People v. Cuiriz, A144351

Defendant Deyanira Cuiriz (age 19) shot a man during an altercation after two men confronted and assaulted her father outside her home following her 19th birthday party; the victim became a quadriplegic.
Defendant was handed a gun moments before the shooting; jurors convicted her of attempted voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion), shooting at an occupied vehicle, and mayhem; acquitted of attempted murder.
Police Mirandized defendant at the station ~6–7 hours after the shooting; her recorded interrogation (in which she admitted shooting and made statements undermining self‑defense) was admitted at trial.
The trial court imposed mitigated base terms but was required to add the mandatory firearm enhancement of 25 years‑to‑life under Penal Code §12022.53(d), producing an aggregate sentence of 27 years‑to‑life; other sentences were stayed.
On appeal the court affirmed conviction, rejected Miranda‑waiver and excision claims, but found the 27‑to‑life sentence cruel and unusual as applied and remanded to impose a reduced aggregate sentence (12 years for attempted voluntary manslaughter with appropriate stayed enhancements).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of recorded interrogation (Miranda waiver)	Waiver was voluntary/knowing; recording admissible.	Waiver was not voluntary/knowing given youth, distress, sleep/deprivation; exclude recording.	Waiver was valid; recorded interrogation admissible.
Failure to excise detective’s opinion from recording	Any officer remarks cured by limiting instruction; no prejudice.	Detective’s comment undermined fairness and should be stricken.	No error — jury instructed police statements are not evidence; any prejudice cured.
Eighth Amendment/state const. cruel and unusual challenge to 25‑to‑life enhancement	Enhancement valid and constitutionally applied in many cases to deter gun violence.	25‑to‑life enhancement is grossly disproportionate as applied to a provoked, heat‑of‑passion shooter with no record; punishment shocks conscience.	Sentence (27‑to‑life) was cruel and unusual as applied; modified to 12 years (attempted voluntary manslaughter) and vacated the imposed enhancement sentence.
Proper remedial sentence when enhancement invalidated	N/A (prosecution sought to enforce enhancement).	If enhancement unconstitutional as applied, remand for appropriate lesser term reflecting culpability.	Court substituted a 12‑year term (activated stayed attempted manslaughter sentence) as appropriate remedy.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda warning and waiver requirements)
People v. Duff, 58 Cal.4th 527 (2014) (standard for reviewing Miranda waiver admission)
People v. Dillon, 34 Cal.3d 441 (1983) (three‑pronged test for disproportionate punishment under state constitution)
In re Lynch, 8 Cal.3d 410 (1972) (framework for cruel or unusual punishment review)
People v. Em, 171 Cal.App.4th 964 (2009) (discussion of Lynch/Dillon test and Eighth Amendment analysis)
People v. Hines, 15 Cal.4th 997 (1997) (factors for assessing sentence proportionality to defendant and offense)
People v. Ervine, 47 Cal.4th 745 (2009) (presumption that juries follow limiting instructions)
People v. Schueren, 10 Cal.3d 553 (1973) (unusual punishment where lesser included offense carries greater statutory punishment)
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (proportionality principles informing cruel and unusual analysis)
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding severe sentences for recidivists under Eighth Amendment)