People v. Stevenson CA3
C089872
| Cal. Ct. App. | Sep 20, 2021Background
- At ~12:20 a.m., Stevenson (driving with BAC 0.15%) crashed into two parked cars and left the scene with passenger Antonio Moreno; both were later confronted by Yuba City Officer Charanpreet Singh.
- Singh ordered them to stop; Moreno adopted an aggressive stance, Singh struck Moreno with a baton, then was knocked unconscious and repeatedly had his head slammed into pavement by Stevenson.
- Witnesses (Castner, Medina) observed Stevenson lift and slam Singh’s head into concrete multiple times; Singh suffered a hematoma, concussion, and lasting postconcussive symptoms.
- Moreno, while being transported after arrest, threatened officers and declared he was a Norteño gang member; a gang expert opined both men were active Norteño members and explained gang norms (e.g., aiding fellow members, retaliating against perceived cowardice).
- A jury convicted Stevenson of attempted murder of a peace officer, assault on a peace officer, resisting arrest, gang participation, and DUI-related offenses; sentence included 15 years-to-life (attempted murder).
- On appeal Stevenson argued: (1) venire should have been dismissed for gang-related juror bias; (2) Moreno’s postarrest statements were inadmissible; (3) counsel was ineffective for not requesting a voluntary intoxication instruction; and (4) insufficient evidence of intent to kill. The Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Stevenson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether court abused discretion by not dismissing entire venire after jurors voiced fear of gang retaliation | Venire dismissal unnecessary; trial court properly excused biased jurors and gave curative instruction | Juror comments (fear of gang retaliation) tainted the entire panel such that venire should be dismissed | No abuse of discretion; dismissal of entire venire is drastic and not warranted where individual jurors were excused and court probed others (affirmed) |
| 2. Admissibility of Moreno’s postarrest statement (threat & gang ID) | Highly probative of gang participation and §186.22 enhancements; admission proper despite being post-arrest | Statement occurred after incident and was prejudicial/cumulative under Evid. Code §352; undue risk jury would attribute Moreno’s threats to defendant | Admissible: relevant to gang elements and enhancements; probative value outweighed prejudice; not reversible error |
| 3. Ineffective assistance for failing to request a voluntary intoxication instruction | Counsel had tactical reasons to pursue self-defense theory over intoxication; omission reasonable | Counsel should have requested instruction because strong evidence of intoxication existed and it could negate specific intent | No ineffective assistance: strategic choice reasonably explained; requesting instruction could have undermined defense strategy; no prejudice shown |
| 4. Sufficiency of evidence of specific intent to kill for attempted murder | Witnesses observed repeated deliberate head‑slams to a vulnerable area while victim was unconscious; injuries and lifting before smashing support intent | Lack of skull fracture and nonfatal result show no intent to kill | Evidence sufficient: intent to kill may be inferred from repeated, forceful attacks to the head and surrounding facts (conviction affirmed) |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Medina, 51 Cal.3d 870 (venire dismissal is a drastic remedy; trial judge best gauges juror bias)
- People v. Martinez, 228 Cal.App.3d 1456 (trial court’s discretion to assess juror prejudice)
- Mach v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 630 (9th Cir.) (prospective juror’s expert‑like voir dire can taint panel)
- People v. Waidla, 22 Cal.4th 690 (abuse of discretion review for evidentiary rulings)
- People v. Breverman, 19 Cal.4th 142 (harmless‑error/miscarriage of justice standard)
- People v. Soto, 4 Cal.5th 968 (scope of voluntary intoxication evidence re: intent)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- People v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
