2014 COA 72
Colo. Ct. App.2014Background
- Defendant William Roger Trujillo was convicted by a jury of second-degree kidnapping, robbery, third-degree assault, and menacing after a bar/7‑Eleven incident in which the victim and witness Marcelina Gonzales gave conflicting accounts about Trujillo’s participation.
- Prosecution sought a continuance past Trujillo’s six‑month speedy‑trial deadline to secure Gonzales’s testimony, explaining a plea agreement in her separate case (and corroboration by detectives) would make her available. The court granted the continuance.
- The prosecution introduced extensive gang evidence: testimony from a gang detective, a gang expert describing the Surefios gang’s structure, culture, and rules (including anti‑snitching), and Gonzales’s testimony referencing “green light,” teardrop tattoos, and a shooting. Photographs of Trujillo’s tattoos were admitted.
- Defense objected pretrial and at trial, arguing gang evidence was irrelevant, highly prejudicial, and improper propensity evidence under CRE 404(b); he also objected to undisclosed expert testimony.
- The trial court admitted the gang evidence (with some limiting instructions) and the jury convicted. On appeal Trujillo argued (1) the continuance violated speedy‑trial rules and (2) admission of gang evidence was erroneous and prejudicial.
- The appellate court affirmed denial of dismissal under the speedy‑trial statute but reversed and remanded for a new trial based on erroneous admission of substantial gang‑related evidence that likely affected the verdict.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Trujillo’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether continuance beyond 6‑month speedy‑trial deadline was permissible to obtain Gonzales’s testimony | Continuance proper: prosecutor exercised due diligence to secure plea agreement and investigators actively corroborated, and reasonable grounds existed to believe witness would be available at the later date | Continuance violated speedy‑trial statute; reliance on completing witness’s own prosecution/trial is improper given self‑incrimination protections | Affirmed continuance: record shows due diligence and reasonable grounds (plea agreement contingent on corroboration); no speedy‑trial dismissal required |
| Whether admission of extensive gang evidence (expert and witness testimony, tattoos, gang culture, anti‑snitching, unrelated violent acts) was admissible | Gang evidence relevant as res gestae, to show motive/collective action, and to explain witness’s changed testimony/fear of retaliation | Evidence was irrelevant or impermissible propensity/other‑acts evidence, unduly prejudicial under CRE 403 and barred by CRE 404(b) | Reversed: large portions of gang expert and Gonzales testimony (organizational structure, violent reputation, anti‑snitching, meaning of “green light,” teardrop, shooting) were inadmissible; improperly admitted evidence likely contributed to conviction; new trial required |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Roberts, 146 P.3d 589 (Colo. 2006) (prosecution and trial court must make record to satisfy speedy‑trial continuance requirements)
- People v. Koolbeck, 703 P.2d 673 (Colo.App. 1985) (continuance to secure an important witness discussed by lower courts)
- Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999) (self‑incrimination issues persist through sentencing and direct appeal)
- People v. Martinez, 24 P.3d 629 (Colo.App. 2000) (limits on inferring guilt from gang association; jury instruction referenced)
- Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d 458 (Colo. 2009) (framework for admissibility of relevant evidence and limits on prior bad‑act evidence)
- People v. Quintana, 882 P.2d 1366 (Colo. 1994) (scope of res gestae and reviewing court’s duty to consider potential theories of admissibility)
- People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1990) (four‑prong test for admissibility of other‑act evidence under CRE 404(b))
- People v. Asberry, 172 P.3d 927 (Colo.App. 2007) (definition and limits of res gestae evidence)