1 Cal. App. 5th 892
Cal. Ct. App.2016Background
- Defendant Rito Tejeda was charged with murder; assigned to Judge Thomas Goethals in December 2015 and the People filed a Code Civ. Proc. § 170.6 peremptory challenge the same day.
- The Orange County Superior Court denied the People’s § 170.6 motion after concluding the District Attorney’s office was engaging in an ongoing “blanket” campaign disqualifying Judge Goethals from murder cases, disrupting court operations.
- The record showed a dramatic change in practice: before early 2014 Goethals was rarely challenged by the People; thereafter he was challenged in almost every murder case assigned to him (dozens of disqualifications over ~18 months).
- The trial court took judicial notice of earlier rulings by Judge Goethals finding prosecutorial/Brady-related misconduct and disqualifying the DA’s office in a high-profile case, and found the blanket challenges were retaliatory and impaired the court’s ability to administer justice.
- The appellate panel majority concluded it was bound by California Supreme Court precedent in Solberg v. Superior Court and granted the People’s petition for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its denial and assign a new judge; the majority urged the Supreme Court to revisit Solberg.
- A dissent argued Solberg did not control, that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s separation‑of‑powers ruling, and that institutionalized blanket challenges by the executive branch can impermissibly impair judicial independence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a trial court may refuse to honor a timely, procedurally proper § 170.6 peremptory challenge because repetitive "blanket" use by the DA impairs the judiciary (separation of powers) | People: § 170.6 motion was timely and facially sufficient; Solberg requires honoring peremptory challenges and forbids inquiry into motive; writ relief is proper | Superior Ct.: DA’s sustained, retaliatory blanket challenges materially impaired court administration and judicial independence, so denial was proper to protect separation of powers | Majority: Solberg binds inferior courts; trial court exceeded authority by denying the § 170.6 motion on separation‑of‑powers grounds; grant writ and reassign judge; urged Supreme Court review |
| Standard and scope of review for denial of § 170.6 motions on separation‑of‑powers grounds | People: writ review is the exclusive remedy; appellate court reviews de novo whether Solberg precludes inquiry | Court/DA: trial court’s factual findings on motive/disruption supported by substantial evidence and reviewed for abuse of discretion | Majority: legal question whether Solberg precludes inquiry reviewed de novo; Solberg controls and forecloses such an as‑applied separation‑of‑powers defense |
| Whether Solberg’s separation‑of‑powers analysis is binding precedent or dicta and its applicability to extensive blanket challenges | People: Solberg is binding even if portions might be dicta; it anticipated blanket challenges and rejected separation‑of‑powers invalidation | Trial court/Dissent: Solberg is distinguishable (different facts, legislative vs. executive branch dynamics) and does not foreclose an as‑applied challenge when abuse is extreme | Majority: treated Solberg as binding precedent applicable here; declined to revisit its correctness but invited Supreme Court reconsideration |
| Whether courts may take evidence or conduct inquiry into institutional blanket challenge practices when abuse is alleged | People: Solberg discourages evidentiary inquiry and assumes abuses are an acceptable cost; courts must honor procedural sufficiency | Trial court/Dissent: where substantial evidence shows systemic, retaliatory abuse that disrupts court operations, judicial inquiry is warranted to protect separation of powers | Majority: Solberg precluded trial court’s evidentiary inquiry in this posture; appellate court granted relief despite criticizing Solberg and urging Supreme Court reexamination |
Key Cases Cited
- Solberg v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.3d 182 (Cal. 1977) (upheld § 170.6 against separation‑of‑powers challenge and rejected as‑applied invalidation for blanket challenges)
- Johnson v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 693 (Cal. 1958) (upheld predecessor facial constitutionality of peremptory judge‑challenge scheme; Legislature may reasonably regulate disqualification)
- McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal.3d 512 (Cal. 1974) (criticized blanket challenge practice as reflecting bad faith, though statements were treated as persuasive dicta)
- Austin v. Lambert, 11 Cal.2d 73 (Cal. 1938) (invalidated an earlier, broader peremptory judge‑removal statute as an unconstitutional interference with judicial function)
- People v. Superior Court (Williams), 8 Cal.App.4th 688 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (recognized limits on § 170.6 where challenges are based on unconstitutional group bias; governmental misuse may be subject to inquiry)
- Steen v. Appellate Division of Superior Court, 59 Cal.4th 1045 (Cal. 2014) (separation‑of‑powers test: one branch may not defeat or materially impair another branch’s inherent functions)