People v. Valdez
2014 COA 125
Colo. Ct. App.2014Background
- In March 2010 police found Arthur Ray Valdez passed out in the driver’s seat of a parked vehicle on the curb with a 24-oz beer can, keys in the ignition, lights on, and his feet near the pedals; he attempted to start the car and was intoxicated. His license was previously revoked as a habitual traffic offender.
- Prosecutors charged Valdez with aggravated driving after revocation prohibited (ADARP) and driving under the influence (DUI); a jury convicted him of both offenses.
- The trial court sentenced Valdez to probation for ADARP (3 years) and probation plus 60 days’ jail for DUI (2 years probation).
- Valdez moved for judgments of acquittal arguing the prosecution failed to prove he "operated" or "drove" an "operable" vehicle; he also argued the court should have required proof beyond a reasonable doubt of vehicle operability and that the convictions should merge under double jeopardy principles.
- The court denied acquittal motions and refused to treat operability as an element requiring separate proof beyond a reasonable doubt; the court also rejected Valdez’s double jeopardy claim and affirmed convictions and sentences.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence that Valdez "drove"/"operated" an operable vehicle | Prosecution: evidence (driver asleep in seat, keys in ignition, lights on, attempted to start) sufficed to show driving/operation | Valdez: no proof he drove; car allegedly immobile (dead battery) and witnesses said he didn’t drive | Court: Evidence substantial — jury could infer Valdez drove/operated despite lack of vehicle movement; convictions upheld |
| Whether trial court should instruct that operability must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt | Prosecution: operability is not an element that prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt; instruction per VanMatre sufficed | Valdez: jury should have been instructed to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that vehicle was operable | Court: Operability is an element-negating traverse, not a statutory element; prosecution need only prove statutory elements; no error in instructions |
| Whether vehicle immobility negates "drive"/"operate" elements | Prosecution: mechanical condition irrelevant if defendant exerted control in arriving where vehicle stopped | Valdez: vehicle inoperable (battery dead); could not have driven | Court: Mechanical immobility is not dispositive; courts focus on occupant’s control in arriving at rest; evidence of intoxicated operation sustained convictions |
| Double jeopardy / merger of ADARP and DUI convictions | Prosecution: law unsettled whether listed driving offenses are elements or sentence enhancers; separate convictions may stand | Valdez: DUI is a lesser-included offense of ADARP and convictions should merge | Court: Because precedent is unsettled among divisions of the court, no plain error; separate convictions and sentences allowed; judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107 (Colo. 2002) (defines "drive"/"operate" concepts and actual physical control)
- People v. Swain, 959 P.2d 426 (Colo. 1998) (actual physical control standard for "drive")
- Smith v. Charnes, 728 P.2d 1287 (Colo. 1986) (intoxicated occupant asleep in running car constitutes actual physical control)
- People v. VanMatre, 190 P.3d 770 (Colo. App. 2008) (instructing jury on operability when evidence suggests vehicle may have been inoperable)
- State v. Smelter, 674 P.2d 690 (Wash. App. 1984) (focus on occupant’s control in arriving at place where car becomes inoperable)
- People v. Bennett, 515 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1973) (substantial evidence test for sufficiency review)