2020 IL App (3d) 160758
Ill. App. Ct.2020Background
- Andrew Grant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and sentenced to 14 years; the victim (Z.G.) was physically disabled (cerebral palsy and legally blind).
- During a post-assault medical exam, a single hair and fingernail scrapings were collected but were not DNA-tested at trial; no semen was identified on swabs.
- Grant pursued postconviction forensic testing under 725 ILCS 5/116-3; this court previously held he met the statutory threshold for testing of the hair (People v. Grant, 2016 IL App (3d) 140211).
- On remand the parties discovered that the Peoria Police Department had destroyed all forensic evidence in 2007 in violation of section 116-4, which requires preservation of forensic evidence until completion of sentence and MSR.
- The trial court denied Grant’s motion for a new trial or JNOV, finding the order for testing could not be complied with and that destruction was not willful; Grant appealed.
- The appellate majority held the evidence-preservation mandate in section 116-4 is mandatory, vacated Grant’s conviction, and remanded for further proceedings with an instruction that a retrial jury may be told of the State’s failure to preserve evidence and may draw an adverse inference.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness of appeal given completed sentence | State: case moot because Grant completed incarceration and MSR, so no effective remedy | Grant: conviction—not sentence—remains and vacatur/exoneration is meaningful; appeal not moot | Not moot; conviction challenge survives completion of sentence |
| Mandatory vs. directory status of §116-4 evidence-retention rule | State: statute’s criminal penalty (720 ILCS 5/33-5) shows adequate consequence; preservation rule is directory | Grant: destruction irreparably extinguishes statutory right to postconviction testing; legislature must have intended a judicial remedy | §116-4 is mandatory; failure to comply generally requires vacatur of conviction because the protected right would be injured under a directory reading |
| Appropriate remedy for statutory violation (vacatur, new trial, jury instruction) | State: legislative penalty suffices; no automatic vacatur; remedy should follow statute | Grant: vacatur and retrial appropriate; jury should be informed of destroyed evidence and may draw adverse inference | Vacatur of conviction and remand for further proceedings; at retrial jury may be instructed it can consider State’s failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence (per Youngblood guidance) |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Robinson, 217 Ill.2d 43 (Ill. 2005) (framework for mandatory vs. directory statutory analysis)
- People v. Delvillar, 235 Ill.2d 507 (Ill. 2009) (application of mandatory/directory rule and protection-of-rights exception)
- In re M.I., 2013 IL 113776 (Ill. 2013) (statutory construction guidance for mandatory/directory consequences)
- Pullen v. Mulligan, 138 Ill.2d 21 (Ill. 1990) (legislative intent and consequences in statutory construction)
- Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (U.S. 1988) (permitting adverse inference instructions where State failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence in bad faith)
- District Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (U.S. 2009) (declining to recognize a freestanding constitutional right to postconviction DNA testing)