2022 COA 82
Colo. Ct. App.2022Background
- J.C., a teenage boy, drank alcohol at Lancaster’s home and, while heavily intoxicated, was subjected to repeated sexual contact (oral sex and anal penetration); Lancaster gave J.C. money and threatened jail to secure his silence after incidents.
- J.C. eventually reported the abuse; a jury convicted Lancaster of sexual assault on a child <15, unlawful sexual contact, sexual assault (victim incapable of appraising conduct), contributing to delinquency of a minor, and two counts of bribery.
- The bribery counts were based on money Lancaster gave J.C. and threats made before any criminal charges or formal proceedings were initiated.
- The prosecution introduced prior-act evidence: M.O. alleged a 1990 incident in which Lancaster befriended him, supplied alcohol, and performed oral sex while M.O. was vulnerable; a recorded pretext call and interviews followed.
- Lancaster challenged (1) the temporal scope of the bribery statute (arguing it applies only to existing proceedings), (2) sufficiency of evidence on the victim-incapable and bribery counts, and (3) admission of the prior-act evidence under CRE 404(b)/§16-10-301. The court affirmed all convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does “any official proceeding” in the bribery statute require a pending proceeding? | Statute protects against bribery intended to influence testimony in pending or future official proceedings. | Bribery requires that an official proceeding already be initiated. | "Any official proceeding" includes future proceedings; statute not limited to pending matters. |
| Sufficiency of bribery evidence | Lancaster gave money and threatened J.C. to silence him; jury could infer intent to influence future testimony. | Because no proceedings had started, bribery elements not met. | Evidence sufficient: jury could reasonably find Lancaster believed J.C. would be called and paid him to influence future testimony. |
| Sufficiency of sexual-assault (victim incapable) evidence | J.C. drank 10–12 mixed drinks, could not stand/see straight, and testified he "just agreed to anything," supporting incapacity. | J.C.’s coherent, detailed testimony shows he appreciated his conduct. | Evidence sufficient: a reasonable juror could find J.C. was incapable of appraising his conduct. |
| Admission of prior-act (M.O.) evidence under CRE 404(b)/§16-10-301 | Prior act showed motive, common plan (befriending, alcohol, isolating, sexual contact), and knowledge; probative value outweighed prejudice. | Prior act was remote, dissimilar, and prejudicial; single act insufficient to show a pattern. | No abuse of discretion: Spoto factors satisfied; probative value not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; limiting instruction given. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Yascavage, 101 P.3d 1090 (Colo. 2004) (interpreting “any official proceeding” in tampering statute to include future proceedings)
- People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1990) (four-part test for admissibility of other-act evidence)
- Platt v. People, 201 P.3d 545 (Colo. 2009) (standard for victim being incapable of appraising nature of conduct)
- People v. Yusem, 210 P.3d 458 (Colo. 2009) (CRE 403 balancing and analysis of other-act evidence)
- Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287 (Colo. 2010) (substantial-evidence standard for sufficiency review)