People v. Vasquez

v VASQUEZ PEOPLE (Calendar Argued 7). No. 116660. No. Docket March Decided July 27, 2001. Vasquez, Jr., County charged Mark J. in the Isabella Trial Court possession being “resisting minor of alcohol and and obstructing” police by lying age. about his name and The court, Chamberlain, C.J., quashed “resisting Paul H. and obstructing” charge. Appeals, Fitzgerald, P.J., The Court of and JJ., App Saad and reversed and remanded. Whitbeck, (Docket 222895). appeals. No. The defendant separate opinions, Supreme In Court held: lying police age The defendant’s to a officer about his name and meaning “resisting was not “obstruction” within the of the and obstructing” statute, proscribes only MCL 750.479. This statute physical police actual or threatened interference with officers. Cavanagh joined by Justice Justices and stated Markman, Tailor, conduct, i.e., lying police that defendant’s to a officer about his age, name did not constitute an “obstruction” within the mean- .and ing Michigan’s “resisting obstructing” and statute. This statute proscribe any does not manner of interference with a officer, proscribe only poses nor does it conduct that a threat safety police officers; rather, proscribes to the threatened physical interference, express implied, and actual interference. “resisting obstructing” proscribes statute conduct that attempting “keep “obstructs” a officer while the officer is peace.” “keep peace” ordinary An officer’s efforts to include police functions, including legally all the duties executed an case, responding officer. In this because the officer was to sus- pected activity, ordinary police function, ques- criminal when he defendant, attempting “keep peace” tioned the he was within meaning “resisting obstructing” statute, when the defendant lied to him. part containing The statute uses the word “obstruct” as of a list words, namely, “resist, oppose, assault, five other beat [and] wound.” The of “obstruct” should be determined this particular context, given meaning logically and be related to the 465 Mich 83 clearly words, which, together, surrounding each of when read implies actual interference. an element of threatened or Although “obstruct” can be defined to include both nonphysical interference, context, when read in the more reason- interpretation actual, is one that communicates an or a threat able of, physical interference. principal protect police purpose The of this statute is to officers harm, purpose. physical only from but that is not its Both interfer- poses safety police physical to the and ence that threat officers may, pose necessarily, interference that does not but nevertheless safety police proscribed. threat to the officers are This is true may actually physically because one threaten to or interfere with a actually police threatening harming officer without to or officer. Legislature separate that the The fact used six terms to describe types sought proscribe, of conduct that makes it even probable that, truly proscribe “lying” more had it intended to to a police officer, expressly it would have included such a term. case, In this the defendant’s conduct did not constitute physical giving threatened or actual interference. The aof false certainly age officer, laudatory, name and to an while not does not range fit within the of conduct that this statute was meant to prohibit. writing separately, Justice stated that the defendant’s use Kelly, age of a did false name and not rise to an obstruction within the meaning resisting obstructing statute, of the and arrest MCL 750.479. Legislature resisting obstructing enacted the and arrest stat- penalize physical ute to actual or threatened acts of interference or against police Lies, alone, violence officers. do violate the stat- operate against physi- § ute. It intended 479 to actual or threatened engaged cal harm to or interference with a law enforcement officer keeping peace. The word as in “obstruct” used the statute physically progress means interference that hinders the of an offi- cial action or creates actual or threatened harm to a officer. contemplates expressed implied The statute both threats of such harm. Reversed. joined by Chief Justice Justices Weaver dis- Corrigan, Young,

senting, conduct, alleged lying that the stated defendant’s to the clearly age, officer about his name and falls within a common understanding of the word “obstruct.” Although clearly encompasses physical the definition of obstruct interference, possible it is not limited to interference. It is Opinion by Markman, hinder, interrupt, delay attempts keep an officer’s peace resorting without to actual or threatened interfer- Oral, nonphysical hinder, interrupt, delay ence. acts that attempts peace officer’s constitute obstruction under the statute. prohibited Of the six verbs used in the statute to describe con- duct, physical only interference is not the common element. Read context, equally likely Legislature it is at least that the meant to types interference, nonphysical. criminalize all both fundamentally, unique More structure of the statute demon- grouping strates that the did not intend that its of the give special meaning six begin- words of the words. At the ning statute, regarding process, of the service of the words “obstruct, resist, oppose” specifically apart are set from the beat, “assault, Later, however, words or wound.” when the statute keeping peace, together. refera to all six words are listed Because the of each word contained in the list of six is part established reference to the first the fact that appears “assault, the word “obstruct” later with the words beat or given any special significance. wound” should not be M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas Jennifer L. Casey, Solicitor General, Larry J. Burdick, Pros- ecuting Attorney, and Mark H. Duthie, Chief Assis- tant Prosecuting for Attorney, people.

Joseph T. Barberi for the defendant.

Amicus Curiae:

Jeffrey L. Sauter, President, and Terrence E. Dean, Senior Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the Pros- ecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan. J. granted We leave to consider whether

Markman, defendant’s alleged conduct lying police to a officer about his name and age, constituted “obstruction” within the Michigan’s “resisting and obstructing” statute. MCL 750.479. Michigan’s “resisting obstructing” statute does proscribe any manner of interference with a 465 Mich 83 Markman, police proscribe only officer, and it also does not poses safety police conduct that a threat to the proscribes officers; rather, threatened, either expressly impliedly, physical interference and actual interference with a officer. Therefore, we would reverse the decision of the Appeals Court of dismissing and reinstate the trial court’s order charge against defendant.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY investigating complaint party, While about a loud urinating officer found defendant on the private lawn front of a residence. The officer approached defendant and him asked whether he had drinking responded, been alcohol. Defendant “Yes, very suspected but not much.” The officer that defen- dant was an intoxicated minor. When the officer age, asked defendant his name and defendant said Wesley Chippeway” that his name was “John and that years he was sixteen fact, old. In defendant’s name Vasquez, was Mark Jr., John and he was seventeen years old. being

The officer arrested defendant for a minor in possession 436.1703(1). During of alcohol. MCL booking process, the officer learned from another recognized officer, who defendant, that he was actu- ally Vasquez, Mark John Jr. When confronted about knowledge actually the officer’s of who he was, he age. admitted his true name and prosecutor charged being defendant with possession—second “resisting minor in offense and obstructing” and quashed officer. The trial court “resisting rely- obstructing” charge, and People 87 v Opinion by Markman, Philabaun, App 471; on 234 Mich ing (Philabaun which this Court (1999) I), NW2d 502 subsequently reversed, 255; 602 NW2d (Philabaun Appeals The Court of there- (1999) II). remanded, App after reversed and 240 Mich NW2d 162 on our decision in (2000), relying II, obey that a defendant’s mere refusal to Philabaun for a could constitute sample resisting an order blood opposing.

