People v. Duff
58 Cal. 4th 527
Cal.2014Background
- Defendant Dewey Joe Duff was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree murder with robbery and multiple-murder special circumstances for the 1998 slayings of Roscoe Riley and Brandon Hagan; jury returned a death verdict.
- Evidence: Duff confessed in a recorded interview and described shooting in self-defense; forensic and eyewitness evidence supported prosecution theory that victims were shot from behind and robbed; friends and cohabitants testified about Duff’s prior threats, planning to set up and rob Riley, and post-crime handling of victims’ property.
- Procedural history: pretrial motions included suppression of statements (Miranda and voluntariness), a Trombetta spoliation motion regarding destruction of the vehicle containing the bodies, multiple voir dire disputes (Witherspoon‑Witt excusal, stipulations to excusals, Wheeler‑Batson race challenge), evidentiary disputes over crime‑scene and autopsy photos and tattoos, and penalty‑phase disputes about prior bad acts and rebuttal victim‑impact evidence.
- Trial rulings challenged on appeal included: admission of Duff’s confession, excusal of certain jurors (for cause and by stipulation), denial of spoliation sanctions for disposal of the car, admission of victim images but exclusion of a victim tattoo photo, refusal to instruct on lesser included manslaughter, and several penalty‑phase rulings (use of prior crimes, exclusion of rebuttal evidence, and alleged prosecutorial misconduct).
- The Supreme Court of California affirmed the convictions and death sentence in full, rejecting all constitutional and statutory claims and finding no reversible error.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Duff) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excusal of jurors by stipulation / failure to record reasons | Stipulations to excusal were permissible and forfeited later objections | Stipulations hid Witherspoon‑Witt errors; lack of findings requires reversal | Stipulation forfeited appellate review; no relief (stipulated excusals not reviewable) |
| Excusal for cause under Witherspoon‑Witt (Prospective Juror S.L.) | Juror’s equivocal questionnaire and voir dire showed substantial impairment; court properly excused her | Excusal violated Witherspoon/Witt and equal protection (religious bias) | Substantial evidence supported finding of substantial impairment; excusal proper and not religiously motivated |
| Batson/Wheeler racial challenge to peremptories | Prosecutor offered race‑neutral, plausible reasons for strikes | Peremptories were race‑based; trial court erred in denying motion | Court found prosecutor’s reasons credible and nonpretextual; no Batson/Wheeler violation |
| Suppression of statements (Miranda, invocation, readvisement, voluntariness) | Officers obtained valid waiver, clarified equivocal attorney reference, no readvisement required after brief break, and confession was voluntary | Invocation equivocal and required clarification/readvisement; confession coerced | Waiver was knowing; officers clarified before interrogation; readvisement unnecessary given circumstances; confession voluntary and admissible |
| Trombetta/spoliation (destruction of car) | No bad faith in routine destruction; car not shown to have apparent exculpatory value | Loss prevented exculpatory testing supporting self‑defense; sanctions required | No bad faith shown; evidence was at best potentially useful, so Youngblood/Trombetta standard not met; no sanctions warranted |
| Admission of crime‑scene/autopsy photographs and exclusion of tattoo photo | Photos were highly probative of wound location and consistent with forensic testimony; tattoo photo was cumulative and lacked foundation | Autopsy/scene photos unduly prejudicial; tattoo photo relevant to defendant’s belief about victim being armed | Admission of photos was within discretion (probative > prejudicial); exclusion of tattoo photo proper because cumulative and no foundation that Duff knew of it |
| Refusal to instruct on lesser included (voluntary manslaughter / imperfect self‑defense) | No instruction required because evidence supported either perfect self‑defense (acquittal) or first‑degree murder; no intermediate theory supported | Jury should have had manslaughter option to avoid all‑or‑nothing choice (Beck) | No substantial evidence of imperfect self‑defense or heat of passion; refusal to instruct proper; no Beck error |
| Penalty phase: use of prior bad acts and exclusion of rebuttal victim‑impact evidence | Prior violent acts admissible under §190.3, factor (b); prosecution limited its victim impact so defense rebuttal not opened | Admission of extensive unadjudicated acts unconstitutional and unduly prejudicial; exclusion of rebuttal evidence violated right to rebut | Courts repeatedly upheld §190.3(b); evidence admissible and not unduly prejudicial; limited victim‑impact testimony did not open the door to the proffered rebuttal evidence; exclusion was within discretion |
| Alleged prosecutorial misconduct (display of novels during closing) | Argument and display were poor taste but defendant waived curative instruction and was permitted to respond | Display prejudiced jury and warranted mistrial/new penalty determination | Claim forfeited by defense choice to respond rather than seek admonition; no prejudice shown requiring reversal |
Key Cases Cited
- Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (U.S. 1968) (juror excusal for views on capital punishment that prevent performance)
- Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (U.S. 1985) (juror may be excused if views would substantially impair duty)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1986) (peremptory strikes based on race prohibited)
- Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (U.S. 1988) (no due process violation absent bad faith in failure to preserve potentially useful evidence)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (custodial interrogation warnings required; waiver standard)
- Trombetta v. California, 467 U.S. 479 (U.S. 1984) (state’s duty to preserve evidence of apparent exculpatory value)
- Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2007) (deference to trial court’s assessment of juror impartiality)
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (U.S. 2010) (clarifies invocation and waiver principles under Miranda)
- Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (U.S. 1991) (victim impact evidence admissible in capital sentencing)
- Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (U.S. 1980) (jury must be instructed on lesser included offenses under certain circumstances)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000) (facts increasing statutory maximum must be found by jury)