People v. EstradaPeople v. Estrada
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- Before:
- Lucas
Opinion
LUCAS, C. J.
A defendant convicted of first degree murder with at least one special circumstance found true will be sentenced to either death or life
We granted review in this case to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeal over whether a trial court has a sua sponte duty to define the phrase “reckless indifference to human life” when instructing a jury regarding a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation against a defendant who is not the actual killer. We conclude that because a common understanding of the phrase “reckless indifference to human life” amply conveys the meaning of
Background
Police officers were summoned to the El Monte home of Rudolph Jaime, where they found the house ransacked and Mr. Jaime lying in a pool of blood on the living room floor. The victim was alive but gravely injured from multiple cuts and stab wounds to his chest, neck, and head. He died from his injuries shortly after the officers arrived.
Defendant Michael Siqueros and a codefendant, Conrad Estrada, were present in Jaime’s home and were immediately taken into custody. They were jointly charged in a three-count information with first degree murder, robbery, and burglary. Two felony-murder special circumstances were alleged, namely, (1) that the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery, and (2) that the murder occurred during the course of a burglary. It was also alleged, as to each count, that defendant and Estrada personally used a weapon in the commission of the offense. Finally, as to defendant only, an allegation was made that he suffered two prior serious felony convictions.
Defendant and Estrada were tried jointly before a jury. At trial, evidence was introduced that defendant was not the actual killer. In light of this
Following deliberations, the jury found both defendants guilty of first degree murder, robbery, and burglary. The jury also found true, as to each defendant, the special circumstance allegations that the murder of Jaime was committed while defendants were engaged in the robbery and burglary of the victim’s home. Consistent with the prosecution’s version of the evidence, the jury found true the allegations that Estrada personally used a knife during the commission of each offense, but found the same allegations not true as to defendant.
Both defendants were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, with consecutive midterm sentences for the robbery and burglary convictions stayed pursuant to section 654. In addition, the court imposed on defendant a restitution fine of $5,000, and a consecutive sentence of 10 years, having found true the allegation that defendant suffered 2 prior serious felony convictions.
Defendant and Estrada jointly appealed their convictions and sentences on numerous grounds. Rejecting all contentions, the Court of Appeal unanimously affirmed the judgments.
In the portion of its opinion relevant to the issue presented here, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court had no sua sponte duty to define the phrase “reckless indifference to human life.” Noting that defendant failed to request an explanatory instruction, the court found no trial court error. In so holding, the court expressly disagreed with the conclusion reached in People v. Purcell (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 65 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 242] (hereafter Purcell).
Discussion
In a criminal case, a trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on “ ‘ “ ‘the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 503 [244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803].) The “general principles of law governing the case” are those principles connected with the evidence and which are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case. (Ibid.) People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 323 [185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311].) As to pertinent matters falling outside the definition of a “general principle of law governing the case,” it is “defendant’s obligation to request any clarifying or amplifying instruction.” (People v. Kimble, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 503.)
As we explained in People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306 [246 Cal.Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082], “[t]he language of a statute defining a crime or defense is generally an appropriate and desirable basis for an instruction, and is ordinarily sufficient when the defendant fails to request amplification. If the jury would have no difficulty in understanding the statute without guidance, the court need do no more than instruct in statutory language.” (Id. at p. 327; see also People v. Rogers (1971) 5 Cal.3d 129, 138 [95 Cal.Rptr. 601, 486 P.2d 129]; People v. Page (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 569, 577 [163 Cal.Rptr. 839].)
The rule to be applied in determining whether the meaning of a statute is adequately conveyed by its express terms is well established. When a word or phrase “ ‘is commonly understood by those familiar with the English language and is not used in a technical sense peculiar to the law, the court is not required to give an instruction as to its meaning in the absence of a request.’”
(People
v.
Rowland
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 270-271 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897], citing
People
v.
Bonin
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 698 [250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217]; see also
People
v.
Howard
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 408 [243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279];
People
v.
Williams
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1314-1315 [248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221];
People
v.
Anderson
(1966) 64 Cal.2d 633, 639 [51 Cal.Rptr. 238, 414 P.2d 366].) A word or phrase having a technical, legal meaning requiring clarification by the court is one that has a definition that
differs
from its nonlegal meaning. (See, e.g.,
People
v.
Raley
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 901 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712] [no
legal
definition of “sadistic purpose”].) Thus, as the court in
People
v.
Richie
(1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1347 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 200] explains, terms are held to require clarification by the trial
The jury in this case was instructed in the language of
The portion of the statutory language of
Tison
was concerned with whether imposition of the
death penalty
on an accomplice to a felony murder who neither killed nor intended to kill the victim would violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. The decision itself does not stand for the proposition that imposition of a penalty less severe than death, such as life imprisonment without parole, would offend constitutional principles in the absence of proof of “reckless indifference to human life.” (Cf.
Rosenberg
v.
