52 Cal.App.5th 1041
Cal. Ct. App.2020Background
- In 2010 Angelique Nash participated in a residential burglary as a lookout while a codefendant (David Moses) entered the home, struck the elderly victim, who later died of blunt-force head trauma. Nash was tried three times and in her third trial convicted of first-degree felony murder with a burglary special circumstance and sentenced to 25 years to life.
- On prior appeal this court had reversed the burglary special-circumstance finding as unsupported by substantial evidence that Nash was a major participant (People v. Banks framework applied).
- Senate Bill No. 1437 (effective Jan. 1, 2019) narrowed felony-murder liability, amended Penal Code §§ 188 and 189, and created Penal Code § 1170.95 to permit resentencing petitions for persons convicted under the old law.
- Nash petitioned under § 1170.95 seeking relief; the prosecutor opposed, arguing SB 1437 unconstitutionally amended voter initiatives (Propositions 7, 115, 9) and violated separation of powers.
- The trial court dismissed the petition based on its view SB 1437 impermissibly amended Proposition 7 as applied retroactively; on appeal the Court of Appeal disagreed, followed Lamoureux and Gooden, held SB 1437 constitutional, reversed, and remanded for further § 1170.95 proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People/DA) | Defendant's Argument (Nash/AG) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether SB 1437 impermissibly amends Proposition 7 (Briggs Initiative) | SB 1437 narrows the class punishable as murder, thereby changing the scope/effect of Prop 7 and taking away punishments the voters adopted | Prop 7 increased punishments but did not freeze or incorporate the 1978 substantive definition of murder; Legislature may legislate in a related but distinct area | SB 1437 does not unconstitutionally amend Prop 7; trial court erred — reversed and remanded for § 1170.95 proceedings |
| Whether SB 1437 impermissibly amends Proposition 115 (Crime Victims Justice Reform Act) | Prop 115 reenacted § 189 and limited legislative amendments; SB 1437 alters culpability and so undermines Prop 115 | Prop 115 only added specific felonies to felony-murder; SB 1437 does not alter that list and is within ordinary legislative power to amend reenacted text | SB 1437 does not amend Prop 115; Legislature retained authority to address related aspects of murder liability |
| Whether SB 1437 violates Proposition 9 (Marsy’s Law) — victims’ rights to finality and safety | § 1170.95 undermines victims’ right to finality and fails to ensure victims/public safety in postconviction relief | Prop 9 contemplates postconviction proceedings; § 1170.95 contains prompt time limits and resentencing procedures that allow consideration of safety and victims’ rights | SB 1437/§ 1170.95 do not violate Prop 9; victims’ procedural rights preserved and resentencing allows safety considerations |
| Whether SB 1437/§ 1170.95 violate separation of powers (reopening final judgments or usurping clemency) | Retroactive vacatur of final murder convictions improperly intrudes on judicial finality and on the Governor’s pardon power | Legislature may enact broad penal reform; any reopening of final judgments is incidental to legitimate legislative objectives and not an act of executive clemency | No separation-of-powers violation: retroactive relief is permissible as incidental to comprehensive penal reform and does not impermissibly usurp clemency |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Lamoureux, 42 Cal.App.5th 241 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (upheld constitutionality of S.B. 1437 and rejected challenges under Props. 7, 115, 9 and separation of powers)
- People v. Superior Court (Gooden), 42 Cal.App.5th 270 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (reasoned SB 1437 addresses related but distinct subject; supported Lamoureux)
- People v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (Cal. 2015) (framework for assessing major participant and reckless indifference in felony-murder cases)
- People v. Kelly, 47 Cal.4th 1008 (Cal. 2010) (limits on legislative amendment of initiative statutes; amendment means taking away from initiative)
- People v. Superior Court (Pearson), 48 Cal.4th 564 (Cal. 2010) (principles for interpreting initiative amendments vs. related legislation)
- County of San Diego v. Commission on State Mandates, 6 Cal.5th 196 (Cal. 2018) (technical reenactment doctrine and when electorate’s goals may bar ordinary legislative amendment)
- People v. Bunn, 27 Cal.4th 1 (Cal. 2002) (separation-of-powers limits on retroactive revival of time‑barred prosecutions; discussed but distinguished)
- Way v. Superior Court, 74 Cal.App.3d 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (legislative penal reform may be applied retroactively as incidental to comprehensive reform)
- Younger v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.3d 102 (Cal. 1978) (Legislature’s remedial enactments affecting convictions are not necessarily executive clemency and can be valid legislative acts)