People v. StuckeyPeople v. Stuckey
Justice CONNORS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
¶ 1 Defendant Lashon Stuckey aрpeals from his conviction by a jury for communication with a witness in violation of
¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 In 2002, Latonia Jones witnessed a murder and identified Derrick Rogers as the killer. Defendant was an acquaintance of Rogers, and in April 2006, defendant approached Jones’ mother Della Thomas about Jones’ upcoming appearance as a witness in Rogers’ murder trial. As Della later testified, defendant told Della that Rogers planned to give Jones $1,000 if she failed to appear in court and testify against Rogers. Whether defendant himself was initially part of this proposed transaction is somewhat unclear from Della‘s testimony, but she stated that “[defendant] said they were offering—[Rogers] would offer [Jones] a stack to not to [sic ] testify, not to come to court to testify,” and also that “[i]f she testified, something might happen to her, something would happen to her.”
¶ 4 Hоwever, Della told Jones’ sister Shauntae Thomas about the conversation with defendant, and when defendant approached Shauntae the next day he stated his intentions more explicitly. Shauntae testified that defendant told her, “`[Rogers] said if [Jones] don‘t come to court, they would give her a thousand dollars * * * a thousand dollars to not come to court to testify, but if she do come to court to testify, something is going to happen to her.”
¶ 5 Both Della and Shauntae related these conversations to Jones, but it was not long before defendant approached Jones herself. As Jones later testified, defendant asked her to “do [him] a favor,” and defendant again reiterated that if Jones came to court “something bad” would happen to her. However, if Jones failed to appear she would “get paid dough.”
¶ 6 Defendant was later arrested and charged with communicating with a witness in violation of
¶ 7 The jury ultimately convicted defendant of communicating with a witness, and following posttrial motions, the trial court sentenced defendant to eight years’ incarceration. As part of the sentence, the trial court imposed several fines and fees. After defendant‘s motion to reconsider the sentence was denied, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. This case is now before us.
¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 9 Defendant raises three issues on appeal that we will consider in turn: (1) whether the State‘s evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) whether the trial court properly admonished potential jurors pursuant to
¶ 10 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 11 Defendant‘s primary argument on appeal is that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant question is `whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rationаl trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.‘” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Jackson, 232 Ill.2d 246, 280, 328 Ill.Dec. 1, 903 N.E.2d 388 (2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). We will not reverse a conviction “unless the evidence is `unreasonable, improbable, or so unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant‘s guilt.‘” Id. at 281, 328 Ill.Dec. 1, 903 N.E.2d 388 (quoting People v. Campbell, 146 Ill.2d 363, 375, 166 Ill.Dec. 932, 586 N.E.2d 1261 (1992)).
“A person who, with intent to deter any party or witness from testifying freely, fully and truthfully to any matter pending in any court, or before a Grand Jury, Administrative agency or any other State or local governmental unit, forcibly detains such party or witness, or communicates, directly or indirectly, to such party or witness any knowingly false information or a threat of injury or damage to the propеrty or person of any individual or offers or delivers or threatens to withhold money or another thing of value to any individual commits a Class 3 felony.”
720 ILCS 5/32-4(b) (West 2008) .
Accordingly, in order to prove the mens rea element, the State must demonstrate that defendant had the “intent to deter any party or witness from testifying freely, fully and truthfully.”
