2014 COA 35
Colo. Ct. App.2014Background
- In 2010 an 18-year-old defendant, Dallas Cardenas, arranged online ads for a 17-year-old victim to provide massages that led to sexual acts; he collected the proceeds and coached callers; others also prostituted at his direction.
- A jury convicted Cardenas of trafficking in children (Class 2 felony) and multiple prostitution-related offenses; court sentenced him to concurrent terms (8 years for trafficking, concurrent with other counts).
- At trial the jury received instructions defining "sell, exchange, barter, or lease a child" and dictionary-style definitions of those verbs; jurors asked whether ownership or control was required and were referred to the definitions.
- Defense moved for judgment of acquittal on trafficking charges for insufficiency of the evidence; the trial court denied the motion; Cardenas appealed on sufficiency and the admissibility of testimony about a forearm tattoo reading "MOB."
- The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed and vacated the trafficking-in-children conviction for insufficient evidence (holding the statute criminalizes transfer of custody/possession of a child, not facilitation of the child’s services), but affirmed convictions for pimping, pandering, and inducing child prostitution; tattoo evidence admission was upheld.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether arranging buyers for a minor’s sexual services satisfies elements of § 18-8-502(1)(a) (trafficking in children) | Prosecution: trafficking conviction valid because defendant profited from and facilitated commercial sex by a minor | Cardenas: evidence showed only facilitation of services (pimping/pandering), not sale/exchange/barter/lease of the child herself; insufficient to prove trafficking | Reversed: statute’s plain meaning requires sale/exchange/barter/lease of the child (transfer of physical or legal custody/possession), not merely sale of the child’s services; evidence insufficient → acquittal entered on that charge |
| Whether testimony about defendant’s "MOB" tattoo was admissible | Prosecution: tattoo probative of intent, motive, and context ("money over bitches") and part of the res gestae of the offenses | Cardenas: tattoo irrelevant and unduly prejudicial; alternatively, improper other-acts evidence under CRE 404(b) | Affirmed: trial court did not abuse discretion; tattoo testimony was relevant, res gestae, probative of intent/context, and not unduly prejudicial |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Sprouse, 988 P.2d 771 (Colo. 1999) (standard for judgment of acquittal and sufficiency review)
- Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d 800 (Colo. 2005) (evidence must be substantial and sufficient; de novo review language)
- Montes-Rodriguez v. People, 241 P.3d 924 (Colo. 2010) (statutory construction and de novo review)
- People v. Voth, 312 P.3d 144 (Colo. 2013) (start with plain and ordinary meaning of statutory language)
- State v. Runkles, 605 A.2d 111 (Md. 1992) (statute interpreted to reach transfers of custody of a child for money)
- United States v. Fazal-Ur-Raheman-Fazal, 355 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2004) (children are not property; limits on treating humans as transferable property)
- People v. Skinner, 58 P.3d 720 (Colo. App. 2002) (tattoo evidence probative of intent/motive)
- People v. Quintana, 882 P.2d 1366 (Colo. 1994) (res gestae evidence admissible to provide context of the criminal episode)