed whether the trial court should have appointed new counsel to se, argue pro defendant’s post-trial mo- tion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, I respect- dissent. fully

The opinion, in majority concluding that new counsel should not have been appointed argue defendant’s pro

se, motion this court’s decision distinguished post-trial v. Krankel People 102 Ill. 2d 181. (1984), Specifically, on the of counsel defend type focused majority opinion and whether de ant trial (a private attorney), had defend argue that new counsel requested fense counsel se, pro ant’s trial motion. post Krankel, the failure to ap- In this court found that se, pro post- new counsel defendant’s point argue ineffective assistance of counsel alleging trial motion on the hearing error and the cause for a new remanded The defendant’s assistance of counsel issue. ineffective defense, an alibi or trial counsel had failed to present the defendant. contact an alibi witness suggested that new counsel agreed Both the State and the defendant’s argue appointed should have been counsel. claim of ineffective assistance of court, in interpreting our Subsequently, appellate se rule Krankel, per mandating no held that there is a defendant counsel should be whenever appointed new se, a new trial alleg motion presents for v. Bell People (See counsel. ineffective assistance ing v. People Washington 613; 197 Ill. 3d (1990), App. 703; People Generally (1988), 184 Ill. 3d App. v. Jackson 131 Ill. 668; 170 Ill. App. Rather, to whether new counsel 3d determine 128.) App. the court should examine “the trial appointed, should be *** defendant’s the underlying factual matters claim[.] of trial merit or to matters pertains the claim lacks [I]f if need be appointed[, then no new counsel strategy, but] *** new of the case neglect show allegations possible the Washington, 184 Ill. counsel be appointed.” [should] 3d at 711. App. v. Nitz 2d this 143 Ill.

Recently, of interpretation our court’s court adopted appellate Krankel, for new the when and set forth parameters pro to a defendant’s argue should be appointed counsel se, a motion for new trial ineffective post-trial alleging Nitz, In assistance of counsel. this court stated: “If the trial court preliminary investigation conducts a allegations the defendant’s them and determines to be tactics, spurious pertaining only or to trial no new coun If, sel should be appointed represent to the defendant. however, allegations defendant’s incompetence indicate that neglected case, trial counsel the defendant’s court appoint argue should new counsel defendant’s Nitz, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” 143 Ill. 2d at 134-35. majority distinguished Krankel

Presently, stat defendant in Krankel was represented that the ing an appointed defender Ill. at public (144 15), whereas the defendant in this case was represented private a at Thus, torney. to the according majority opinion, trial court did not have the or authority “advise exercise influence or any control over the selection of counsel by defendant, to, who was able did, choose counsel on his own accord.” 144 Ill. 2d 15. Nitz,

This is irrelevant. As noted in if the defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel show possible neglect case, then new counsel should be ap- pointed to argue Otherwise, defendant’s allegations. there would abe conflict of interest to have defense counsel his argue own at the It incompetence hearing. is as equally inappropriate private counsel for argue incompetence at as it post-trial hearing is for an ap- pointed public defender.

Further, the majority states that defendant’s trial counsel never that new counsel be requested appointed se motion argue defendant’s ineffective alleging Krankel. counsel, assistance of as counsel did in defense However, the that majority acknowledges defendant did to be co-counsel with to his request respect mo- tion, but the trial court told he could ei- it is attorney. Again, se or pro through

ther proceed counsel failed to request that defendant’s trial irrelevant the trial coun- argue counsel be appointed new incompetence. sel’s own incorrectly distinguished opinion the majority

Because whether new counsel incorrectly analyzed Krankel and se, post- defendant’s argue should appointed be counsel, I ineffective assistance trial motion alleging dissent. respectfully

(No. 70587. PUBLISHERS, Appellant, CHICAGO ACADEMY CHEEVER, Appellee. MARY W. 20, 1991. Rehearing

Opinion June — filed 30, 1991. September denied

Case Details

Case Name: People v. Pecoraro

Court Name: Illinois Supreme Court

Date Published: Jun 4, 1991

Citation: 578 N.E.2d 942

Docket Number: 67289

Court Abbreviation: Ill.