People v. Figueroa
11 Cal. App. 5th 665
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Figueroa was charged with two felonies (with gang enhancements) and one misdemeanor in July 2013; he waived arraignment but did not enter a plea before competency doubts arose.
- On August 14, 2013 the court suspended proceedings under §1368 due to a doubt as to competency; proceedings were reinstated on March 12, 2014 after the court found him competent.
- On March 24, 2014 the court (erroneously) told Figueroa he had a right to a preliminary hearing within 60 days of reinstatement; Figueroa personally waived that purported right.
- On April 10, 2014 Figueroa pleaded not guilty and personally waived the 10-court-day preliminary-hearing requirement, but was not asked to (and did not) personally waive the 60-day right measured from his plea.
- Multiple continuances followed and no preliminary examination occurred within 60 days of the April 10, 2014 plea; the trial court granted the dismissal motion under §859b and the People appealed.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Figueroa’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which event triggers §859b’s 60-day limit when arraignment, plea, and reinstatement differ in time? | The People argued the 60 days ran from reinstatement (and that Figueroa waived that period). | Figueroa argued the 60 days run from the later of arraignment or plea (here, his April 10, 2014 plea) and he did not waive that right after pleading. | The court held the 60-day period is triggered by the later of arraignment or plea (and reinstatement only matters when timelines were already running at suspension); here the plea triggered the 60-day clock. |
| Was the personal waiver obtained March 24, 2014 effective to waive the 60-day period applicable after the April 10, 2014 plea? | The People argued the March 24 waiver encompassed the 60-day right and therefore was an effective personal waiver. | Figueroa argued the March 24 waiver was ineffective because the 60-day right had not yet accrued at that time (he had not pleaded). | The court held the March 24 waiver was ineffective because the statutory 60-day right had not yet accrued; personal waiver must occur after the right exists. |
| Does reinstatement after a §1368 suspension start a new 60-day period even if the plea had not yet been entered before suspension? | The People treated reinstatement as the triggering event. | Figueroa contended reinstatement does not trigger the 60-day period if the plea (or arraignment) that would start the clock had not yet occurred before suspension. | The court held reinstatement starts a new period only when the timelines were already running at suspension; where the plea had not occurred before suspension, reinstatement is irrelevant—the plea governs. |
| Remedy when no valid personal waiver after triggering event and preliminary hearing set beyond 60 days? | The People argued past waivers or counsel waivers cured the defect. | Figueroa argued absence of an express personal waiver after plea mandates dismissal. | The court held dismissal is mandatory under §859b where more than 60 days elapsed after the triggering event without a personal waiver; it affirmed dismissal. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Standish, 38 Cal.4th 858 (2006) (§859b implements speedy-preliminary-exam protections and dismissal is mandatory for certain time violations)
- Landrum v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.3d 1 (1981) (legislative policy preventing prolonged pre‑preliminary incarceration)
- People v. Mackey, 176 Cal.App.3d 177 (1985) (60-day period runs from plea or arraignment, whichever is later)
- Ramos v. Superior Court, 146 Cal.App.4th 719 (2007) (section 859b’s 60‑day rule is absolute absent the defendant’s personal waiver)
- Bridgeforth v. Superior Court, 214 Cal.App.4th 1074 (2013) (distinguishing pre-plea posture from the post-plea position of a defendant entitled to a preliminary hearing)