171 A.D.3d 442
N.Y. App. Div.2019Background
- Defendant Zhakariyya Muhammad was convicted by a jury of first-degree sexual abuse and endangering the welfare of a child; acquitted of two predatory sexual assault counts; sentenced to 7 years aggregate.
- The jury deliberated several days; on Thursday it asked what happens if it cannot reach unanimity and the court gave an Allen charge. The next morning the jury asked to "re-hear" that guidance; the court reread the Allen charge.
- On the verdict day the jury requested readbacks, took lunch, then sent a note saying they were at a "critical juncture" and asked to continue deliberating until 5:00 or 6:00 p.m., also reporting that multiple jurors had travel conflicts the following week. The court allowed further deliberations that afternoon without addressing the scheduling conflicts.
- The jury returned a split verdict that afternoon; the foreperson and each juror were polled and affirmed the verdict. Defense counsel made contemporaneous mistrial motions but did not object to the Allen charge language or to provision of written copies of the court's final charge when those were first given.
- Posttrial, defendant submitted a juror affidavit alleging she was the lone holdout and changed her vote because of pressure after the court extended deliberations; the trial court denied a CPL 330.30 motion to set aside the verdict. On appeal, defendant argues the court's responses to jury notes coerced the verdict, that the court improperly gave jurors written copies of the charge, that acquitted counts were considered at sentencing, and that the sentence was excessive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Muhammad) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether repeating the Allen charge and rereading it on request was coercive | The Allen charge repeated appropriate noncoercive language; jurors asked to "re-hear" it and the court properly complied. | Repetition of the same Allen charge without additional guidance after a note requesting further help was coercive. | Affirmed: the court's Allen charge (and its repetition) was not coercive under Hardy and circumstances; defendant preserved no objection to charge language. |
| Whether permitting further deliberation that day without addressing jurors' travel conflicts coerced the verdict | Granting the jury's request to continue was reasonable because jurors said they were at a "critical juncture" and likely to reach verdict that day. | Allowing continued deliberations without addressing scheduling created substantial risk of coercion (jurors might rush to avoid forcing peers to cancel travel). | Affirmed: no reversible coercion; better practice would be to address conflicts but court's action did not prejudice defendant. Dissent would reverse. |
| Whether the court failed to "respond meaningfully" to jury requests (Malloy) | The court sought additional guidance from counsel, had none to offer, and complied with the jury's specific request to reread instructions; claim unpreserved and in any event meritless. | Rereading without extra guidance did not answer the jury's expressed need and was insufficient under Malloy. | Affirmed: claim unpreserved; alternatively the court's response was adequate because the jury specifically requested rereading and counsel had no additional suggestions. |
| Whether providing written copies of the final charge and sentencing remarks warrant reversal | Written copies were given as an aid, with limiting instructions; defense acquiesced and made no contemporaneous objection. Sentencing court explicitly noted acquittals and used "predator" colloquially. | Distribution of written copies without consent was improper; sentencing court considered acquitted counts and sentence was excessive. | Affirmed: written-charge claim unpreserved and not mode-of-proceedings error here; sentencing claim unpreserved and, alternatively, court did not rely improperly on acquitted counts; sentence not reduced. |
Key Cases Cited
- Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896) (framework for supplemental charge urging jurors to try to reach verdict)
- People v. Hardy, 26 N.Y.3d 245 (2015) (defines noncoercive Allen charge requirements)
- People v. Malloy, 55 N.Y.2d 296 (1982) (court must "respond meaningfully" to jury requests during deliberations)
- People v. DeJesus, 134 A.D.3d 463 (1st Dept. 2015) (granting of continued deliberations despite juror schedule conflicts posed coercion risk)
- People v. Maragh, 94 N.Y.2d 569 (2000) (verdict generally not subject to impeachment by juror testimony about deliberations)
- Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (narrow exception to no-impeachment rule for overt racial bias)