Henderson
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) 733 F.Supp. 577, 578 [rule of
Tison
inapplicable to defendant sentenced to life imprisonment].) Nonetheless,
Tison
is the source of the language of
The defendants in Tison were two brothers sentenced to death for their involvement in the roadside kidnapping, robbery, and murder of a family of four. At trial, it was established that the defendants orchestrated the prison escape of their father and his cellmate, arming themselves, a third brother, and the two convicted murderers with guns while still inside prison walls, and assisting in the escapees’ flight after the breakout. When a tire on the group’s getaway car went flat on the highway, one of the defendants flagged down a passing motorist for help. Both of the defendants participated in the kidnapping and robbery of the occupants of the stopped vehicle, and were nearby when their father and his cellmate shot and killed the four victims. (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 139-141 [95 L.Ed.2d at pp. 132-134].)
Relying on Enmundv. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 [73 L.Ed.2d 1140,102 S.Ct. 3368], the Tison defendants contended that because they did not intend to kill the victims, their death sentences did not comport with the Eighth Amendment’s requirement that the death penalty be proportional to the culpability of the defendant. The high court rejected the defendants’ argument. Noting that “[a] critical facet of the individualized determination of culpability required in capital cases is the mental state with which the defendant commits the crime” (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 156 [95 L.Ed.2d at p. 141]), the court found that, when faced with determining the level of a defendant’s culpability for which the state may exact the death penalty, focusing solely on the question of whether the defendant intended to kill the victim was unsatisfactory. (Id. at p. 157 [95 L.Ed.2d at p. 144].)
In the high court’s view, “some nonintentional murderers may be among the most dangerous and inhumane of all—the person who tortures another not caring whether the victim lives or dies, or the robber who shoots someone in the course of the robbery, utterly indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob may have the unintended consequence of killing the victim as well as taking the victim’s property. This reckless indifference to the value of human life may be every bit as shocking to the moral sense as an ‘intent to kill.’ ” (481 U.S. at p. 157 [95 L.Ed.2d at p. 144].)
Finding support in the Model Penal Code, which equates reckless killing with intentional killing for purposes of classifying various types of homicide, the court in
Tison
concluded that “the reckless disregard for human life
Tison thus instructs that the culpable mental state of “reckless indifference to life” is one in which the defendant “knowingly engag[es] in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death” (481 U.S. at p. 157 [95 L.Ed.2d at p. 144]), and it is this meaning that we ascribe to the statutory phrase “reckless indifference to human life” in section 190.2(d). Our task now becomes to determine whether the statutory meaning of the phrase is adequately conveyed by a common understanding of its terms.
Relying on the court’s holding in Purcell, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th 65, defendant argues that the phrase, “reckless indifference to human life,” has a technical, legal meaning that is not conveyed by an average juror’s understanding of the words. In Purcell, the court determined that in common parlance, the phrase “reckless indifference to human life” fails to make clear the requisite mental state, expressed in Tison, that a defendant must subjectively appreciate that his or her acts were extremely likely to result in the death of an innocent human life. (Purcell, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 74.) In the court’s view, “ ‘reckless indifference’ commonly would be understood to mean something akin to extreme carelessness or extreme lack of concern.” (Id. at p. 72, fn. omitted.)
We disagree and find that, when considered in its entirety—as the phrase is presented to the jury—“reckless indifference to human life” is commonly understood to mean that the defendant was subjectively aware that his or her participation in the felony involved a grave risk of death. The common meaning of the term “indifference,” referring to “the state of being indifferent,” is that which is “regarded as being of no significant importance or value.” (Webster’s New Intemat. Diet. (3d ed. 1981) p. 1151, col. 1.) To regard something, even to regard it as worthless, is to be aware of it. (See id. at p. 1911, col. 1 [“regard” is synonymous with “consider, evaluate, judge”].)
Although the term “reckless”—standing alone—may arguably be understood in common parlance to mean simply neglectful, heedless, or rash (see Webster’s New Intemat. Diet., supra, at p. 1896, col. 1), when the word is placed in context within the statutory phrase “indifference to human life,” what is conveyed to the jury is more than mere negligence.
In reaching our conclusion in Dellinger, supra, we noted that the word “disregard” has been defined as describing the situation in which a lack of attention is “intentional or willful.” (49 Cal.3d at p. 1219.) We also found persuasive the observation of the court in People v. Benson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1223, 1230, footnote 4 [259 Cal.Rptr. 9] that an individual cannot be said to have wantonly disregarded a fact without having regarded it in the first instance. (49 Cal.3d at p. 1220.) Likewise, in this case, one cannot be indifferent to something of which he or she is unaware.
Consistent with our decision in
Dellinger,
we conclude the generally accepted meaning of the phrase, “reckless indifference to human life,” in common parlance amply conveys to the jury the requirement of a defendant’s subjective awareness of the grave risk to human life created by his or her participation in the underlying felony. This is the meaning intended by the phrase “reckless indifference to human life” as it is used in section 190.2(d), and as defined in
Tison.