H. STANDARD OF REVIEW requires This case us to construe Michigan’s Questions and “resisting obstructing” statute. of statu- tory construction Donajkowski are reviewed de novo. Alpena Power Co, 243, 248; 460 Mich 596 NW2d 574 (1999).

m. ANALYSIS OF STATUTE primary “The goal judicial interpretation is to ascertain and effect to the intent of give Legisla- ture.” McJunkin Corp, v Cellasto Plastic 461 Mich 590, 598; step 608 NW2d 57 “The first in that (2000). determination is language to review the of the statute In re Telecommunications, itself.” MCI 411; 596 NW2d 164 “resisting and obstructing” part: statute states in relevant

Any person knowingly willfully who shall and obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, . . . beat or wound any person persons . . . authorized law to maintain preserve peace, acts, attempts in their lawful maintain, preserve peace efforts shall be guilty of a misdemeanor .... [MCL 750.479.] 88 465 Mich 83 Opinion by J. Markman, proscribes This statute conduct that a “obstructs]” police while the officer is to attempting “keep officer peace.” the

A. “KEEP THE PEACE” “resisting proscribes and obstructing” statute by certain conduct encountered a law enforcement officer while the officer is attempting “keep the peace.” Therefore, the police first issue is whether the officer, in this case, “keep was attempting to peace” when defendant lied to him. officer’s “[A]n ‘keep efforts peace’ ordinary include police directly functions that do not placing person involve a People under Little, arrest.” v Mich NW2d (1990). statutory broad clause ‘main- “[T]he preserve peace’ and all tain, includes of the police duties executed legally People officer.” Weatherspoon, 6 App 229, 232; 148 NW2d 889 case,

In this the officer was to a responding com- plaint a loud party about when he found defendant urinating on the private front lawn of a residence. Because officer suspected that defendant was an minor, intoxicated the officer asked defendant for his name age. and told Defendant officer his name Wesley was “John Chippeway” he was years sixteen old. In fact, was defendant’s name Mark John Vasquez, Jr., years and he was seventeen old. Defendant was posses- arrested for being minor sion of MCL alcohol. It 436.1703(1). that, is clear the time defendant lied the officer, the latter was responding suspected activity, criminal which con- ordinary stitutes function. Because the lawfully performing assigned such func- Markman, questioned defendant, when he the officer was tion “keep peace” meaning within the attempting “resisting obstructing” statute, when defen- lied to him. dant

B. “OBSTRUCT” “obstructed,” The next issue is whether defendant “resisting obstructing” within the him. officer when he lied to “[T]he statutory meaning language, plain not, depends of King Hosp, v St Vincent’s 215, on context.” 502 US L 221; 570; (1991). S Ct 116 Ed 2d 578 “Contextual understanding generally grounded statutes is in the noscitur a sociis: doctrine is known from its ‘[i]t see Law associates,’ Dictionary (6th ed), Black’s at 1060. principle This doctrine stands for the that a phrase given word or is its context or set- meaning Tyler v Schs, Livonia Public ting.” 390- 391; 590 NW2d 560 (1999). seeking meaning, “[I]n words and clauses will not be divorced from those and those which follow.” Sanchick v precede which State Bd Optometry, 555, 559; 70 NW2d principle statutory “It is a familiar con- grouped given struction that words in a list should be Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville v meaning.” related Impac Ltd, Inc, 312, 322; 432 US 97 S Ct 53 L Ed 2d 368 (1977). present case,

In the the statute uses the word part “obstruct” as of a list five other containing words, namely, “resist, beat oppose, assault, [and] wound.” The of the word “obstruct” should particular context, be determined in this and be given meaning logically surrounding related to the five words of the statute. “Resist” is defined as “to with- 465 Mich 83

Opinion by Markman, stand, against, oppose.” strive Random House Web- College Dictionary ster’s (1991) 1146. “Resistance” additionally is opposition defined as “the offered thing, force, “Oppose” one etc.” Id. is defined as “to act or furnish against to; resistance combat.” Id. at 949. “Assault” is defined as “a sudden violent attack; onslaught.” Id. at 82. “Beat” is defined as “to strike forcefully and repeatedly; ... repeatedly hit as to painful injury.” cause Id. at 120. “Wound” is defined as “to upon; inflict wound injure; hurt.” Id. at 1537. Each of these words, when read together, clearly implies an element of threatened or actual physical interference.

The accompanying term “obstruct” susceptible potential several meanings. “Obstruct” is defined as: “1. to up block or close with an 2. obstacle. to hinder, interrupt, delay the passage, progress, course, etc. of. 3. to block from sight; way be in the of (a view, passage, etc.).” Id. at 935. Accordingly, we understand the dissent’s definition of “obstruct,” which defines it as both including nonphysical conduct. we Although understand that “obstruct” can be defined in such a manner, when read in context, we believe that the more reasonable interpretation is one actual, communicates an or of, physical a threat interference.1 1 statute, very Michigan’s “resisting An Iowa obstructing” similar to

statute, provides: person knowingly anyone A who resists or obstructs known person peace performance any to be a officer ... in the act scope duty authority which is within the of the lawful or of that simple officer . . . commits a misdemeanor. § Code [Iowa 719.1.] Supreme language The Iowa Court has said of section “[t]he 719.1 was conveys interference, chosen it the idea of active because with the draft- 91 Opinion Markman, J. necessarily “assault, beat, or wound” The words the words violence; whereas, an element of contain neces may, but do not “obstruct, oppose” resist [or] example, For of violence. sarily, contain an element with beat, or wound” an officer “assault, one cannot “obstruct, resist, however, one can being violent; out necessarily being vio an officer without oppose” [or] when the us to believe is that What this leads lent. it intended together, these six words used Legislature physical violent and nonviolent proscribe both only ele interference interference; physical being Therefore, by group to all six words. ment common part single type as a of a together these six words ing has demon conduct, Legislature prohibited amounting conduct purpose proscribing strated a 2 In this actual or threatened interference. ‘object’ passive ing rejecting language as or ‘fail to committee more such ” Smithson, (Iowa, 1999), quoting cooperate.’ NW2d Iowa v Carlson, Procedure, (Supp 1998) (empha- Yeager § Law & & Criminal added). Therefore, providing false information to a the mere act of sis officer does amount to a violation of this statute. Iowa (Iowa App, Henley, 2001). 2001 WL 57994 ‘obstruct’ The dissent asserts that “the fact that the word later ‘assault, beat, given appears should not be with the words wound’ 120-121, beginning special significance,” post because “[a]t process, ‘obstruct, resist, statute, regarding words service of ‘assault, beat, apart oppose’ specifically from the words are set ” Rather, respectfully disagree. Legislature that the wound.’ initially Id. at 120. We groups sug separated two in the statute does the six terms into meaning. gest groups This words have a distinct distinc that the two oppose,” “obstruct, resist, refer to nonviolent is that the words tion physical interference; while, [and] beat, “assault, wound” the words refer [and] However, Legislature the fact that the to violent interference. words, portion that we in the of the statute then combined the two sets of referring interpreting here, suggests to both violent and non are being only physical interference, interference violent words. element common to both sets of “resisting Further, judgment, used six verbs our conduct, prohibit obstructing” six discrete forms of but not to thorough prohibit general category in as a man- one of conduct rather 465 92 Mich 83 Opinion by Markman, J.

