People v. Clark
8 Cal. App. 5th 863
Cal. Ct. App.2017Background
- In 1997 Jon Eric Clark was convicted of felony indecent exposure and sentenced to 26 years-to-life under California’s Three Strikes law based on prior convictions including two § 288 (lewd conduct) convictions (1974, 1985).
- Clark previously challenged the 1974 prior as constitutionally invalid under Boykin/Tahl (lack of record showing waiver of jury, confrontation, and self-incrimination rights); those challenges were rejected on direct and habeas review in the 1980s–1990s.
- After Proposition 36 (Three Strikes Reform Act) and § 1170.126 (2012), Clark petitioned for resentencing (2014), arguing: (1) the 1974 prior was constitutionally invalid and thus could not render him ineligible for resentencing; (2) the court had discretion under § 1385 to strike priors in the interests of justice to make him eligible; and (3) equal protection was violated because § 288.7 offenders (more serious) would be treated differently.
- The prosecutor argued Clark was statutorily ineligible under § 1170.126(e)(3) due to his § 288 priors, the court lacked authority in a § 1170.126 proceeding to collaterally attack priors or to use § 1385 to bypass eligibility criteria, and no equal protection problem existed.
- The trial court denied the resentencing petition, finding Clark ineligible under § 1170.126 and that the court lacked authority to revisit the constitutionality of long-final priors or to use § 1385 to circumvent the statute; Clark appealed.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding § 1170.126 provides no basis to collateral attack or strike long-final disqualifying priors in a resentencing petition and that § 288.7 is also disqualifying, so no equal protection violation existed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May a trial court, in a § 1170.126 resentencing petition, determine the constitutional validity of a disqualifying prior (Boykin/Tahl challenge) and strike it? | Clark: A constitutionally invalid prior cannot be used to render him ineligible; court must adjudicate validity. | State: § 1170.126 focuses on the fact of prior convictions; it does not authorize collateral attacks in resentencing proceedings. | Held: No. § 1170.126 does not authorize collateral attack or evidentiary hearings to relitigate long-final priors in a resentencing petition. |
| May a trial court use § 1385 (interests of justice) to dismiss/strike a disqualifying prior so petitioner becomes eligible under § 1170.126? | Clark: § 1170.126 does not clearly remove § 1385 power; court can dismiss priors to give effect to voters’ lenity. | State: Proposition 36’s text and materials limit resentencing to those meeting eligibility criteria; Brown controls—no § 1385 power to circumvent eligibility. | Held: No. Trial court lacks power under § 1385 to bypass § 1170.126 eligibility requirements. |
| Does § 1170.126 require pleading and proof of disqualifying priors (so court could dismiss them)? | Clark: Cross-reference to § 1170.12 implies pleading/proof requirement and thus something for the court to dismiss. | State: Retrospective § 1170.126 contains no pleading/proof requirement; courts uniformly treat eligibility as court-determined fact, not a prosecution pleading. | Held: § 1170.126 contains no pleading/proof requirement; eligibility turns on the fact of prior convictions, not a plea/proof process. |
| Equal protection: Is Clark denied equal protection because a § 288.7 offender (more serious) would not be disqualified while a § 288 offender is? | Clark: § 288.7 is more serious; treating § 288 differently is arbitrary. | State: § 288.7 is disqualifying as a life-punishable offense and thus included; even if distinctions exist, non-similarly situated inmates justify the difference. | Held: No equal protection violation; § 288.7 is disqualifying (life-punishable) and Clark is not similarly situated to new-sentencing defendants. |
Key Cases Cited
- Allen v. People, 21 Cal.4th 424 (reaffirming motion-to-strike procedure for Boykin/Tahl claims but not creating authority to relitigate long-final priors in § 1170.126 proceedings)
- Garcia v. Superior Court, 14 Cal.4th 953 (limits on collateral attack via motion to strike; distinction among types of prior-challenge claims)
- Sumstine v. People, 36 Cal.3d 909 (permitting motion to strike prior on Boykin/Tahl grounds as policy of judicial efficiency)
- Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (holding federal sentencing statute focuses on fact of prior convictions and does not authorize collateral attack in sentencing)
- People v. Brown, 230 Cal.App.4th 1502 (holding trial courts lack § 1385 power to bypass § 1170.126 eligibility criteria)
- People v. Romero, 13 Cal.4th 497 (section 1385 power to dismiss priors at original sentencing)
- People v. Osuna, 225 Cal.App.4th 1020 (§ 1170.126 is a limited resentencing mechanism that cannot increase sentences; eligibility is statutory and circumscribed)