People v. Grant, 2022 IL 126824

Background

Andrew Grant was convicted in 2004 of aggravated criminal sexual assault; a sexual‑assault exam collected vaginal swabs, a single hair, and fingernail scrapings, but the hair and scrapings were never forensically tested.
In 2007 the Peoria Police Department destroyed all forensic evidence in the case pursuant to its policy.
In 2013 the Illinois Innocence Project sought postconviction forensic testing under 725 ILCS 5/116‑3 for the hair; the circuit court initially denied testing but the appellate court reversed and remanded.
On remand counsel learned the evidence had been destroyed and Grant moved for a new trial or judgment n.o.v., arguing PPD violated the statutory preservation duty in 725 ILCS 5/116‑4.
The appellate court vacated Grant’s conviction and ordered any retrial to include a jury instruction that the State failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence; the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that although section 116‑4 is mandatory, the legislature prescribed the remedy (criminal penalty under 720 ILCS 5/33‑5) and did not intend vacatur.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Grant)	Held
Is the statutory duty in 725 ILCS 5/116‑4 (preserve forensic evidence) mandatory or directory?	The duty is mandatory and the legislature supplied a consequence (criminal liability under 720 ILCS 5/33‑5 for intentional violations).	The duty is mandatory and violations that destroy the ability to test evidence warrant a remedy that relieves the injury (vacatur/new trial).	The Court: 116‑4 is mandatory; the legislature provided the consequence in 33‑5, so no separate inference of vacatur is warranted.
Does a violation of 116‑4 require vacatur of the underlying conviction?	No; the statute does not say vacatur is the remedy and the legislature provided the remedy it intended.	Yes; destruction of evidence permanently eviscerates the right to postconviction testing and requires vacatur to vindicate the right.	The Court: No vacatur. The plain text and related statute show the legislature did not intend vacatur as a consequence.
Does the criminal penalty in 720 ILCS 5/33‑5 (for intentional failure) constitute the statutory consequence for 116‑4 violations, including negligent destruction?	Yes; the existence of 33‑5 shows the legislature intended a concrete consequence.	No; 33‑5 covers only intentional acts and provides no relief to defendants harmed by negligent or reckless destruction.	The Court: 33‑5 demonstrates legislative intent about consequences; the Court did not adopt a separate remedy for negligent or reckless destruction.
Would an adverse‑inference/Youngblood jury instruction be appropriate on retrial?	Not reached as a necessary ruling given reversal of the appellate court.	Sought an adverse‑inference instruction to cure the lost testing opportunity.	The Court declined to decide the Youngblood instruction issue.

Key Cases Cited

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (standards governing counsel withdrawal on appeal).
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (due‑process framework for pretrial loss of potentially exculpatory evidence).
District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009) (postconviction forensic testing is a statutory, not constitutional, right).
People v. Ramirez, 214 Ill. 2d 176 (2005) (strict compliance with certain mandatory statutory prerequisites is required).
People v. Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d 43 (2005) (mandatory‑directory analysis for procedural statutes).
People v. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507 (2009) (mandatory‑directory framework and consequences of noncompliance).