People v. Reynoso CA3, C093085

In 1996 Reynoso, with accomplices Pablo Cobb and Cruz Avila, entered Nicholas Godinez’s home during an attempted robbery; Cobb shot and killed Godinez though Reynoso did not fire the fatal shot.
Reynoso was tried and in 1998 convicted of first-degree murder, burglary, and attempted robbery; the jury found true felony‑murder special‑circumstance allegations that the killing occurred during burglary and robbery and that Reynoso was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life (CALJIC No. 8.80.1).
He was sentenced to life without parole plus four years.
After SB 1437 (which narrowed felony‑murder liability) became effective, Reynoso filed a Penal Code §1170.95 petition in 2019 seeking resentencing.
The trial court denied the petition without issuing an order to show cause, concluding Reynoso was ineligible as a matter of law because the jury’s special‑circumstance findings satisfy the post‑SB 1437 requirements for felony murder.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the trial court properly considered the record of conviction and that the special‑circumstance findings rendered Reynoso ineligible for §1170.95 relief; any challenge to the sufficiency of those findings must proceed via habeas corpus.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (Reynoso)	Held
Whether the trial court erred by denying the §1170.95 petition without issuing an order to show cause	Reynoso is ineligible as a matter of law because the jury found felony‑murder special circumstances that satisfy SB 1437’s requirements	Banks and Clark altered the major‑participant/reckless‑indifference standard so Reynoso could not now be convicted of first‑degree murder	Court: No error; trial court may review the record of conviction and the special‑circumstance findings make Reynoso ineligible for §1170.95 relief
Whether post‑conviction decisions (Banks/Clark) entitle Reynoso to §1170.95 relief retroactively	Banks/Clark clarified law; they do not create a new rule that automatically entitles petitioners to §1170.95 relief	Banks/Clark changed how "major participant"/"reckless indifference" are defined, so Reynoso meets §1170.95 eligibility	Court: Banks/Clark clarified law (per Scoggins); any claim that those decisions render the special‑circumstance finding insufficient must be raised via habeas corpus, not by §1170.95 alone

People v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (Cal. 2015) (clarifies major‑participant/reckless‑indifference framework)
People v. Clark, 63 Cal.4th 522 (Cal. 2016) (applies Banks to accomplice liability and reckless indifference analysis)
In re Scoggins, 9 Cal.5th 667 (Cal. 2020) (explains Banks/Clark clarified, not announced new law; relief for pre‑existing convictions lies via habeas when conduct is not proscribed by clarified rule)
People v. Lewis, 11 Cal.5th 952 (Cal. 2021) (trial court may consider record of conviction in §1170.95 prima facie review)
People v. Galvan, 52 Cal.App.5th 1134 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020) (felony‑murder special‑circumstance findings equivalent to SB 1437 felony‑murder requirements; such findings render petitioner ineligible for §1170.95 relief)
People v. Gomez, 52 Cal.App.5th 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020) (same line: special‑circumstance findings preclude §1170.95 relief)