The phrase therefore does not have a technical meaning peculiar to the law, and the trial court had no sua sponte duty to further define the statutory phrase for the jury. Indeed, by expressly declining to “delineate the particular types of conduct and states of mind
We note that following the Court of Appeal’s decision in Purcell, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th 65, language from that opinion was added to CALJIC No. 8.80.1. A portion of the standard jury instruction now reads as follows: “A defendant acts with reckless indifference to human life when such defendant knew or was aware that [his] [her] acts involved an extreme likelihood that such acts could result in the death of an innocent human being.” (Ibid.) Although we conclude that the trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to further amplify “reckless indifference to human life,” and therefore disapprove Purcell, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th 65, our holding should not be understood to discourage trial courts from amplifying the statutory language for the jury. (Cf. People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 501, fn. 16 [244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803].) Except for the Purcell-mspktd portion of CALJIC No. 8.80.1 regarding “an extreme likelihood” of risk to innocent human life, discussed more fully below, we recognize that in appropriate cases, a clarifying instruction must be given on request. (Cf. People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 153 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781]; cf. People v. Cordero (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 275, 282 [264 Cal.Rptr. 774] [defendant entitled to requested clarifying instruction on theory of defense so long as supported by substantial evidence].)
According to the court in Purcell, from which the language of the clarifying instruction derives, “the Tison court intended the phrase ‘reckless indifference to human life’ to refer to a mental state which includes subjective appreciation, or knowledge, by the defendant that the defendant’s acts involved an extreme likelihood that such acts could result in the death of an innocent human being.” (Purcell, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 74, italics added.) Although the Court of Appeal in Purcell purported to base its formulation of Tison’s rule on the language of that case, a close reading of Tison fails to disclose the high court’s intent to set the degree of risk posed by a defendant’s conduct at the level of “extreme likelihood.”
In fact,
Tison
sets forth various descriptions of the life-threatening risk of which a defendant who knowingly participates in criminal activities must be subjectively aware in order for imposition of the death penalty to be constitutionally permissible. (See
Tison, supra,
481 U.S. at pp. 149 [95 L.Ed.2d at p. 139] [“likelihood of a killing in the course of a robbery [was] so
The question remains what language should replace the standard instruction’s present reference to an “extreme likelihood” of risk. In light of the intent of the voters to incorporate Tison‘s holding into section 190.2(d) (see Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 298, fn. 16), we believe that, in the event the request for a clarifying instruction is granted, the jury should be instructed in the language of Tison itself. Although the high court provided several descriptions of the requisite mental state throughout its opinion, we think it prudent to instruct according to the rule set forth in the holding of that case, i.e., “that the reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable mental state, a mental state that may be taken into account in making a capital sentencing judgment when that conduct causes its natural, though also not inevitable, lethal result.” (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 157-158 [95 L.Ed.2d at p. 144].)
Thus, we find that in the event a request for clarification of the phrase “reckless indifference to human life” is granted, the present reference in CALJIC No. 8.80.1 to an “extreme likelihood” of risk to innocent life should be replaced with the language from Tison concerning a “grave” risk of death.
Defendant further contends that in the absence of further definition by this court, the phrase “reckless indifference to human life” is too vague to comport with federal and state constitutional guarantees of due process and proscriptions against cruel and/or unusual punishment. The record in this case discloses, however, that defendant asserts these claims for the first time in his opening brief in this court, and he fails to make any attempt to show that they are “fairly included” in the issue on which his petition for review was granted. (See
Having concluded that, absent a request, the court is not required to clarify for the jury the phrase “reckless indifference to human life,” we further reject defendant’s additional contention that, without some limiting instruction, the statutory phrase is unconstitutionally vague. In determining whether a statute is sufficiently certain to comport with due process standards, the court will “look first to the language of the statute, then to its legislative history, and finally to California decisions construing the statutory language.” (Pryor v. Municipal Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 246 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].) A similar analytical framework is used when a vagueness claim is grounded on Eighth Amendment principles. Thus, in evaluating whether a capital sentencing scheme provides sufficient guidance to the sentencer, the court first inquires whether the statutory language is vague. (Arave v. Creech (1993) 507 U.S. 463, 470-471 [123 L.Ed.2d 188, 198, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 1540].) If the words of the statute themselves are uncertain, the court looks to decisions further defining the vague statutory language, and evaluates whether such construction meets the constitutional requirement of providing guidance to the sentencer. (Ibid.)
We have determined that, viewing the statutory language as a whole, the common understanding of the phrase “reckless indifference to human life” conveys the notion that a defendant subjectively appreciated that his or her conduct created a grave risk of death. Because the ordinary meaning of the statutory phrase amply communicates the parameters of the mental state subjecting a defendant to a sentence of death or lifelong incarceration—as articulated in Tison—the statute is sufficiently certain. (Cf. Martin v. State (1977) 261 Ark. 80 [547 S.W.2d 81, 82] [statutory phrase “circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” not unconstitutionally vague].) Our inquiry need go no further.
Conclusion and Disposition
We find the statutory phrase “reckless indifference to human life” is commonly understood to mean that a defendant subjectively appreciated that his or her conduct created a grave risk to human life, and thus conveys the meaning of section 190.2(d), as derived from Tison. In light of this determination, we hold that the trial court had no sua sponte duty to further explain the statutory phrase for the jury.
Mosk, J., Kennard, J., Arabian, J., Baxter, J., George, J., and Werdegar, J., concurred.