People v. Delgado
214 Cal. Rptr. 3d 223
Cal.2017Background
- Defendant Anthony Delgado, serving a life term under California's Three Strikes scheme, murdered two fellow inmates (Mendoza and Mahoney) and was convicted of two counts of first‑degree murder with special circumstances (lying in wait and multiple murders), among other offenses; jury returned a death verdict.
- After the murders and during trial preparation, the court (with prosecutor and defense counsel agreement) ordered correctional officers to be present during attorney‑client consultations for counsel’s safety and admonished officers to treat overheard communications as privileged; defendant did not object at trial.
- Surveillance video and defendant’s admissions/reenactments provided strong evidence of premeditation, planning, and violent intent; defendant also committed multiple violent incidents and possessed weapons in custody that were presented at the penalty phase as aggravating evidence under Cal. Penal Code § 190.3(b).
- At penalty, the prosecution introduced ten unadjudicated incidents (cell extractions, weapon possession, assaults on officers) in aggravation; court instructed jurors they could consider such incidents only if convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant committed them.
- Defendant raised numerous challenges on appeal: intrusion on attorney‑client privilege/6th Amendment, right to be present at the in‑chambers proceeding, multiplicity of convictions (murder vs. § 4500), instructional errors, admissibility and sufficiency of other‑crimes aggravating evidence, and constitutional challenges to lying‑in‑wait and § 4500 death‑eligibility provisions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Presence of correctional officers during attorney‑client meetings (privilege/6th) | State: officers were present for safety, bound by privilege; no evidence of disclosure or prosecutorial benefit | Delgado: officers’ presence destroyed confidentiality, chilled communications, violated Sixth Amendment and state right to counsel; structural error | Forfeited by failure to object; on merits, no Sixth Amendment violation under Weatherford test—no disclosure, no prosecutorial benefit, no realistic possibility of prejudice; trial court did not abuse discretion |
| Defendant excluded from August 6 in‑camera hearing ordering officer presence (right to be present/statutory) | State: error (if any) harmless because defendant later had opportunity to object and was informed in open court | Delgado: absence deprived him of chance to object, reject counsel, or proceed pro se; prejudicial | Any exclusion harmless: defendant had subsequent opportunities, voiced no complaints, and no prejudice shown |
| Multiplicity: convictions for murder and § 4500 aggravated assault by a life prisoner | State: § 4500 and first‑degree murder have different elements; both permissible | Delgado: murder convictions necessarily included in § 4500 so multiple convictions improper under lesser‑included theory | Rejected: first‑degree murder (willful, premeditated, deliberate or listed means) requires elements not included in § 4500; convictions may stand concurrently |
| Admission/sufficiency of unadjudicated other‑crimes evidence in aggravation (§ 190.3(b)) | State: evidence of assaults, weapons, gassing, and cell extractions properly admitted as violent conduct bearing on character and danger | Delgado: many incidents were only misdemeanor/nonviolent or insufficiently proven; admission prejudiced penalty determination | Forfeited claims by failure to object; on merits court did not abuse discretion—evidence legally sufficient to show use/attempt/threat of force; jury instructed to find each incident beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Eighth Amendment challenges to lying‑in‑wait special circumstance and § 4500 eligibility | State: both statutes validly narrow death‑eligible class and serve penological goals (retribution, deterrence, institutional safety) | Delgado: lying‑in‑wait and § 4500 fail to meaningfully narrow death‑eligible class; § 4500 arbitrarily distinguishes by custody status | Rejected: prior precedent upholding both; lying‑in‑wait distinct from other theories of first‑degree murder; § 4500 constitutionally permissible as an eligibility factor (selection stage addresses individualized mitigation) |
Key Cases Cited
- Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (attorney‑client intrusion requires showing of prejudice or prosecutorial benefit under Sixth Amendment)
- Alexander v. People, 49 Cal.4th 846 (2010) (no per se Sixth Amendment violation from overheard communications absent evidence of disclosure or prejudice)
- Ervine v. People, 47 Cal.4th 745 (2009) (no Sixth Amendment violation where jail personnel read defense materials but did not communicate them to prosecutors; defendant must show prejudice)
- Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal.3d 742 (1979) (undercover agent’s attendance at confidential consultations can violate state right to counsel when disclosure and chilling effect are established)
- Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994) (capital eligibility must genuinely narrow death‑eligible class; selection phase for individualized weighing)
- Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (struck down mandatory death penalty statute for inmates without individualized consideration)
- People v. Landry, 2 Cal.5th 52 (2016) (upholding § 4500 against Eighth Amendment challenge; custody status permissible eligibility factor)
- People v. Casares, 62 Cal.4th 808 (2016) (upholding lying‑in‑wait special circumstance against Eighth Amendment narrowing challenge)
- People v. Montiel, 5 Cal.4th 877 (1993) (penalty‑phase challenges to admission/sufficiency of unadjudicated crimes must be preserved by timely objection)
- People v. Phillips, 41 Cal.3d 29 (1985) (trial court determines as a matter of law whether proposed unadjudicated conduct meets statutory definition for admissibility under § 190.3)