¶ 13 Defendant‘s position on appeal is that, at most, the evidence at trial showed that his intent was to deter Jones from showing up in court in order to testify. Defendant argues that the statute only applies to situations in which a defendant intends to cоerce witnesses into altering their testimony or testifying falsely. In support, defendant relies exclusively on the decision of this court in People v. Robinson, 186 Ill.App.3d 1, 133 Ill.Dec. 898, 541 N.E.2d 1336 (1989), which construed the mens rea element of this crime. In Robinson, the defendant was convicted of communicating with a witness after he offered to pay money to an alleged sexual assault victim and her mother in exchange for not appearing in court in order to testify against him. See id. at 2, 133 Ill.Dec. 898, 541 N.E.2d 1336. The appellate court reversed the defendant‘s conviction, finding that the State had failed to prove the mens rea element. See id. at 3, 133 Ill.Dec. 898, 541 N.E.2d 1336. The court examinеd the elements of the crime and held that the defendant should have been charged instead with compounding a crime, which is a different offense. See id. at 4, 133 Ill.Dec. 898, 541 N.E.2d 1336 (citing People v. Scribner, 108 Ill.App.3d 1138, 64 Ill.Dec. 608, 440 N.E.2d 160 (1982)); see also
“Defendant‘s offer of money for the Stephens [i.e., the victim and her mother] not to appear in court is in return for their nonaid in the prosecution of the sexual assault charge. Nonappearance is a refusal to aid in a prosecution rather than a refusal to testify other than freely, fully and truthfully. Furthermore, the police officer testified that defendant asked Stephen not to prosecute the case. Although the State argues that an offer of money not to appear in court can be equated to an offer of monеy not to testify freely, fully and truthfully, there is no supporting authority for this equation. If the Stephens had accepted defendant‘s offer, the State could still have proceeded with the prosecution, subpoenaing
them as witnesses whereupon they could then testify freely, fully and truthfully. * * *
We agree with the reasoning of the Scribner court that our legislature probably did not intend section 32-4 to be a duplicate of section 32-1, thus making the latter superflous, and further, that criminal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of an accused and nothing is to be taken by intendment or implication against a defendant beyond the literal and obvious meaning of the statute. [Citation.]
Accordingly, we conclude that the State did not prove that defendant offered Stephen money to not testify freely, fully and truthfully, but rather offered her money not to aid in the prosecution of the sexual assault charge against him.” Id. at 3-4, 133 Ill.Dec. 898, 541 N.E.2d 1336.
One justice dissented, arguing that Scribner was inapplicable to this situation based on the facts of that case. See id. at 4-15, 133 Ill.Dec. 898, 541 N.E.2d 1336 (Pincham, J., dissenting). In particular, the dissent pointed out that in Scribner the evidence demonstrated only that the defendant had paid the complaining witness in order to have charges dropped, and it did not establish that the defendant had ever asked the complaining witness not to testify in court or to testify other than freely, fully, and truthfully. See id. at 9, 133 Ill.Dec. 898, 541 N.E.2d 1336 (Pincham, J., dissenting).
¶ 14 Robinson is directly on point and we must address it, but to do so we must examine both the communicating-with-a-witness statute (
¶ 15 However, when all of the elements of the two statutes are examined in their entirety, it is evident that the statutes are not redundant. In addition to the mens rea element, communicating with a witness has three possible actus reus elements, only one of which must be proven in order to establish the crime. The State must prove that a defendant either (1) forcibly detained the witness; (2) communicated to the witness “knowingly false information or a threat of injury or damagе to the property or person“; or (3) “offer[ed] or deliver[ed] or threaten[ed] to withhold money or another thing of value.”
¶ 16 The problem with Robinson‘s construction of the communicating-with-a-witness statute is that it focuses solely on the third potential actus reus element in construing the mens rea element. It does not consider how its interpretation of the mens rea element would apply to the other two alternative actus reus elements. This is likely due to the fact that the third communicating-with-a-witness element and the sole element of compounding a crime both deal with paying money to witnesses. However, when Robinson‘s interpretation of the mens rea element is applied to the other actus reus elements, inconsistencies immediately appear.
¶ 18 Although Robinson‘s interpretation of the mens rea element makes sense in the limited context of a defendant who pays witnesses not to testify, such an interpretation is not reasonable when it is applied to the rest of
¶ 19 Having declined to follow Robinson, the question remains whether the intent to deter a witness from appearing in court in order to testify satisfies the mens rea element of
“The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. [Citation.] Accordingly, a court must consider a statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the legislature‘s apparent objective in enacting it. [Citation.] The best indication of the legislature‘s intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] Where the languаge is clear and unambiguous, it will be given effect without resorting to further aids of construction. [Citation.]” Id.
