People v. Patrick CA3
C099774
| Cal. Ct. App. | Jun 20, 2025Background
- In 2007, Nicholas Patrick was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of robbery in a joint trial with a codefendant who was acquitted on all charges.
- The charges stemmed from the shooting deaths of James Fullard, Jr., and Doretha Moore during a robbery, where evidence at trial showed that both defendants accused each other of being the shooter, there was one shooter, and all shots were fired from a single gun.
- The jury found true allegations that Patrick personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death under Penal Code § 12022.53(d), but did not specify whether the murder convictions were based on malice or felony murder theory.
- After legislative changes to California's felony murder law (Senate Bill 1437, effective 2019), Patrick filed a petition under Penal Code § 1172.6 seeking to vacate his murder convictions, arguing he could not now be convicted as a murderer under the revised law.
- The trial court denied Patrick's petition at the prima facie stage, finding that the jury's true findings on firearm discharge enhancements necessarily established that he was the "actual killer," making him ineligible for resentencing.
- On appeal, the majority affirmed the denial, while a dissent argued the jury findings did not necessarily establish Patrick as the "actual killer" under the law.
Issues
| Issue | Patrick's Argument | People's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the jury finding on the firearm enhancement conclusively establish Patrick as the actual killer, foreclosing relief under § 1172.6? | The jury was not required to find Patrick was the actual killer; the verdict doesn't preclude resentencing. | The jury’s true finding that Patrick personally discharged a firearm and caused death means he was the actual killer; ineligible for relief. | The finding establishes Patrick was the actual killer; ineligible for resentencing. |
| Can the court consider the effect of prior jury findings at the prima facie stage of § 1172.6 proceedings? | Should not consider or weigh the effect at this stage; must accept allegations unless conclusively refuted. | Courts may rely on issue preclusion principles and jury findings to identify meritless petitions at the prima facie stage. | Prior jury findings are preclusive when their elements are necessarily decided; effect may be considered. |
| Do aiding and abetting or felony-murder instructions affect the analysis of eligibility for resentencing? | Jury may have convicted on aiding/abetting or felony murder; cannot say only as actual killer. | Jury instructions and findings required proof Patrick was the perpetrator acting with malice and as the shooter. | This record established Patrick was the shooter; not a case of imputed malice; eligibility foreclosed. |
| Is the jury’s finding under § 12022.53(d) equivalent to a finding Patrick personally killed the victims? | No, because finding only requires proximate causation, not necessarily that Patrick inflicted the fatal wounds. | Yes, in this case, because evidence showed one shooter and Patrick was found to have discharged the firearm causing death. | Enhancement finding equated to finding Patrick personally killed; issue preclusion applies here. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (Cal. 2015) (clarified major participant and reckless indifference standards for felony murder special circumstance)
- People v. Clark, 63 Cal.4th 522 (Cal. 2016) (applied Banks standards, further defining reckless indifference)
- People v. Bland, 28 Cal.4th 313 (Cal. 2002) (distinguished between personal infliction and proximate causation under firearm sentencing enhancements)
- People v. Lewis, 11 Cal.5th 952 (Cal. 2021) (outlined procedure for assessing prima facie eligibility for relief under Senate Bill 1437)
- People v. Strong, 13 Cal.5th 698 (Cal. 2022) (explained use of prior jury findings in § 1172.6 proceedings)
- People v. Curiel, 15 Cal.5th 433 (Cal. 2023) (clarified issue preclusion and scope of review in § 1172.6 petitions)