case, defendant’s did not threat conduct constitute ened actual interference. Defendant instead lied to officer his age. about name and certainly laudatory, While not defendant’s did conduct physically not physically interfere with or threaten to 3 interfere the officer. Moreover, principal “purpose of “resisting [the and obstructing” protect is to from officers statute] physical harm.” II, supra 262, Philabaun at n 17. “The by possible, ensuring gaps ner as that there were no obvious that could be exploited Therefore, interpret in the statute. we must the six each of by looking together general words gory at them in order to determine the cate- prohibit. of conduct that the intended to 3 provide age, The dissent asserts asked to his name and defen “[w]hen truthfully dant had two lawful he choices: could have answered or exer right Instead, cised his constitutional not to at all. answer defendant By doing so, impeded by investigation chose lie. to he the officer’s creat nonphysical ing attempt gather a obstacle to the officer’s accurate reasoning, information.” Post at 119. Under dissent’s if had defendant all, charged refused answer he could also have been under the “resisting obstructing” answer, statute. If had defendant refused to “impeded investigation by creating this would have also the officer’s a nonphysical attempt gather obstacle to the officer’s accurate informa However, compelled questions by posed tion.” police one be cannot to answer a Mississippi, 721, 727, 6; officer. Davis v n 394 US S Ct (1969); Risbridger Supp L Connelly, (WD Ed 2d 676 v 122 F 2d Mich, 2000) (holding compel that a officer cannot one to disclose identity); People Burrell, 439, 458; (1983). one’s 417 Mich 339 NW2d 403 Therefore, prosecuted “obstructing” police one cannot be for a officer on questions. City Baldwin, basis one’s refusal answer Pontiac v App 147, 152; 413 NW2d 689 The dissent asserts a by refusing ques does defendant “obstruct” to answer by posed However, tions an officer. the dissent concludes that when one impedes investigation, “resisting hinders or obstructing” an one violates the Perhaps willing exception statute. the dissent is to make an merely speak, change where one refuses to but that does not fact that reasoning, merely speak under the dissent’s one who refuses to violates “resisting obstructing” may statute because such conduct obvi ously impede investigation exactly type hinder or and that is argues proscribed judg conduct that the dissent is this statute. In our ment, reasoning may to the leads conclusion that one violate stat by exercising right problematic, though ute a constitutional even one is prepared exception constitutionally protected to make an for conduct. Maekman, protect arrest statute is purpose resisting violence and from persons (the officers) 64; 272 Kretchmer, harm.” an “attempts punish The statute to (1978). NW2d 558 discharge an officer while in the of his upon assault imposed for duty by penalty more severe than Peo- assaults,” i.e., private other assaults on citizens.4 80 NW 126 ple Tompkins, 431, 432; only punish upon purpose officers Not is the of this statute to assaults punish severely upon private citizens, but it is also to more physical than assaults severely nonphysical than inter interferences with officers more punish by in This is evidenced the differences ferences officers. placed upon physical nonphysical interferences with ments in the law punishment (proscription officers. The for violation of MCL 750.479 of “imprisonment prison physical interferences) not more than is the state by 1,000 257.324(1), years, or a fine of not more than dollars.” MCL contrast, provides part: in relevant person any following: A shall not do fictitious, (h) peace false, forged, Furnish to a officer or mislead- person ing identifying verbal or written information as another

person, person if the is detained for a violation of motor vehi- [the .... cle code] punishment (proscription nonphysical violation of this statute for ninety days. interferences) suspension Similarly, is of driver’s license for provides: MCL 750.217 any Any person disguise himself, who shall in manner with intent law, to obstruct the due execution of the or with intent to intimi- date, interrupt any person, or officer other in the hinder or duty, legal performance rights of his or the exercise of his under state, the constitution and laws of this whether such intent be not, guilty effected or shall be of a misdemeanor .... punishment (proscription nonphysical The interferences) for violation of MCL 750.217 county jail year “imprisonment is in the not more than 1 Thus, punishment “resisting fine of not more than 500 dollars.” for obstructing” punishment an officer is far more severe than the for lying to an officer while detained for a violation of the motor vehicle code punishment disguising one’s self to an officer. When MCL for types statutes, specifically 750.479 is read in the context of these two punishments each, increasingly pur- it is evident that the attached pose punish physical of MCL is to interferences with 750.479 officers. 465 Mich 83

Opinion by Markman, judgment, giving conduct, In i.e., our defendant’s age to officer, of a false name and an not fit does range within the of conduct that MCL 750.479 prohibit. meant principal purpose

isIt clear that the of this statute protect police However, officers from harm. language, from its we do not believe that is the this only purpose. may Because one threaten to or actu- ally physically with a interfere officer without threatening actually hurting police officer, we may physically believe that one an “obstruct” necessarily posing without threat the officer’s safety. may example, For one “obstruct” an officer placing object way in the of the officer with the making intent may it less accessible to the This officer. pose safety, no real threat to the officer’s but it may physical nevertheless “obstruct” of because the interposed performance barrier to the officer’s of his Therefore, duties. both interference that poses safety police a threat to the of officers (“assault, wound”) or beat, interference necessarily, pose may, does that not but nevertheless police safety (“obstruct, a threat to the of officers oppose”) proscribed. resist, [or] are Legislature proscribe any If the had intended to police manner of a interference with officer, as the why Legislature clearly dissent asserts, the did not express Legislature this intent?5 If the to intended example, statute, 1001, provides, For the federal 18 USC in relevant part: (a) Except provided section, whoever, as otherwise in this any jurisdiction executive, legislative, matter within the or

judicial States, knowingly branch the of Government of the United willfully— Opinion Markman, it “obstruction,” could nonphysical forms proscribe to “refuses “lies,” “falsifies,” terms as used such have It “objects with” or to.” did “interferes cooperate,” .6 that, chose six words Instead, the Legislature not proscribe an to together, read evidence intent when or actual interference. only threatened sepa- six Legislature fact the used Indeed, the types the of conduct it terms to describe rate probable makes it even more proscribe, sought truly Legislature proscribe intended to that, had the expressly police officer, it would have “lying” litany.7 to the is, in its That included such term falsifies, up by trick, scheme, (1) conceals, any or or covers fact; a material device fictitious, any materially false, (2) statement makes fraudulent representation; or writing knowing (3) uses the makes or false document any materially false, fictitious, state- to contain or fraudulent same entry; imprisoned shall under this not ment or be fined title or years, or more than 5 both. statutory clearly language proscribes giving the This of a false statement States, 400; Brogan S Ct officer. v United 522 US clearly statute, (1998). Michigan had a defen- 139 L Ed 2d 830 If similar charged However, whatever rea- could be under such a statute. for dant reasonably sons, Michigan MCL has no such 750.479 cannot interpreted by Rather, giving this fill that void. if false infor- be Court to offense, mation to the to become is for our say so. job interpret meaning The dissent “our is to contends that plain actually language Legislature.” Post at 122 doing words used exactly added). agree, (emphasis We and that is what we are here. merely interpret reasonably attempting We are “obstruct, resist, assault, beat, oppose, used in words or wound” as simply prepared process, In this we are to insert word statute. statute. “lies” into the fully “lying Although the dissent to a we concur with that grave consequences,” post during investigation have an could at proscribe 119, 3, simply Just as n MCL 750.479 does not such conduct. it Congress’ responsibility issue to address this in the context federal is law, “lying” 5, responsibility Legislature insert note it is the see MCL 750.479. into 465 Mich 83 Opinion by Markman, J. Legislature sought proscribe extent that the types of conduct that the dissent to the attributes starting point statute, what more obvious there could prohibit “lying?”Why, light been have than in of its laundry proscribed list of its activities, literal thesau- Legislature misconduct, rus of forms of would the cryptic setting been have so in forth such an obvious wrongdoing “lying?” “lying” form of as all, After is something describing than more an obscure verb misconduct; abstruse form of rather, it describes a form that, itself, misconduct has been made the subject significant of numerous criminal statutes, including, example, for those described in J. Markman, example resisting obstructing

Although classic the physically with the who interferes involves a defendant necessary officer, physical not be- interference is actual expressed physi- an threat law instructs that cause case interference, physical interference, is suffi- actual cal absent an support charge a the And while cient to under statute. physical expressed with an officer is threat of interference support charge a under the such sufficient to necessary this has held that a threat not because Court is an barrage of and abusive remarks to constant obscene comply officer, together the with the refusal to with taken charge orders, the is sufficient to warrant a under officer’s I, II, supra quoting Philabaun statute. [Philabaun dissenting) supra J., (citations omitted).] at 488 (Murphy, passive agree II conduct We with Philabaun may be sufficient to constitute obstruction sometimes “resisting obstructing” statute. Passive under the physical conduct, to level of if it rises the threatened interference, meaning “obstruction” within constitutes example, II, in Philabaun of the statute. For comply with the search defendant’s refusal to passive although to level warrant, conduct, rose physical interference because of threatened placed which, in order officers were in a situation they get sample blood, would to the defendant’s physically his have to constrain him take had against to his When the refused blood will. defendant sequence very likely cooperate, of events the next possible injury of a well could have been the attempting to the search warrant. enforce physi- agree II that actual We also with Philabaun unnecessary support charge is to cal interference “resisting obstructing” Rather, statute. under rises the level of threatened conduct that charge support a under is sufficient to interference agree expressed Additionally, we that an the statute. Opinion by Makkman, of threat interference is unnecessary sup- port a charge Rather, any under statute. conduct that rises level of threatened interfer- expressed whether it ence, not, is sufficient support a charge example, under statute. For II, Philabaun the defendant’s refusal comply although the search warrant, express threat of interference, was support sufficient to a the charge under statute because refusing coop- to defendant erate, was, effect, in physically interfering police with the officers; his refusal left the officers with no other choice than to use force to execute the search warrant.

