59 Cal.App.5th 923
Cal. Ct. App.2021Background
- Arnold, Park, and Case were arraigned on consolidated amended complaints (out of custody) and repeatedly agreed to limited time waivers for the preliminary hearing, often as "zero of 60" or "zero of 90" dates, ultimately expecting the hearing by November 14, 2019.
- The court continued the preliminary hearing past the agreed date over the defendants’ objections, citing joinder with codefendants and a pending motion to disqualify the district attorney’s office as good cause.
- The defendants moved to dismiss under Penal Code § 859b for failure to hold the preliminary hearing within 60 days (or the agreed date); the trial court denied the motion, then the superior court granted writ petitions and dismissed the complaints.
- The People petitioned the Court of Appeal to vacate the superior court’s dismissal orders.
- The People argued that any waiver extending beyond the initial 60-day period operates as a general waiver (eliminating the right to demand a date-certain hearing) and that good cause (joinder/disqualification motion) permits continuance beyond 60 days.
- The Court of Appeal held that § 859b permits limited (date-certain) waivers beyond 60 days, and absent a defendant’s further personal waiver the court may not continue the preliminary hearing past the agreed date for good cause; the petitions were denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a defendant’s waiver that extends the preliminary hearing beyond the initial 60 days is a general waiver that eliminates the right to demand a date-certain hearing under § 859b | Once a defendant waives time past the initial 60 days, the right to demand a timely preliminary hearing is lost (waiver is general) | Waivers were specific, limited, and conditioned on the hearing occurring by a date certain; such limited waivers do not forfeit the § 859b right | Held: Limited, date-certain waivers are permitted; if the court continues beyond the agreed date without consent, the defendant retains the § 859b dismissal right. |
| Whether the court may continue a nonconsenting defendant’s preliminary hearing beyond 60 days for good cause (e.g., to maintain joinder under § 1050.1) | Good cause for one defendant (joinder) or pending motions authorizes continuance of nonconsenting co-defendants’ hearings beyond 60 days | § 859b’s 60-day rule is absolute absent the defendant’s personal waiver; Ramos forbids a good-cause exception to the 60-day limit | Held: No good-cause exception to § 859b’s 60-day limit; the court may not continue over a nonconsenting defendant absent that defendant’s personal waiver. |
| Whether a pending motion to disqualify the district attorney’s office (or similar defense motion) tolls the § 859b 60-day period | A disqualification motion makes the magistrate powerless to hold the hearing and therefore tolls the 60-day period (analogous to Lind) | A § 1424 disqualification motion against the DA’s office does not divest the magistrate of authority; Lind (judge disqualification) is distinguishable | Held: Motion to disqualify the DA’s office did not toll the 60-day limit; defendants retained their right to a timely preliminary hearing. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ramos v. Superior Court, 146 Cal.App.4th 719 (2007) (no good-cause exception allows continuing a preliminary hearing beyond § 859b’s 60-day limit for nonconsenting defendants)
- Garcia v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.App.5th 631 (2020) (a defendant may enter a specific, limited time waiver conditioned on a date-certain preliminary hearing)
- People v. Standish, 38 Cal.4th 858 (2006) (overview of § 859b and its role in protecting timely preliminary examinations)
- Stroud v. Superior Court, 23 Cal.4th 952 (2000) (purpose of prompt preliminary examination to protect defendants from prolonged uncertainty)
- People v. Alvarez, 208 Cal.App.3d 567 (1989) (distinguishes general waivers from limited waivers under § 859b)
- People v. Love, 132 Cal.App.4th 276 (2005) (addresses consequences when an out-of-custody defendant previously waived time and later appears in custody)
- People v. Lind, 230 Cal.App.4th 709 (2014) (judge disqualification tolls § 859b where the magistrate is powerless; distinguished in this case)