People v. Williams
2011 IL App (3d) 100142
Ill. App. Ct.2011Background
- Derrick D. Williams was convicted and sentenced to concurrent terms of 35 years (attempted first degree murder), 15 years (home invasion), and 6 years (armed robbery).
- He was ordered to pay a $200 DNA analysis fee pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-4-3(j) (West 2006).
- Williams was in custody from July 22, 2006, until sentencing on November 9, 2006.
- During postconviction proceedings, Williams filed a successive postconviction petition which the court denied, and this court affirmed the denial on appeal.
- The central issue is whether Williams could apply his $5-per-day presentence custody credit toward the $200 DNA analysis fee.
- The court held that the DNA analysis fee is a fee, not a fine, and thus presentence credit cannot be applied to it.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| DNA fee is a fee or a fine | DNA fee is compensatory, not punishment. | Long held it to be a fine (punitive). | DNA analysis assessment is a fee. |
| Can presentence credit be applied to the DNA fee | Credit may be applied against fines or fees as allowed. | Credit should be applicable to the DNA fee. | Presentence credit cannot be applied to the DNA analysis fee. |
| Accessibility of presenting presentence-credit claims on appeal | Claims for per diem credit can be raised on appeal of a postconviction petition. | Waiver or procedural requirements may bar such raises. | A defendant may raise the credit claim on appeal of a postconviction petition. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Guadarrama, 2011 IL App (2d) 100072 (2011) (DNA fee characterized as a fee, not a fine)
- People v. Long, 398 Ill. App. 3d 1028 (2010) (previously treated DNA assessment as a fine)
- People v. Anthony, 408 Ill. App. 3d 799 (2011) (DNA fee reimbursement tied to prosecutorial costs)
- People v. Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d 285 (2011) (DNA analysis fee intended to cover analysis costs; supports fee characterization)
- People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435 (1997) (permissive of ministerial credit decisions to promote judicial economy)
- People v. Caballero, 228 Ill. 2d 79 (2008) (recognizes per diem credit as statutory, not under Post-Conviction Act; supports appeals-based credit raising)
- People v. Scott, 277 Ill. App. 3d 565 (1996) (statements on ministerial nature of certain credits)
- People v. Stuckey, 2011 IL App (1st) 092535 (2011) (rejected Long in light of Marshall)