In the present case, unlike II, police Philabaun the officer was not a faced with situation in which his next act would, likely more not, than involve confrontation. physically Defendant did not obstruct any way. resist the officer in He instead lied the officer about his age.9 name and This type is not the 9 following sup cases are illustrative cases in which defendants plied police subsequently false information to officers and courts held guilty there was insufficient evidence find the defendants violat ing proscribe obstructing Daigle, statutes that an officer: Louisiana v 701 App, (La (the falsely 1997) police So 2d 685 defendant told that a fact, present, when, was); Pennsylvania woman was Shelly, not in she (Pa Super, 1997) (the police 703 gave A2d 499 defendant a false name to a officer); Florida, (Fla App, 1989) (the Steele v 711 537 So 2d defendant gave police officer); Smith, a false to a name Louisiana v 352 2dSo 216 (La, 1977) (the falsely police son, defendant told a officer that her who robbery, house, when, fact, was wanted for armed not was in the in he was); Stephens, App 229; (the Ohio v (1978) 57 Ohio 2d 387 NE2d 252 falsely police person, defendant told officers she did not know a who subsequently basement); was found in defendant’s Wilbourn v Missis sippi, (1964) 249 (the gave Miss 2d So a defendant false description husband, when, fact, of the man shot who her in her son shot husband). her Markman, obstructing” “resisting Michigan’s conduct that proscribe.10 intended to statute was

IV. CONCLUSION preserve and “maintain, attempts An officer’s encompass the 750.479 under MCL peace” a law duties of lawfully assigned all execution of case, present In the officer. enforcement peace” when “keep attempting was officer legally the officer was him, lied to because defendant questioned he of his duties when one executing proposition, accept that the statute the dissent’s Even one were to if attempting any proscribes while he is interference with a reasonably question may “keep peace,” defendant’s whether one still peace" fact, “keeping lies, in this case. the officer in “obstructed” example, age, gave defendant Although, the officer false for defendant age gave made defendant a minor. There him an that still nevertheless fore, hardly pre false, though have it could even the information posses being arresting minor in defendant for the officer from vented majority identify Additionally, actual “obstruction” does sion. supplying the officer in this case as a result of defendant that occurred delay any apparent processing name. It did not cause false any wrongfully defendant, charge being charge against it lead to nor did is, persons. pursued against any such an “obstruction” of innocent While course, conceivable, simply did not occur here. it “[a]ny per obstructing” provides Michigan’s “resisting statute and guilty . . . shall be of a misdemeanor son who shall . . . obstruct may [Emphasis Accordingly, of a commit obstruction . . . .” one added.] officer, by police only by actually obstructing police rather than a McConnell, merely attempting an officer. See In re 370 US to obstruct 230, 233-234; 1288; (1962) (holding that a statute 82 S Ct 8 L Ed 2d 434 any person punish authorizing in its “misbehavior of federal courts justice” presence of as to obstruct the administration or so near thereto (emphasis justice) requires of the administration of an actual obstruction 43; (1999) (hold Wilson, added); 721 NE2d 521 101 Ohio Misc 2d Ohio v police ing not violate a stat made to a officer does that a false statement prohibiting business unless the officer is the obstruction of official ute Stephens, (citing actually hampered way) Ohio v in some substantial accept added). Therefore, supra 230) (emphasis one were to the even if any proposition, proscribes interference with a that the statute dissent’s attempted officer, defendant, most, police to “obstruct” the officer. at the 465 Mich J. Kelly, plain meaning

defendant. Under the of 750.479, MCL conduct that of rises the level threatened or actual physical proscribed. Michigan’s interference “resisting proscribe obstructing” and statute does not any police officer, manner of with a interference and proscribe only poses it also does not conduct that a safety police pros- officers; threat rather, it expressly impliedly, phys- threatened, cribes either ical interference and actual interference with police officer. Defendant’s did conduct not consti- tute threatened actual interference. There- did fore, defendant not “obstruct” officer, meaning within the of MCL when 750.479, he lied to Accordingly, him. we would reverse the decision Appeals the Court of reinstate trial court’s dismissing charges against order defendant.11 and Taylor, JJ., with concurred Cavanagh Markman, Vasquez, age J. Mark John Jr., lied about his Kelly, identity policeman consequence, and, aas charged resisting obstructing with quashed MCL officer. 750.479. The trial court charge ground on the that the lies did not constitute meaning an “obstruction” within the of the statute. Appeals Court reversed and remanded. 240 App 612 NW2d 162 granted interpret meaning We leave “keep peace” “obstruct” and as those terms were primary § used in 479. Our task is Kelly’s separate opinion, agrees In Justice she with the conclusion set forth here that defendant’s conduct did not “obstruct” the officer agrees within the of MCL She 750.479. further that this statute proscribe police officers; does not manner with of interference rather, only proscribes threatened actual interference police officers. Kelly, J. interpret to determine the term “obstruct” penalize. scope was intended to actions the statute proscribes acts of that the statute We would hold physically officer’s hinder interference peace threaten to hinder or that efforts to the statute. lies did not violate them. Defendant’s Appeals should be Hence, the decision of the Court reversed.1

BACKGROUND early May morning 1, 1999, Michi- In the hours Spinner Trooper Stephen gan State Police investi- complaint party gated in Union Town- about a loud County. ship, Arriving residence where Isabella at the party trooper being held, encountered approached urinating on the front lawn. He defendant drinking. been and asked defendant whether he had very Spin- responded, “Yes, Defendant but not much.” watery eyes observed that his were bloodshot and ner strong intoxicants on defen- and noticed a odor of dant’s breath.

Spinner requested Defendant identification. said Wesley Chippeway” and that that his name was “John years Spinner sixteen old. took defendant into he was custody booking charges him on of minor and started possession. 436.1703(1). During booking MCL process, recognized Mark other officers defendant as Vasquez, apparent with the Jr. When confronted John his true iden- identification, defendant admitted false tity age. Appeals argument in the Court of raised an alternative Defendant impermissibly vague and therefore unconstitutional. He has not § 479 was Accordingly,

pursued we do not treat here. that issue. 465 Mich 83 by

Opinion J. Kelly, him fingerprinted Authorities then adminis- and preliminary Breathalyzer tered a test showed County intoxication. The legal prosecutor Isabella charged possession- defendant with a minor in being offense, resisting second and and obstructing in officer violation of 479. § provides: 479 Section

