People v. Harrison
73 Cal.App.5th 429
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2021Background
- Senate Bill 1437 (effective Jan. 1, 2019) narrowed felony-murder liability and added Penal Code §1170.95, permitting eligible prisoners to seek vacatur/resentencing if they could not be convicted under the amended §§188/189.
- In 2000 Harrison was convicted after a bench trial of felony murder (as an accomplice to robbery) for the killing of Harless; the court acquitted on the robbery-murder special circumstance (§190.2(a)(17)), finding Harrison was not the actual killer, lacked intent to kill, and (based on a mistaken view of the law) did not act with reckless indifference to innocent human life.
- Harrison received 25 years to life on the murder count and later filed a §1170.95 petition in 2019; counsel was appointed and the prosecutor initially conceded prima facie but later withdrew the concession.
- The resentencing court denied the petition at the prima facie stage after reviewing trial evidence and finding Harrison could still be convicted under the amended law as a major participant who acted with reckless indifference.
- The Court of Appeal held the resentencing court erred by weighing evidence at the §1170.95 prima facie stage and further held the earlier judicial acquittal qualified as a prior finding under §1170.95(d)(2), entitling Harrison to vacation of his murder conviction and resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Harrison) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of §1170.95(c) prima facie inquiry | Court may consult record and can deny if record shows petitioner could be convicted under current law | Court must accept petition allegations as true and may not engage in factfinding at prima facie stage | Trial court erred by weighing evidence; prima facie inquiry is limited and should not resolve disputed facts absent a record that conclusively refutes the petition |
| Effect of prior judicial acquittal under §1170.95(d)(2) | Acquittal is not an affirmative finding of innocence; §1170.95(d)(2) should not bar a resentencing hearing | A prior court finding that petitioner did not act with reckless indifference or was not a major participant mandates vacatur/resentencing under §1170.95(d)(2) | A prior judicial acquittal on the special circumstance qualifies as a prior finding under §1170.95(d)(2) and requires vacatur/resentencing; courts cannot re-litigate such prior findings |
| Proper remedy (hearing vs. immediate relief) | Remand for an evidentiary hearing; prosecution must prove ineligibility beyond a reasonable doubt | No remand needed; §1170.95(d)(2) mandates vacatur and resentencing based on the prior finding | Relief was mandatory here: reverse denial, grant the petition, vacate the murder conviction, and resentence without further hearing |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Lewis, 11 Cal.5th 952 (explains limited scope of prima facie inquiry under §1170.95)
- People v. Ramirez, 41 Cal.App.5th 923 (habeas ruling finding insufficient evidence of major-participant/reckless-indifference satisfied §1170.95(d)(2))
- People v. Clayton, 66 Cal.App.5th 145 (majority held jury acquittal on special circumstance can trigger §1170.95(d)(2))
- People v. Briscoe, 92 Cal.App.4th 568 (rejects requirement of reckless indifference to an "innocent" human life)
- People v. Santamaria, 8 Cal.4th 903 (split verdicts and limits of collateral estoppel; distinguished here)
- Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (judicial acquittal is conclusive for double jeopardy purposes even if based on legal error)
- People v. Drayton, 47 Cal.App.5th 965 (trial court erred by engaging in factfinding at §1170.95 prima facie stage)