69 Cal.App.5th 776
Cal. Ct. App.2021Background
- Defendant Jered Pillsbury pleaded no contest (2013) to second-degree robbery and admitted a §12022.53(b) firearm enhancement; plea bargain resulted in an aggregate 13-year state prison term (3-year midterm + 10-year enhancement).
- In 2018 the Legislature amended §12022.53(h) to allow courts discretion to strike or dismiss certain firearm enhancements; §1170(d)(1) authorizes the Secretary of CDCR to recommend recall and resentencing "at any time."
- The CDCR Secretary sent the sentencing court a §1170(d)(1) recommendation and a cumulative case summary documenting rehabilitation and programming; the court summarily declined to recall or resentence Pillsbury without giving him notice, an opportunity to be heard, or a statement of reasons.
- Pillsbury appealed, arguing the trial court had authority to recall/resentence based on the change in law and that the court’s summary declination violated due process and related rights.
- The Court of Appeal reversed: it held trial courts have authority to recall and resentence on a Secretary recommendation to give defendants the benefit of ameliorative changes in law (including striking enhancements), that defendants are entitled to notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a statement of reasons before a summary declination, but there is no constitutional right to counsel at the pre-declination stage when the prosecution has not yet participated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People/AG) | Defendant's Argument (Pillsbury) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a trial court may recall and resentence based on a post‑judgment ameliorative change in the law when the Secretary recommends recall under §1170(d)(1) | §1170(d)(1) does not authorize reopening a final judgment to apply new laws retroactively; trial court lacks authority | §1170(d)(1) and §12022.53(h) permit recall/resentencing to give defendants the benefit of ameliorative law changes even if judgment is final | Held: Court has authority to recall and resentence upon Secretary recommendation and may apply §12022.53(h)/§1385 to strike enhancements at any time |
| Whether plea agreements bar resentencing relief under §1170(d)(1) | Plea bargains should bind the court; court cannot deviate from stipulated sentence | §1170(d)(1) expressly authorizes modifying judgments entered after pleas; plea agreements do not insulate defendants from later changes in law | Held: Plea agreements do not bar resentencing relief under §1170(d)(1) |
| Whether due process requires notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a statement of reasons before a court summarily declines Secretary’s §1170(d)(1) recommendation | No protected liberty interest entitles defendant to those protections; summary declination permissible | Liberty interest in freedom from restraint is implicated; due process requires notice, chance to be heard, and statement of reasons | Held: Due process requires notice, reasonable time to respond, ability to submit materials, and a statement of reasons when court summarily declines |
| Whether defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel before the court summarily declines to recall/resentence | No federal constitutional right to counsel for this pre-declination stage | Defendant argues resentencing is a critical stage entitling him to counsel from the outset | Held: No constitutional right to counsel prior to summary declination; however, counsel is required at any actual resentencing proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Buycks, 5 Cal.5th 857 (2018) (discusses full‑resentencing rule and that a resentencing court may modify every aspect of a defendant's sentence)
- People v. Federico, 50 Cal.App.5th 318 (2020) (concluded trial court cannot apply certain post‑judgment reforms to final judgments; court here disagreed with aspects of Federico)
- Doe v. Harris, 57 Cal.4th 64 (2013) (plea agreements do not insulate defendants from subsequent changes in law)
- People v. Loper, 60 Cal.4th 1155 (2015) (recognizes §1170(e) creates a liberty interest; analogous reasoning applied to §1170(d)(1))
- People v. McCallum, 55 Cal.App.5th 202 (2020) (trial court abused discretion by ignoring defendant’s request to present information in response to Secretary recommendation)
- People v. Carmony, 33 Cal.4th 367 (2004) (defendant entitled to invite court to consider dismissal under §1385 and to present supporting evidence)
- People v. Blount, 175 Cal.App.4th 992 (2009) (older precedent declining §1170(d) authority to deviate from plea bargains; superseded by later amendments and controlling law here)
- People v. Nelms, 165 Cal.App.4th 1465 (2008) (earlier view that §1170(d) is limited to resentencing without modifying judgment; superseded by 2018 amendment and this court's analysis)
- Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011) (due process principles for liberty interests; cited for procedural due process standards)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (federal balancing test for what process is due; applied alongside California's Allen/Otto factors)