Any person wilfully obstruct, knowingly who shall and oppose coroner, any sheriff, township treasurer, resist or duly person authorized, constable or other or serving, any process, or attempting to serve or execute rule by authority, or order made or issued lawful or shall who any any by ordinance, law, resist officer in the execution of any rule, made, issued, by passed or order or resolution or any city trustees, the common council of board of com- or village any incorporated village, mon council or council of township any township assault, or board or who shall any coroner, sheriff, township wound treasurer, beat or duly authorized, serving, constable or other officer while or attempting any process, to serve or execute such rule or order, served, attempted or having for or or serve exe- obstruct, resist, oppose, same, or who shall so cute the assault, any officers, beat or wound the above named or person persons by other authorized law to maintain acts, attempts preserve in their peace, and lawful maintain, preserve peace, shall be efforts misdemeanor, guilty punishable by imprisonment aof in the prison years, state not 2 more than a fine of not more 1,000 [Emphasis than dollars. added.] Defendant quash moved to the resisting obstructing In charge. addressing motion, the trial analyzed court Vasquez’ statute and reasoned that not lies did create the kind of “obstruction” that the contemplated. statute gave

The court the terms of the statute their “ordi- nary It usage.” noted that the statute required the People Kelly, was “maintain- the officer while occur obstruction defendant’s Thus, since peace.” preserving ing determining progress hinder lies did they “did not drinking, had been whether defendant to main- of the officer required the actions obstruct circumstances totality of the under a peace tain the this case.”2 we Vasquez, decided Appeals the Court

Before I. See in Philabaun the decision reversed (1999) NW2d 371 Philabaun, held that II, we Philabaun In II). (Philabaun the officer’s by resisting § had violated defendant Moreover, we warrant. a search to execute attempt statute violate the could a defendant that observed with the altercation in a engaging without officer. is to the statute purpose that the concluded

We See Philabaun harm. from officers protect Kretchmer, 404 People v 17, citing n supra II, also concluded We NW2d 558 59, 64; 272 Mich falls conduct specific whether determinations that case-by-case be made on should within the statute 263-264. supra at II, See Philabaun basis. II to Philabaun relied on Appeals

The Court were vio- acts Vasquez’ verbal support finding its opinion Appeals on the Court of The court relied I). (Philabaun (1999) At App 471; Philabaun, NW2d 502 234 Mich permit refusal whether the defendant’s was issue in Philabaun sample by obtaining a blood a search warrant to execute “physi did obstructing The defendant resisting under the statute. and majority Appeals in Philabaun cally officer. The Court resist” the test did passive to a blood refusal to submit I that the defendant’s found trial court likened under the statute. an offense not constitute Philabaun, noting the absence of operating Vasquez’ to that conduct trooper have been against which would action taken “affirmative safety.” public threatening to 465 Mich 83

Opinion by Kelly, despite lations the absence of part. obstruction or resistance on his From the lan- guage holding II, and of Philabaun the Court of Appeals applied following and discerned test: prosecutor support [charge must under

[A] § 479] competent probable showing evidence that there is cause to (1) alleged, pas- believe that the conduct whether active sive, obstructed, resisted, opposed any (2) of the listed (3) in (4) alleged officials their described duties and wilfully. knowingly conduct was done [240 App 244.]

It concluded that the evidence tended to show that Vasquez knowingly Spinner lied to about his name age. Vasquez’ passive, “suggested conduct, while prevent [he] wished the State Police from instituting legal against action him as an individ- actually agents ual and would law hinder enforcement taking against from action him, which fits under restricting, obstructing, op- the broad definitions of posing.” App Appeals 245. The Court of continued: similarity

We see marked between saying the effect of police request, Philabaun, “no” to a giving as in false misleading response request information in to a similar trooper; responses presented a State Police both investigating agent’s obstacle to the law enforcement attempt discharge legal his duties. [Id. 245.] Appeals Vasquez’ Therefore, the of Court concluded, lying Spinner coverage act of fell within the of § 479. 105 v Opinion by Kelly, OP REVIEW

STANDARD statutory interpre- question This case involves Friend Genesee Co review de novo. tation, which we 44; 626 Corp, 464 Mich Motors the Court v General of NW2d Care Michigan Health Brown v 395 (2001); 301 374; (2000). 617 NW2d Corp, 368, 463 Mich

DISCUSSION lies that Vas- is whether the presented question The the statute conduct told constitute quez judicial primary goal The penalize. intended to and give is to ascertain of statutes interpretation Frankenmuth Legislature. effect to the intent 511, 515; Mich Homes, Inc, 456 Mut Ins v Marlette 325, 461 Mich People Morey, NW2d 611 (1998); 573 first criterion The 329-330; (1999). 603 NW2d 250 of the stat- specific language intent is the determining Telecommunications, 460 Mich In re MCI ute. People v Borchard- NW2d 164 (1999); 596 NW2d 1 278, 284; (1999). 597 Ruhland, 460 Mich by con- given The is sometimes language Serv Co v Pub Consumers Power setting. text or NW2d 126 148, 163, 10; (1999); n Comm, 460 382, 391; 590 Schs, 459 Mich v Livonia Public Tyler in mind interpret it, we As we (1999). NW2d 560 the act. In re purpose subject matter Peo- 467, 474; (1998); NW2d Wirsing, 456 Mich 385, 391; 571 NW2d App ple Seeburger, “KEEP THE PEACE” applies 479 indicates wording § by a law enforcement conduct encountered 106 83 465 Mich J. Opinion by Kelly, preserve attempting keep while “maintain, and the peace.” apply gain Thus, to the we must understanding “keep peace.” of what it means to phrase originated

The under common laws of England “king’speace.” referred It to the related general justices assigned peace, to the duties England by King first in III instituted Edward in 1326. People (1888), McLean, 480, 482; 36 NW231 Steph citing justices Grim 190. Law, were “assigned peace” by and, order of the king, empowered they “to take and arrest all those may by suspicion, put find indictment or them in prison.” English Thus, Id. the common-law duties of justices peace of the resemble those associated with modern-day law enforcement officers. Dictionary peace” “keeping

Black’s Law defines “[a]voiding peace; dissuading as a breach of the or preventing breaking peace.” others from Black’s Dictionary, (1991). Law 6th ed Breach Peace, in turn, was a criminal offense common law. In 1884, Burgess,3 commonly in Davis v this Court set forth a accepted peace”: definition for “breach of the

Now, peace?” By what is “a understood breach of the “peace,” connection, as used the law in this is meant the tranquillity enjoyed by municipality of a citizens commu- or nity good reigns among where order its It members. is the right persons political society, natural of all ain peace.” right intentional violation of that is “a breach of the public It is disturbing peace, the offense of violation public public order or decorum. 20 NW 540 Kelly, Similarly, People v Johnson,4 this Court described “breaking peace” “any inciting as act conduct provoke tending violence, or excite others to peace.” break the statutory provisions

Absent or internal definitions contrary, interpret language to the we must of a light previously statute in established rules of com- give acquired unique mon We law. those words that meaning meaning at common law the same when dealing subject. used in a statute with the same Num- Dep’t Treasury, 534, mer v 448 544; Mich 533 NW2d (1995); 250 Co, Pulver v Dundee Cement 445 Mich 68, People (1994); Young, 75; 515 NW2d728 Mich 1, v 418 (1983). 13; Therefore, 340 NW2d805 we read the stat- utory phrase preserve keep peace” “maintain, and by to refer to law conduct enforcement It officers. prevent discourage conduct intended to and acts that tranquility good peaceful violate the and order of a community or incite others to so. do phrase, setting § as used in 479, evokes a performing which lawa enforcement officer is official setting beyond duties. We note that such a extends ample the location where an arrest occurs. There is authority suggest “keep that an officer’s efforts to peace” ordinary police include functions not directly placing person involved in under arrest. People e.g., See, Little, 752, v 434 759; 456 NW2d People (1990); 237 Krum, 374 Mich 132 (1965); Weatherspoon, NW2d 69 App (1967). 229, 232; 148 NW2d 889 supra

