People v. Mil
135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 339
| Cal. | 2012Background
- Mil was convicted of first-degree murder with burglary-murder and robbery-murder special circumstances.
- The jury was instructed on felony-murder for the actual killer but not on the required elements for a nonkiller, including major participant in the underlying felonies and reckless indifference to life.
- The Court of Appeal held the omission was harmless; the Supreme Court reverses as prejudicial.
- Facts: Rolland Coe was found murdered at the El Don Motel; Eyraud and Mil were involved, with Eyraud stabbing Coe and Mil allegedly participating in a burglary/robbery.
- Police interviews and co-defendant Eyraud’s statements were admitted; Cowen and Rodriquez testified about Mil’s conduct and statements.
- The案ical evidence showed Mil entered Room 11 during a struggle, fought Coe, and attempted to flee with Eyraud, while Eyraud stabbed Coe and Mil sought to leave with property.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether omission of two elements is harmless error | Mil argues omission is structural error. | Mil contends two omitted elements require automatic reversal. | Harmless-error review applies; not per se structural. |
| Whether the trial court’s omission of major-participant and reckless-indifference elements invalidates the verdict | Remains valid under Neder and Flood analysis. | Omission undermines jury determination of special circumstances. | Error subject to harmless-error analysis; depends on prejudice. |
| Whether the error affected the jury’s ability to determine the burglary-murder/robbery-murder special circumstances | Omission would not prejudice if elements uncontested. | Record supports possible different conclusion on omitted elements. | Remand for resentencing/retrial on the special circumstances; prejudice found. |
| What standard governs assessment of prejudice for omissions of multiple elements | Chapman/Neder framework applies; harmless beyond reasonable doubt. | Multiple omissions may be inherently prejudicial. | Neder framework applied; harmless if elements uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence; here not satisfied. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Estrada, 11 Cal.4th 568 (Cal. 1995) (defines recklessness and major-participant standards for felony-murder)
- People v. Prieto, 30 Cal.4th 226 (Cal. 2003) (sua sponte duty to instruct on essential elements)
- Flood, 18 Cal.4th 470 (Cal. 1998) (instructional error and harmless-error analysis guidance)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1999) (harmless-error analysis for omitted elements; vitiation of all findings only in certain cases)
- Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (U.S. 1986) (jury-trial rights limits on structural errors)
- Cummings, 4 Cal.4th 1233 (Cal. 1993) (omission of substantial offense elements and reversible error)
- Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (U.S. 2006) (structural vs. trial-error distinctions in harmless-error framework)
- Odle, 45 Cal.3d 386 (Cal. 1988) (California-specific application of harmless-error for special circumstances)
- People v. Williams, 16 Cal.4th 635 (Cal. 1997) (standard for assessing prejudicial effect of instructional error)
- Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (U.S. 1993) (definitive limits of harmless-error in certain due-process contexts)