¶ 20 Given that section 32-4 does not define any of its terms, we resort to the dictionary for their ordinary and popular meaning. See People v. Cardamone, 232 Ill.2d 504, 513, 328 Ill.Dec. 917, 905 N.E.2d 806 (2009). The key mens rea phrase in
¶ 21 Applying this definition to
¶ 22 This reading of the statute is reinforced when we considеr
¶ 23 However, the legislature usеd two different words when defining the respective mens rea elements of communicating with a juror and communicating with a witness, and we cannot presume that the difference was anything other than intentional. See McCarty, 223 Ill.2d at 124, 306 Ill.Dec. 570, 858 N.E.2d 15. Accordingly,
¶ 24 In light of the above analysis, we hold that the mens rea of communicating with a witness includes, at the very least, the intent to deter a witness from appearing in court in order to testify. We caution, however, that our holding is in no way intended to limit the mens rea to only that specific mental state. Whether the
¶ 25 All that now remains is to apply these principles to the evidence that was presented at trial. Shauntae, Della, and Jones all testified that defendant approached them and offered Jones $1,000 if she did not come to court in order to testify against Rogers, or else “something” would happen. Even if we were to assume, as defendant argues, that Della‘s testimony was incоnsistent with that of Shauntae and Jones on the issue of defendant‘s intent, resolving conflicting testimony is a function of the jury. See Jackson, 232 Ill.2d at 281, 328 Ill.Dec. 1, 903 N.E.2d 388. The evidence that was presented at trial, if believed by a rational juror, established that defendant not only offered money to Jones but also threatened her, and that he did so with the intent that the offer and accompanying threat would dissuade her from appearing in court in order to testify. This evidence is sufficient for a rational juror to find defendant guilty of communicating with a witness in violation of
¶ 26 B. Voir Dire
¶ 27 Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to properly admonish potential jurors pursuant to
¶ 28 Defendant concedes that he failed to properly preserve this issue for review by objecting during voir dire and including the issue in his posttrial motion. The issue is consequently forfeit and may only be reviewed under the plain-error doctrine. See id. at 611, 345 Ill.Dec. 560, 939 N.E.2d 403 (citing People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988)). In order to obtain reversal and a new trial, defendant bears the burdеn of persuasion. See id. at 613, 345 Ill.Dec. 560, 939 N.E.2d 403. The first step of plain-error analysis is determining whether an error occurred. See id. The only question in determining error in this case is whether the trial court strictly complied with
“The language of
Rule 431(b) is clear and unambiguous. The rule states that the trial court `shall ask’ potential jurors whether they understand and accept the enumerated principles. While the prospective jurors may be questioned individually оr in a group, the method of inquiry must `provide each juror an opportunity to respond to specific questions concerning the [Rule 431(b) ] principles.’ The committee comments emphasize that trial courts may not simply give `a broad statement of the applicable law followed by a general question concerning the juror‘s willingness to follow the law.’ [Citation.]
Rule 431(b) , therefore, mandates a specific question and response process. The trial court must ask each potential juror whеther he or she understands and accepts each of the principles in the rule. The questioning may be performed either individually or in a group, but the rule requires an opportunity for a response from each prospective juror on their understanding and acceptance of those principles.” Id. at 607, 345 Ill.Dec. 560, 939 N.E.2d 403.
¶ 30 Having found that the trial court erred, the remaining question is whether the error is reversible. An error is reversible under the plain-error doctrine only where “(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant‘s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill.2d 551, 565, 312 Ill.Dec. 338, 870 N.E.2d 403 (2007).
¶ 31 The supreme court in Thompson found that a
¶ 32 C. Fines and Fees
¶ 33 The final issue that defendant raises is whether the trial court properly imposed several fines and fees, which total $570. The State concedes that imposition of a $5 court system assessment, a $5 drug court assessment, and a $30 Children‘s Advocacy Center assessment were improper. See
¶ 34 Defendant argues that he should not have been assessed the $10 assessment under
¶ 35 Turning to the $200 assessment under
¶ 36 Although the Jones analysis in Long is persuasive, we do not think that Long survives the supreme court‘s recent decision in People v. Marshall, 242 Ill.2d 285, 351 Ill.Dec. 172, 950 N.E.2d 668 (2011). In Marshall, the supreme court held that the DNA analysis charge under
¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 38 As explained above, we affirm defendant‘s conviction and sentence of incarceration. Howеver, we vacate the $5 court system assessment (
¶ 39 Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded.
Justices CUNNINGHAM and HARRIS concur