As Little, we observed in at 756, 6,n “[a] police expected officer is and be, be, should in a

4 86Mich 175, 177; NW ^[870] Mich Kelly, quell disturbance.” readiness to state of constant phrase encompassed “maintain, Thus, activities patrolling, keep peace” preserve surveil- are activity, quel- suspected responding ling, criminal many executing ling other disturbances, actual assigned legally officer. to a duties Spinner responding Trooper to a was case, In this party complaint he encountered when about a loud questioned urinating defen- a lawn. He on defendant signs It was of drunkenness. and observed dant requested setting him from identification that he dispute. center of this the lies at the and encountered Trooper Spinner executing as a his duties Since place, we find took when the encounter preserve engaged maintain, in “efforts to that he was peace” §of 479. within the “OBSTRUCT” Vasquez question “obstruct- whether The becomes Trooper Spinner’s performance efforts. of those ed” proscribes portion know- the statute at issue The oppose, ing resist, “obstruct, wilful acts that engaged officer or wound” a assault, beat peace. keeping proceed, well-settled mindful of the

As we we are virtually every recognized purpose of the § 479 since court that has addressed purpose “punish an is to it in 1931. The enacted discharge upon public his in the assault imposed duty by penalty for than that more severe supra private Little, . . . .” at on citizens assaults People Tompkins, citing NW 431; 121 Mich v 757, (1899); 671; S Ct Feola, 420 US United States v

Opinion by Kelly, (1975). 1255; 43 L Ed 2d 541 Moreover, the statute is protecting for tool officers from violence and e.g., supra See, harm. Kretchmer, 64; II, at Philabaun supra 262, n at 17. prosecution dissenting colleagues our

argue term “obstruct” should be construed They broadly. any physical encompassing view it as delay presents or oral act causes an obstacle gather to an officer’s efforts to information. While expansive meaning may such an be consistent with a reading comport literal word, it does with legislative underlying § intent 479. dictionary This Court often consults definitions to generally accepted meaning ascertain the of a term expressly that is not defined statute. See Consum- supra Co, ers Power 163, n Oakland Co Rd Property Michigan Casualty Guaranty Comm’rs & Ass’n, 604; 575 NW2d 751 Ran- College Dictionary (1984) dom House Webster’s defines “obstruct” as: up 1. obstacles, block close obstacle as a interrupt, oppose passage, pro-

road. 2. to hinder or gress, course, etc., sight. of. 3. to block from However, as with the word “obstruct,” dictionaries multiple often contain definitions and define a term multiple using multiple that, themselves, terms have dictionary definitions. Thus, exclusive reliance on def- clarify, initions as blur, can as much of a properly regarded word. are Dictionaries therefore as interpretive mere aids for the See court. Consumers supra Looking up: Co, Power at 163, 10; note, n statutory interpretation, Dictionaries and 107 Harv (1994). RL 1437

110 465 Mich 83 Kelly, mind, along in the lay the definition Keeping statutory the statute, the we next examine purpose of appears. word “obstruct” Our in which the context of involves examination consideration context with the family phrases associated words analytical concept is word 479. This § “obstruct” noscitur sociis phrase law Latin known in Livonia Public associates”). its is known from (“It Schs, that, supra proposition It stands for 390. clauses, words we we seek the when precede from those that do not divorce them Bd Optometry, State Sanchick v follow. those that 555, 757 559; 70 NW2d Words (1955). 342 Mich meaning. in a should be related grouped given list Impac Inc, Ltd, Bank Third Nat’l in Nashville 432 Ed 2d 322; 2307; (1977). 53 L 312, US S Ct vein, appropriate In a it to consider similar “ejusdem Latin, from the generis.” Again doctrine kind, class, Black’s means same nature.” “[o]f Dictionary Law If words follow an (6th ed). general specific subjects, general enumeration of words express only things are of the same presumed to kind, character, or as enumerated class, nature Services, Wilson, Appliance Sands Inc v subjects. course, inter- 231, (2000). 615 NW2d 241 Of objective, must we examine its preting apply designed remedy, harm it is we must accomplishes best its reasonable construction that Adair, 479-480; purpose. NW2d 505 ain the statute uses the word “obstruct” six-

Here, “assault,” “resist,” “oppose,” term list that contains each, “beat” and “wound.” Defendant contends by a context, implies per- some action when read Ill Opinion by Kelly, J. physical that son either causes or harm threatens police or interference to a officer. This is consistent interpretations our of the statute in Little and II. Philabaun urges

Defendant that the word “obstruct” be read physical person a obstruction, describe such as a physically blocking pursuing an officer from his passive It can mean duties. also act of obstruction, exposes asserts, defendant one that an officer to physically ability carry harm his blocks out his § Within of 479, duties. mere even words, they lies, cannot “obstruct” unless create an enhanced physical risk of interference or harm an officer’s personal safety, defendant contends.5 interpretation. find

We merit defendant’s The six presented they words, as are in the statute, create a continuum. The first, “obstruct,” is the man- mildest violating ner of final, and the “wound,” opines the most severe. The dissent that the first preclude finding § three words 479 was only intended to address actual or threatened harm to so, officers. This is dissent, surmises the nuga- because the word “assault” would be rendered tory “oppose” if the “obstruct,” “resist,” nar- were physical rowed to the realm. broadly agree.

We cannot Where defined are words grouped specificity, general with terms of words interpreted belonging are as to the same class as the Appliance supra narrowest the list. Sands Service, way I note that defendant’s observation about on the limits “words” says actually nothing can violate statute about whether acts that physically Indeed, threaten interfere § with a officer violate 479. today, as we would hold such do acts constitute obstruction under the statute. Mich Kelly, deny “assault,” terms will Here, none 242. physical necessarily involve and “wound” “beat,” component Therefore, harm. or threatened of actual ejus- applying § purposes the doctrine of for supports restricting generis first terms three dem involving or threatened actual to behavior in the list interference. harm or reasonably only thread common Indeed, through is the element the entire list woven can be or action. interference threatened actual or provides interpretation effective the most Such an way addressing the mischief the statute remedy. designed the basis, we find that On this Legislature a verbs to describe the list of six drafted string a violation of constitutes of behavior that fluid words and the con- follows, the And, statute. it the cepts are interrelated. covered “oppose,” address and “assault”

“Obstruct,”“resist,” physical to an harm words that threaten actions or physical impose to the officer’s barrier performance two, The final “beat” of official duties. physical proscribe to an harm “wound,” actual and proper together, context, in the When viewed officer. depict range runs of conduct. The behavior the words threaten acts that verbal utterances from physically erection with an officer to the interfere and the interference, barriers, perpetration physical harm.6 elevating these that, infer

