People v. Feeley
499 Mich. 429
| Mich. | 2016Background
- Early morning bar disturbance in Brighton; two officers responded: Douglas Roberts (reserve officer) and Christopher Parks (full-time officer).
- Roberts had completed a 16-week training program, was sworn in as a reserve officer, wore a uniform, carried a weapon, and periodically worked 12-hour patrol shifts alongside full-time officers; he was not MCOLES-certified.
- Roberts approached defendant Feeley after being told Feeley was the troublemaker; Feeley ran, Roberts chased, announced "police officer, stop," and later drew his gun when Feeley appeared to reach behind his back; Feeley was arrested and charged under MCL 750.81d for resisting/obstructing.
- At preliminary examination, district court refused bindover, ruling Roberts was not a "police officer" under MCL 750.81d and also concluding the stop was unlawful; circuit court denied prosecution leave to appeal.
- Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision holding reserve officers are not covered by MCL 750.81d; Michigan Supreme Court granted review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “police officer” in MCL 750.81d(7)(b)(i) includes reserve police officers | Feeley’s resistance to Roberts should be punishable because "police officer" covers reserve officers; statute’s broad language and examples show inclusive intent | Roberts (defendant in criminal proceedings; here Feeley argued otherwise) contends reserve officers are not "police officer[s]" under the statute because the statute omits the term and other statutes (MCOLES) exclude auxiliaries/reserve officers | Supreme Court: "police officer" includes reserve police officers for purposes of MCL 750.81d; reversed Court of Appeals and remanded to address whether Feeley knew or had reason to know Roberts was performing duties and whether Roberts’ stop was lawful |
| Whether MCL 750.81d should be read in pari materia with MCOLES definitions (narrowing scope) | Prosecution: resisting/obstructing statute stands alone and uses inclusive language; no reason to import MCOLES limits | Feeley: MCOLES’ narrower definition (excluding auxiliaries) should control interpretation of "police officer" | Held: In pari materia inapplicable — statutes have different purposes and MCOLES definitions are limited "as used in this act," so MCOLES definitions do not govern MCL 750.81d |
| Whether statutory phrase "including, but not limited to" permits expansion beyond listed examples | Prosecution: phrase signals illustrative, non-exhaustive list; reserve officers fall within common meaning | Feeley: omission of "reserve" implies exclusion (expressio unius) | Held: "Including, but not limited to" defeats expressio unius; list is illustrative and expansive, so reserve officers can be included |
| Whether distinctions (part-time status, accompaniment requirement, lack of MCOLES certification) exclude reserve officers from MCL 750.81d protection | Prosecution: none of these limitations appear in MCL 750.81d; Legislature knows how to impose limits and did not here | Feeley: factual differences show reserve officers lack the attributes contemplated by the statute | Held: Such factual distinctions do not alter the plain statutory meaning; Legislature omitted restrictions intentionally elsewhere, so reserve officers remain within statute’s scope |
Key Cases Cited
- Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230 (statutory interpretation focuses on legislative intent and plain language)
- In re Forfeiture of $5,264, 432 Mich 242 ("including, but not limited to" is illustrative, not limiting)
- People v Mazur, 497 Mich 302 (explaining when statutes are read in pari materia — same subject or purpose required)
- People v Moreno, 491 Mich 38 (legislative purpose of MCL 750.81d is to protect persons connected to law enforcement)
- People v Vasquez, 465 Mich 83 (resisting and obstructing statute protects officers from physical harm)