People v. Flores CA4/1, D078725

Background

Defendant Martin Flores, paternal grandfather, was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against two granddaughters (Doe 1 born 2006; Doe 2 born 2008), including aggravated sexual assault, forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, and lewd acts; he also pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography. Sentence: 210 years plus consecutive life without parole.
Victims disclosed abuse years later (Doe 1 at age 11 after watching a TV show); forensic interviews and trial testimony described repeated abuse beginning when the girls were about 3–6 and occurring in Flores’s bedroom and other locations.
Mother made a police-arranged pretext call in which Flores apologized and admitted some touching but denied penetration; Flores later was interviewed at the station, given Miranda warnings in Spanish, and made multiple incriminating admissions before arrest.
Forensic computer exam found numerous child pornography videos. Medical exam showed no trauma (expert explained rapid healing). Jury convicted on counts 1–11 and found kidnapping and multiple-victim enhancements true.
On appeal Flores challenged: denial of suppression of station statements (Miranda), alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing (misstating consent law/age of consent), failure to instruct on certain lesser included offenses, insufficiency/misinstruction on the kidnapping (asportation) enhancement, cumulative error, and clerical minute‑order mistakes.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (Flores)	Held
Whether custodial statements should be suppressed (Miranda)	Statements admissible: Flores received Miranda warnings in Spanish, understood them, and (after clarification) knowingly and voluntarily waived rights; his post‑warning question about counsel was ambiguous and did not require cessation.	Interrogation custodial and sergeant failed to clarify Flores’s question about needing an attorney (a prewaiver ambiguity), so any subsequent statements should be suppressed as obtained in violation of Miranda.	Affirmed. Court applied independent review to recorded interrogation and found Flores knowingly and voluntarily waived rights; his inquiry about counsel was ambiguous and adequately clarified by officer. No Miranda violation.
Prosecutorial remarks asserting victims "cannot legally consent; legal age 18" in closing	Prosecutor’s argument was consistent with law that children under 14 cannot validly consent and was harmless given evidence and defenses.	Misstatement misled jury by conflating legal incapacity and consent element; argument and slides asserting age 18 misstated law and constituted misconduct.	No reversible error. Even assuming error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: defendant did not assert actual consent defense, victims were very young, and defense highlighted correct jury instructions.
Failure to instruct on lesser included offenses (unlawful sexual intercourse §261.5; oral copulation with minor §287/former §288a)	People conceded those crimes are lesser included under the accusatory‑pleading test but argued no substantial evidence supported them and any error was harmless.	Court should have instructed sua sponte on these lesser included offenses because the accusatory pleading encompassed minors; failure deprived Flores of options to convict on lesser crimes.	No reversible error. Although lesser offenses met accusatory‑pleading test, there was no substantial evidence a jury could find only the lesser crimes (victims were very young, defendant denied consent defense). Even if error, harmless under Watson.
Sufficiency of evidence and instruction on kidnapping enhancement (asportation for Count 10)	Movement of Doe 2 from hallway bathroom back into Flores’s locked bedroom increased risk, decreased detection, and allowed additional abuse — substantial asportation; CALCRIM No.1215 was proper.	Movement was de minimis (a few feet) and therefore insufficient for kidnapping; jury instruction misstated law by allowing consideration of whether movement was merely incidental to the associated crime.	Held. Substantial evidence supported asportation given circumstances (prevented escape, locked bedroom, increased risk/decreased detection). Any instruction issue was harmless.

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (Miranda advisals and waiver principles)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (U.S. 1994) (post‑waiver ambiguous invocation need not be clarified)
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (U.S. 2010) (silence and waiver; ambiguous invocations do not require cessation)
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (U.S. 1979) (waiver may be inferred from actions and words)
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (U.S. 1986) (totality of circumstances test for Miranda waiver)
People v. Duff, 58 Cal.4th 527 (Cal. 2014) (discussing prewaiver versus postwaiver invocation issues)
People v. Leon, 8 Cal.5th 831 (Cal. 2020) (standard of review for Miranda waiver and admissibility)
People v. Breverman, 19 Cal.4th 142 (Cal. 1998) (duty to instruct on lesser included offenses)
People v. Smith, 57 Cal.4th 232 (Cal. 2013) (elements test and accusatory‑pleading test for lesser included offenses)
People v. Martinez, 20 Cal.4th 225 (Cal. 1999) (asportation/substantial distance — totality of circumstances)
People v. Jackson, 58 Cal.4th 724 (Cal. 2014) (assessing sufficiency — force and duress factors)