Moreover, one can Legislature high in- the misdemeanors, offenses to assaulting punishment for harsher tended to reserve today Legislature original has never form. The 479 exists its Section amended it. Vasquez Opinion by Kelly,

police officers than committing ordinary for assault. Little, This Court drew that inference in supra, when plain analysis making language of the statute.7 interpret There are other reasons to “obstruct” nar- rowly. Today’s holding, requiring more than mere lies unduly to offend avoids the of an § creation penal harsh It rejects scheme.8 the scenario embraced by prosecutor dissenting colleagues our prosecution argues The also that defendant’s lies should be included proscribed by they § in conduct 479 because could have led to a criminal charge person. being against prosecutor Indeed, made an innocent suspects provide contends that who false identification to officers typically they First, so for being do one two reasons. wish to avoid identity concealing treated as habitual offenders their true past Second, they justice nature of their record. intend abscond from by avoiding hearings charge. future court in connection with criminal fugitive they locating Authorities then encounter difficulties because do not know his true name. case, Vasquez successfully lied, In justice, this had then absconded from person. a warrant would have been issued for the of a arrest different prosecutor interpreted broadly enough § contends that 479 should be encompass Vasquez’ actions, discourage deceptive it because will similar Certainly, engage behavior. some criminals in the dishonest activities prosecutor. justice, described Had absconded from he implicated person proceeding. could have an innocent in a criminal While good revising is a this reason for to consider ascertaining legislative not does advance us in intent. it is That because pertinent ascertaining § to the words used in 479. point by applica This is made clear careful consideration of the broad by interpret tion endorsed proscribe any the dissent. The dissent would “obstruct” delay synapse oral utterance that creates a for an officer carrying absurdity apparent out official duties. The a such rule is when hypothetical following example the is considered: Suppose pickpocketing a man witnesses a crime the on street. Sus- pecting crime, approaches queries, that the man the saw officer and way go?” respond “Which did he The man not does for a full ten seconds. Then, says, way,” points pick- he “He went that and in the direction the fled, pocket case, rule, hi such a under the dissent’s the man’s honest answer would constitute an obstruction. The manner in which man the question delay gathering answered the officer’s created a in the officer’s pursuant Contrary investigation. argu- information ment, to an to the dissent’s certainly Legislature this not conduct intended to penalize. 465 by Kelly, legislative a intent and create statu- would contravene injustice. ripe tory meaning Here, and as for misuse caught aptly reminds, defense counsel possession, being charged a minor in with a and by punishable Under the incarceration. crime by prosecutor reading dissent, and the sanctioned age bring could him two- a lie his name and about year jail sentence. virtually

Moreover, if mere lies violated the any given to of fact misstatement bystander resisting could lead to witness obstructing could chill cit- conviction. Such harshness n willingnessto cooperate police investiga- izens’ prosecution Although this tions. contends that weapon “sparingly” law enforce- would be used open it would officers, ment we are concerned that reject unscrupulous. Thus, wide a for the we door request § 479. to read into previously forth,

For set we would hold the reasons resisting enacted the penalize obstructing actual or arrest statute acts of interference or violence threatened against police Lies, alone, officers. do not violate Vasquez’ age, statute. use a false name and in this case, did not rise to an obstruction within mean- ing §of did not it. 479 and therefore offend

CONCLUSION attempts “maintain, We that an officer’s conclude preserve peace” under MCL 750.470 lawfully encompasses assigned all the execution of case, In this duties of a law enforcement officer. 115 Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, C.J. Trooper Spinner actively engaged was in efforts to peace Vasquez. when he encountered also,

We would hold, that the intended operate against § 479 to actual or threatened harm to interference with a law enforcement engaged keeping peace. It is intended to placement make unlawful the barriers engaged performance before an officer in the of offi- Therefore, cial duties. the word “obstruct” as used in physically the statute means interference that hinders progress of an official action or creates actual or police. threatened harm the The statute contem- plates expressed implied both threats such trigger harm. Mere lies are insufficient a violation. Vasquez’ Thus, conduct not of the kind that the prevent. designed statute was The decision of the Appeals retaining against § charges Court of Vasquez should be reversed.

Corrigan, respectfully agree C.J. I dissent. While I opinion’s with the lead conclusion that the “keep attempting officer in this case was reject peace,” unnecessarily reading I its narrow opinion the word In effect, “obstruct.”1 the lead inserts a new element—actual or threatened resisting obstructing interference—into the stat- my alleged conduct—lying ute. In view, defendant’s age—clearly the officer about his name falls understanding within a common of the word “ob- Accordingly, judgment I struct.” would affirm the Appeals. the Court of dissent, disagree For reasons set I forth this also with Justice

Kelly’s separate opinion, essentially which reaches the same conclusion opinion. as the lead 465

Dissenting by Corrigan, C.J. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTORY I. THE RULES requires an examination case of this Resolution As obstructing statute.2 and resisting the text Ward, 460 Mich Co v Valley Foods forth in Sun set principles guiding (1999), 596 NW2d 119 230, 236; established: axe well of statutes interpretation our construing primary rule, task in and our foremost The Leg give intent of the and effect to the is to discern Telephone Co, 447 Mich Murphy Michigan Bell v islature. W (1994). Nation v 93, 98; See also 523 NW2d 310 489, 494; (1997). This task Co, 563 NW2d 233 D E Electric454 examining language itself. The by of the statute begins provide of its most reliable evidence a statute “the words of 576, 593; Turkette, 101 S Ct 452 US States v intent.” United language (1981). If of the statute 2524; L Ed 2d 246 69 Legislature intended the mean unambiguous, the must have clearly expressed, enforced as the statute must be ing and required per judicial or construction is written. No further 129, Facility, Michigan 451 Mich Tryc Veterans’ mitted. v (1996). 135; NW2d 642 545 words or provided that has

The “[a]ll according and understood shall be construed phrases approved usage language.” and to the common lay dictionary when thus consult MCL 8.3a. We unique phrases that lack words or defining common 439, 462 Mich Detroit, v meaning. See Robinson legal 456; (2000). NW2d 307

H. ANALYSIS obstructing statute states: resisting and Donajkowski This Court reviews de Alpena Power novo Co, questions of statutory interpretation. NW2d 574 by Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, C.J.

Any person knowingly wilfully obstruct, who shall any oppose sheriff, coroner, township treasurer, or resist person duly authorized, or officer constable other or serving, attempting any process, or or to serve execute rule authority, or or order made issued lawful or who shall any any ordinance, by law, in the resist execution any rule, issued, passed by made, or or order resolution or city any trustees, the common council of board of or com- any incorporated village village, mon council or council of township any township assault, or board of or who shall any township sheriff, coroner, treasurer, or beat wound duly authorized, or serving, constable other officer while or attempting any process, or to serve execute such or rule order, having served, attempted or or for to serve or exe- same, obstruct, resist, oppose, cute the who shall so assault, any officers, beat or wound above named person persons other law authorized to maintain preserve peace, acts, attempts in their lawful maintain, preserve keep peace, efforts to shall be guilty misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment of a in the prison years, state not more than 2 or fine of not more (emphasis than one thousand dollars. 750.479 [MCL added).]

Resolution of this case turns interpretation on our of the word “obstruct” as it refers to attempts keep peace. to Consistent with principles statutory interpretation set forth above, we must examine the “common and approved usage” of MCL word. 8.3a. As noted the lead Ran- opinion, College dom House Webster’s Dictionary (1991) de- as: up fines “obstruct” “1. to block or close with an 2. hinder, obstacle .... to interrupt, delay passage, etc. progress, course, of. 3. block from be sight; way in the (a view, passage, etc.).” Although this definition clearly of “obstruct” encom- physical passes interference, physi- is not limited to cal Certainly, possible interference. it is hinder, Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, C.J. attempts delay interrupt, an officer’s physi- resorting peace or threatened to actual without require. opinion would as the lead interference, cal recognized as much in This Court (1999), NW2d 371 255, 264; 602 Philabaun, 461 Mich polite refusal to the defendant’s we held that when comply the extraction of warrant for with a search indisputably passive “although nature, blood, obstruction, constitute sufficient nevertheless explained opposition.” We resistance, speech “[Physical and abusive resistance, threats, prosecution this stat- under relevant facts in can be necessary Id. at 262. element.” none is a ute, but attempts Today, opinion Philabaun to revise the lead nonphysical by explaining con- that the defendant’s actually level of “rose to the in that case duct Thus, Ante at 97. interference.” threatened although logic, opinion’s curious the lead under necessary are nor threats neither resistance prove prosecutors still must elements physi- an actual or threatened of either the existence cal interference. opinion con- that the defendant’s

The lead reasons the level of threatened in Philabaun rose to duct he refused to because, when interference sequence very likely cooperate, of events “the next injury possible aof have been the well could attempting warrant.” enforce the search Accordingly, (emphasis added). rather than Ante at 97 nonphysical focusing actual oral or on a defendant’s opinion demands a diffi- the lead obstruction, act of consequences “likely” “possible” inquiry cult into whether the have courts ask of such an act. It would place in a officer act would defendant’s Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, C.J. “situation in which his next act would, more likely than not, involve confrontation.” Ante at 98 (emphasis I added). do not believe that such inquiry is practicable or required by the plain statutory lan- guage. Consistent with the most straightforward read- ing of our decision in Philabaun, I would hold that nonphysical oral, acts that hinder, interrupt, delay an attempts officer’s peace constitute obstruction under the resisting and obstructing statute.

