People v. Gruis, 94 Cal.App.5th 19

In May 2018 police seized multiple electronic devices from Michael Gruis and found numerous explicit images and videos of a 13‑year‑old victim; defendant was charged with possession of child pornography (Pen. Code, § 311.11(a)).
Gruis pleaded no contest to one count of possession of child pornography; another count was dismissed. The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on two years’ probation with one year in county jail.
A probation condition prohibited Gruis from possessing “any pornographic magazines, videos, pictures or written material or images unless prescribed by a therapist during the course of your treatment.”
Gruis appealed, arguing the term “pornographic” in the probation condition is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it could sweep in protected adult sexually explicit materials.
The Court of Appeal reviewed the probation condition de novo, recognizing the State’s broad discretion to impose conditions but subjecting those conditions to vagueness and overbreadth constraints.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Vagueness of the term “pornographic” in the probation condition	The People acknowledged the term is vague as written but urged the court could cure vagueness by deferring to the probation officer’s determination or by construing the term via the child‑porn statute	The term “pornographic” is inherently subjective and fails to give fair warning or objective standards for enforcement	The court held the no‑pornography term as written is unconstitutionally vague and remanded to strike or modify the condition; it rejected delegation to probation officers and suggested defining “pornographic” by reference to Penal Code §§ 311.11(a) and 311.4(d) plus limiting language (e.g., "primary purpose")
Overbreadth (First Amendment) — prohibition on adult sexually explicit materials	The People argued probation conditions restricting sexually stimulating materials can be upheld to protect public safety and rehabilitation of sex offenders	Gruis argued the ban is overbroad because it bars protected, nonobscene adult sexual material and the record shows no link between viewing adult material and his offense	The court did not decide the merits; it vacated the condition on vagueness grounds and remanded, but advised the trial court to consider tailoring (and to evaluate any as‑applied overbreadth on remand)

Sheena K. v. Superior Court, 40 Cal.4th 875 (2007) (sets vagueness and fair‑warning standards for probation conditions)
People v. Carbajal, 10 Cal.4th 1114 (1995) (trial court has broad but not unlimited discretion to impose probation conditions)
United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2003) (using statutory definition of sexually explicit conduct to render a pornography prohibition non‑subjective)
In re D.H., 4 Cal.App.5th 722 (2016) (rejects cure-by-delegation to probation officer; recognizes “pornography” is subjective)
In re David C., 47 Cal.App.5th 657 (2020) (upheld condition banning materials whose primary purpose is sexual arousal)
People v. Olguin, 45 Cal.4th 375 (2008) (requires close tailoring of conditions that infringe constitutional rights)
United States v. Gnirke, 775 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2015) (illustrates how a literal ban on depictions of sexual conduct could reach mainstream works of art and film)
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (First Amendment privacy principle that possession of obscene material in the home is protected)