2018 IL App (4th) 170877
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background
- At ~12:30 a.m., Walker made a left turn from Hershey Road onto Empire Street and exited into the farther (northernmost) of two westbound lanes; Officer Hernandez stopped him for an alleged improper wide left turn.
- Officer Hernandez testified he believed the Vehicle Code required turning into the nearest lane; he cited his interpretation of 625 ILCS 5/11-801(a)(2). No other evidence supported the stop.
- The circuit court found the statute’s plain language permitted exiting into either westbound lane and granted Walker’s motion to suppress; the State appealed.
- On appeal the State argued (1) the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion because Walker violated section 11-801(a)(2), (2) alternatively the statute is ambiguous so an objectively reasonable mistake of law (Heien) would justify the stop, and (3) suppression was inappropriate under LeFlore.
- The appellate court reviewed statutory construction de novo and Fourth Amendment stop standards under Terry and affirmed suppression.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Walker for violating 11-801(a)(2) | Walker violated 11-801(a)(2) by not entering the nearest westbound lane after a left turn | Statute allows leaving intersection in any lane lawfully available; no violation occurred | Stop invalid; statute’s plain meaning permits exit into either available westbound lane |
| Whether statute is ambiguous so officer’s mistake of law could supply reasonable suspicion (Heien) | If ambiguous, an objectively reasonable mistake would justify the stop | Statute is unambiguous; officer’s interpretation was incorrect and not objectively reasonable | Statute not ambiguous here; Heien does not save the stop |
| Whether suppression should be denied under LeFlore (good-faith exception) | Even if stop improper, suppression unnecessary if officer acted reasonably or negligently | Officer acted contrary to plain statutory language; no reasonable basis to rely on his interpretation | Good-faith exception inapplicable; suppression appropriate |
| Proper interpretation of 625 ILCS 5/11-801(a)(2) | Last sentence requires turning into the nearest lane when practicable | First sentence governs exit lane: leave intersection in a lane lawfully available to traffic; both lanes were lawful | Court construed statute as permitting exit into any lane lawfully available; State’s reading would render language superfluous and was rejected |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (framework for investigatory stops; reasonable, articulable suspicion required)
- United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (totality-of-circumstances reasonable suspicion analysis)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (reasonable suspicion standard discussion)
- Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (an objectively reasonable mistake of law can sometimes justify a stop)
- People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799 (2015) (exclusionary rule’s good-faith exception; suppression only when deterrence justified)
- People v. Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223 (2015) (evidence from unconstitutional stop is generally inadmissible)
- People v. Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181 (2016) (standard of review for suppression rulings; factual findings upheld unless against manifest weight, legal conclusions reviewed de novo)