People v. Jandres
171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 849
Cal. Ct. App.2014Background
- Defendant Jose Saul Jandres was tried for forcible rape, kidnapping to commit rape, and felony false imprisonment for an assault on Adriana Doe in March 2009; the jury convicted him on the rape, kidnapping, and false imprisonment counts and acquitted him of criminal threats. The court later sentenced him to 25 years to life for rape with a kidnapping enhancement.
- The prosecution introduced testimony from Madeline Doe about a June 2009 break-in in which the defendant allegedly put his finger in the mouth of an 11‑year‑old and carried her briefly; the People offered that testimony as uncharged sexual‑offense propensity evidence under Evidence Code § 1108 (and § 1101(b)).
- The trial court admitted Madeline’s testimony after a §402 hearing, and the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 1191 about uncharged sex‑offense evidence but not instructed on the specific elements of Penal Code § 647.6 (the sexual‑offense theory the prosecution relied on).
- Prosecutor statements in closing incorrectly told the jury (1) DNA proved the defendant put his finger in Madeline’s mouth and (2) the defendant had admitted the prior offense so the jury did not need to worry about the preponderance standard; there was also confusion at trial about whether the DNA swab at issue came from a palm or cheek swab.
- On appeal the Court of Appeal found the trial court erred in admitting the Madeline evidence under §352 (prejudicial outweighing probative), and that the jury instructions misstated the law by (a) characterizing the uncharged act as an attempted kidnapping (not a §647.6 sexual offense), (b) failing to instruct on §647.6 elements and the §1108 preponderance finding, and (c) permitting use of the evidence for non‑sexual charges; the court reversed and remanded for retrial and ordered vacation of the false‑imprisonment conviction as a lesser‑included offense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Madeline Doe testimony under §1108 (whether prior act is a statutory “sexual offense”) | Madeline’s touching (finger in mouth) fits §1108 because it can be prosecuted as Penal Code §647.6 (annoying/molesting a child) and thus is admissible propensity evidence | The attempted kidnapping conviction is non‑sexual; the conduct lacks proof of abnormal sexual motivation and thus §1108 does not apply | Trial court could reasonably find the jury might conclude the conduct violated §647.6, so no abuse of discretion on that threshold point (but see §352 analysis) |
| Exclusion under Evidence Code §352 (prejudice vs. probative value) | Madeline’s conduct is highly probative of sexual propensity and supports inference of intent/absence of consent in the charged rape | The incidents differ materially (victim ages, circumstances, conduct) and the propensity evidence is low probative but highly prejudicial and inflammatory; DNA/closing statements inflated its strength | Court abused discretion under §352: prejudice substantially outweighed probative value; erroneous admission was prejudicial under Watson when considered with other errors |
| Jury instructions about uncharged‑offense evidence (CALCRIM No.1191 and prosecutor statements) | Instruction permitted proper use of prior sexual‑offense evidence to show propensity; prosecutor’s comments merely argued reasonable uses | Instructions misidentified the prior offense (attempted kidnapping), omitted §647.6 elements and preponderance burden, and suggested the evidence could be used for non‑sexual charges; prosecutor misstated DNA/admission facts | Instructions misstated law; errors were not harmless given the close, credibility‑dependent case and cumulative effect with §1108/§352 error |
| Conviction for felony false imprisonment together with kidnapping for rape (lesser‑included issue) | People originally prosecuted both; they conceded the point on appeal | Defendant argued he could not be convicted of both the greater kidnapping for rape and its necessarily included false imprisonment | Court ordered the false‑imprisonment conviction vacated as a lesser‑included offense (People conceded) |
Key Cases Cited
- Falsetta v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.4th 903 (Cal. 1999) (§1108 allows prior sexual‑offense propensity evidence but §352 must limit undue prejudice)
- Cottone v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.4th 269 (Cal. 2013) (trial court must determine whether charging document alleges a §1108 “sexual offense” before admitting propensity evidence)
- Nguyen v. Superior Court, 184 Cal.App.4th 1096 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (uncharged, nonsexual conduct may not be admitted under §1108)
- Lucas v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.4th 415 (Cal. 1995) (preliminary fact questions and judicial gatekeeping when relevance depends on such facts)
- Earle v. Superior Court, 172 Cal.App.4th 372 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (limits on using dissimilar uncharged sex acts under §352)
- Harris v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.App.4th 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (§1108 constitutional limits and the necessity of §352 balancing)
- Villatoro v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.4th 1152 (Cal. 2012) (dissimilar sexual offenses may be excluded under §352)
- Breverman v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.4th 142 (Cal. 1998) (standard for assessing what a jury likely would have done absent error)
- Watson v. State, 46 Cal.2d 818 (Cal. 1956) (reasonable‑probability test for non‑constitutional error)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967) (harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard for federal constitutional error)