Applying the statute to facts, these defendant’s alleged conduct falls plain within the meaning of the word “obstruct.” A state trooper tried to gather infor- mation to investigate his suspicion that defendant was an intoxicated minor. When provide asked to his age, name and defendant had two lawful choices: he could have answered truthfully or exercised his con- stitutional right not to answer at all. Instead, defen- dant By chose to lie. doing so, impeded he officer’s investigation creating nonphysical ob- stacle to the attempt officer’s to gather accurate information.3

The lead opinion, relying on the doctrine of nos- citur a sociis, concludes that the word “obstruct” ref- only ers obstruction despite the fact that the common understanding the word clearly encompasses both and nonphysical obstruc- tion. The noscitur a sociis doctrine stands for the simple proposition that the words of a statute should be understood in context. Tyler See v Livonia Public

3 While the facts of this case indicate a de minimis violation of the stat ute, my colleagues I caution certainly that hard facts make bad law. It is conceivable circumstances, that under lying different factual to a during investigation grave consequences. could have 465 Mich 83 by Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, C.J. 382, 390-391; 590 NW2d 560 Schs, objection inteipreting no the word While I have placement its in the stat- “obstruct” in the context of opinion’s disagree conclusion that I with the lead ute, placement Legislature’s word “obstruct” in the of the oppose, including “resist, assault, a list of words also wound,” indicates an intent to limit the com- beat or only physical meaning of word to include mon opinion’s physi- obstruction. The lead conclusion that only is the element common to all six cal interference simple the fact that the notion of words overlooks also all six words. While all six interference connects are verbs that could be used to describe acts words only interference, them, two of “beat” and definitely require physical act; “wound,” the other may nonphysical four also be used to describe acts. equally likely Thus, context, read in it is at least types Legislature meant to criminalize all of inter- nonphysical. ference, both fundamentally, unique More structure of the statute at issue demonstrates that the did grouping together that its intend the six words give special meaning of the words. At the beginning regarding process, service of oppose” specifically “obstruct, resist, the words or are apart “assault, beat, set from the words or wound.” keeping Later, however, when the statute refers to peace, together. Notably, all six words are listed preceded by in the second instance the list is directly “so,” word which refers readers back to the same statute’s earlier use meaning words. Because the of each word contained the list of six is part established reference to the first of the stat- oppose” apart ute, “obstruct, resist, where are set Dissenting Opinion Corrigan, C.J. “assault, beat, wound,” from the fact that the appears word “obstruct” later with the words “as- any special given sault, beat or wound” should not be significance.

To the extent of the word only context, “obstruct” can be determined from comparable “oppose.” relevant words are “resist” and opposition Because be oral resistance can just nonphysical easily they physical, as as can be proper application doctrine of the of noscitur a support Legis- sociis does not the conclusion the lature the a intended word “obstruct” to have limited meaning. anything, Legislature’s If to ini- decision tially separate oppose” “obstruct, words resist, suggests beat, from the “assault, words wound” inteipretation intention to avoid an that would require physical component.

m. THE LEAD OTHER OPINION’S ARGUMENTS Perhaps entirely not satisfied with force of its statutory argument, opinion construction the lead arguments support includes a number of additional position. opinion suggests of its First, the lead my interpretation of the statute would criminalize a right defendant’s assertion of the constitutional against compelled self-incrimination. See n ante person disagree. indepen- 3.1 silence of with no duty simply legal speak dent cannot be character- police investigation ized as an obstacle to a in the same as an manner affirmative untruthful statement. Unlike a false statement, which its nature is mis- merely leading, requires police lawful silence officers perform investigative the full extent their unimpeded—within duties—unaided and the bounda- 465 Corrigan, C.J. Opinion by Dissenting justified legally words, In other the law. ríes of equivalent of a is not the to offer assistance refusal positive to interfere. decision heavily opinion relies on the

Second, the lead Legislature have written the could notion that clearly obstructing resisting more statute to by simply including lying to the criminalize prohibited “lying” 95, 96, actions. Ante at in the list of Generally persuasive. speak- argument n 8. This is job interpret plain ing, of the our is to actually Legisla- language words used assumptions making based on what ture. Rather than Legislature we should strive to done, could have actually Certainly, job did. our determine what it Legislature case if the had would be easier this prohibited specifically “lying” among the listed Legislature’s Nevertheless, the failure to use actions. “lying” does not alter the conclusion that the word police investigation. lying can “obstruct” a position Finally, opinion suggests that its the lead specifically has bolstered because problem lying officers in addressed the other Ante at n 4. The first statute identi- statutes. clearly opinion, 257.324(l)(h), MCL fied in the lead only persons inapplicable because it relates code. The detained for violations of the motor vehicle opinion, MCL second statute identified in the lead inapplicable arguably because it has 750.217,is also only involving apply been construed to to situations People Jones, 142 Mich concealment. See v (holding App (1985) 371 NW2d 459 819, 823; “disguise”). lying to the does not constitute a prosecutor’s only Accordingly, alternative this Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, C.J. charge situation was defendant under MCL 750.479.4

IV. CONCLUSION opinion’s The lead conclusion that the crime of resisting obstructing requires actual or threat- ened interference has no basis in text the statute. Our recent decision Philabaun estab- nonphysical may lished that oral or conduct fall plain within the meaning of the statute. For these rea- sons, respectfully I dissent. JJ., concurred with Young,

Weaver Corrigan, C.J. 257.324(l)(h) Even if MCL750.217 or MCL were available under these facts, nothing legislative pros in either statute reflects a intent to limit the charging statutory provision ecutor’s discretion. The enactment of a cov ering automatically preclude prosecutor a factual scenario does not proceeding statutory provision from under a different that also encom

passes E.g., People Little, 752, 760; the same factual scenario. 456 NW2d 237 notes and 5.8 opinion Our is consistent II, Philabaun where comply we concluded that the defendant’s refusal to sample with a search warrant for blood constituted Michigan’s “resisting an obstruction under and ob- “ structing” although [Defendant's statute. conduct, indisputably passive nature, was nevertheless suffi- opposi- cient obstruction, constitute resistance, or deputy’s tion to the execution of the search warrant for the extraction of defendant’s blood.” Philabaun supra quoting supra II, I, Philabaun at 488- dissenting). reaching 489 (Murphy, J., In this conclu- sion, we stated: point implying The dissent misunderstands our here. areWe prosecutor charged could have defendant under these other statutes. agree inapplicable point We these other statutes are this case. Our merely that, specifically proscribed “lying” because the has significant statutes, likely that, truly in various other isit even more had proscribe “lying” specifically intended in this it would have done this as it has done in these other statutes.

Case Details

Case Name: People v. Vasquez

Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court

Date Published: Jul 27, 2001

Citation: 631 N.W.2d 711

Docket Number: Docket 116660

Court Abbreviation: Mich.