People v. Soto, 51 Cal. 4th 229

Defendant Soto sexually assaulted two girls, 12-year-old C. and 11-year-old R., with acts described as lewd and lascivious; counts included three 288(b)(1) charges and one 288(a) charge; CALCRIM No. 1111 instructed that consent is not a defense to 288(b)(1).
The offenses carry harsher penalties under 288(b)(1) than 288(a), including probation ineligibility and consecutive sentencing under Chelsea’s Law amendments.
Appellate courts had split on whether victim consent could negate a 288(b)(1) conviction after the 1981 amendments removed the phrase ‘against the will of the victim.’
Cicero (1984) held consent could be a defense to 288(b) based on an analogy to rape, leading to confusion.
Trial evidence included C.’s recantation and R.’s corroborated statements; the defense argued lack of proof of force/duress, while the prosecution argued force/duress or fear as elements.
The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal, holding that victim consent is not a defense to aggravated lewd conduct on a child under 14 and disapproved Cicero and related authority to the extent inconsistent with this holding.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether victim consent is a defense to aggravated lewd acts on a child under 14 (288(b)(1)).	People argued consent is irrelevant since the statute targets actions by coercive means.	Soto contended consent could negate the duress/force theory.	Consent is not a defense; 288(b)(1) focuses on the offender's coercive conduct.
What is the proper interpretation of 288(b)(1) after 1981 amendments removing ‘against the will of the victim’?	Legislature intended to remove consent as a defense.	Some courts thought consent still influenced whether duress/force applied.	Legislature intended to focus on coercive conduct, not victim consent.
Did Cicero misread the statutory language and legislative history on consent in 288(b)?	Cicero correctly recognized consent as defense.	Cicero misinterpreted the amendments and relied on flawed analogy to rape.	Cicero is disapproved to the extent it allowed consent as a defense.
Is it error to instruct that consent is not a defense when duress/force are at issue?	Such instruction could mislead juries about considering consent evidence for coercion.	Instruction clarifies lack of defense.	Instruction is potentially confusing but not reversible per se; still, conviction upheld.

People v. Cicero, 157 Cal.App.3d 465 (Cal. App. 3d 1984) (held consent may be a defense to 288(b) based on will concept; later disapproved.)
People v. Leal, 33 Cal.4th 999 (Cal. 2004) (defined duress in 288(b)(1) as objective coercion.)
People v. Quinones, 202 Cal.App.3d 1154 (Cal. App. 3d 1988) (discussed duress/force; consent not definitive for force.)
People v. Griffin, 33 Cal.4th 1015 (Cal. 2004) (defined force concept for 288(b) and distinguished from rape.)
People v. Bolander, 23 Cal.App.4th 155 (Cal. App. 1994) (discussed consent/force relationship; concurring opinions. )
People v. Olsen, 36 Cal.3d 638 (Cal. 1984) (consent not a defense to section 288; child protection policy.)
People v. Verdegreen, 106 Cal. 211 (Cal. 1895) (early holding that minors cannot legally consent.)
Pitmon, 170 Cal.App.3d 38 (Cal. App. 1985) (defined duress as direct/implicit threat to coerce a victim.)