Lead Opinion
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
I. Introduction
In this аppeal, we review the court of appeals' decision to affirm Felix Montes-Rodriguez's conviction for criminal impersonation in violation of section 18-5-113(1)(e), C.R.S. (2010). People v. Montes-Rodrigues,
A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed Montes-Rodriguez's conviction. Montes-Rodriguez,
We reverse. Consistent with previous Colorado case law, we hold that one assumes a false or fictitious capacity in violation of the statute when he or she assumes a false legal qualification, power, fitness, or role. We also reaffirm our earlier holding that one assumes a false identity by holding onе's self out to a third party as being another person. See Alvarado v. People,
The prosecution failed to prove the false-capacity element of the crime because it presented no evidence that the law requires loan applicants to have social security numbers. In other words, the prosecution failed to present evidence that a social security number gives one the legal qualification, fitness, or power tо receive a loan. The prosecution also failed to prove the element of false identity. Montes-Rodriguezs's false social security number was one of many pieces of identifying information submitted on his loan application. On the whole, by providing his proper name, birth date, address, and employment information, the evidence establishes that Montes-Rodriguez applied for the loan as himself, not as another person.
HI. Facts and Proceedings Below
Montes-Rodriguez was charged with criminal impersonation based on his use of a false social security number in an application for an automobile loan. Montes-Rodriguez applied for the loan through Hajek Chevrolet. In the process, he met with the dealership's finance director, who asked Montes-Rodri-guez to complete an application stating his name, birth date, social security number, current and previous addresses, employment information, salary, and more. Montes-Rodri-guez provided a false social security number. However, the rest of the information he provided on his application was correct. The dealership submitted copies of Montes-Rod-riguez's application to various lenders, and one approved him for credit.
On his application, Montes-Rodriguez provided a social security number that actually belonged to another individual, C.F
At trial, Hajek Chevrolet's finance director testified that the dealership requires social security numbers on loan applications because this number is needed to conduct on-Tine credit checks of applicants. Consequently, one may not receive a loan through Hajek Chevrolet without providing a social security number. No other evidence was presented concerning the role of the social security number in the loan application process.
At the close of the prosecution's case, Montes-Rodriguez moved for a judgment of acquittal. He relied upon People v. Jones,
The trial court denied Montes-Rodriguez's motion for a judgment of acquittal, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. Montes-Rodriguez appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. Montes-Rodriguez,
Writing in dissent, Judge Jones agreed with the majority's definition of false capacity but disagreed with the application of that term in this case. Id. at 345 (Jones, J., dissenting). He reasoned that Montes-Rod-riguez had not assumed a false legal qualification or power to receive a loan because one is not legally required to have a social seeurity number in order to apply for or receive a loan. Id. He countered the majority's con
Judge Jones next addressed the parties' arguments concerning false identity. Following court of appeals precedent, he stated that one assumes a false or fictitious identity by " 'hold[ing] oneself out as someone that he or she is not [and assuming] the identity of another person, whether that other person is real or fictitious.'" Id. (quoting Jоnes,
We granted Montes-Rodriguer's petition for certiorari to consider whether the court оf appeals erred in its interpretation and application of the terms "false or fictitious identity or capacity" in the criminal impersonation statute.
III. Standard of Review
When reviewing the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal, we "review the record de novo to determine whether the evidence before the jury was sufficient both in quantity and quality to sustain the convie-tions." Dempsey v. People,
The material facts in this case, however, are largely undisputed. Montes-Rodriguez admitted to using a false social security number on his loan application. The evidence established that he otherwise provided correct identifying information. Consequently, we are not required to weigh the evidence. Rather, we must construe the statute and then apply it to the facts established at trial.
We review issues of statutory construction and application de novo. CLPF-Parkridge One, LP. v. Harwell Invs., Inc.,
IV. Criminal Impersonation Statute
One commits criminal impersonation whenever he or she knowingly assumes a false or fictitious identity or capacity and uses that identity or capacity to perform one of the acts described in subsections (1)(a) through
(1) A person commits criminal impersonation if he knowingly assumes a false or fictitious identity or capacity, and in such identity or capacity he:
(a) Marries, or pretends to marry, or to sustain the marriage relation toward another without the connivance of the latter; or
(b) Becomes bail or surety for a party in an action or proceeding, civil or eriminal, before a court or officer authorized to take the bail or surety; or
(c) Confesses a judgment, or subscribes, verifies, publishes, acknowledges, or proves a written instrument which by law may be recorded, with the intent that the same may be delivered as true; or
(d) Does an act which if done by the person falsely impersonated, might subject such person to an action or special proceeding, civil or criminal, or to liability, charge, forfeiture, or penalty; or
(e) Does any other act with intent to unlawfully gain a benefit for himself or another or to injure or defraud another.
§ 18-5-113. The statute therefore consists of two parts: the knowing assumption of a false identity or capacity and the use of that identity or capacity to perform certain acts or to acquire certain benefits. See Alvarado,
In the present case, Montes-Rodriguez was convicted of assuming a false identity or capacity "with the intent to unlawfully gain a benefit for himself," in violation of subsection (1)(e) of the statute. § 18-5-118(1)(e). The portion of subsection (1)(e) dealing with the terms "to injure or defraud another" was not an issue in this case and the trial court did not instruct the jury on this part of the statute. Montes-Rоdriguez argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he assumed a false identity or a false capacity under the statute. Although the court of appeals affirmed Montes-Rodriguez's conviction on false-capacity grounds and declined to consider the question of false identity, the conviction could be affirmed on either identity or capacity grounds. The parties raised the identity issue at trial and have addressed it in their arguments to the court of appeals and to this court. Hence, we consider both issues to determine whether Montes-Rodri-guez's conviction may have been supported by the evidence.
A. False Capacity
Rеlying on prior Colorado case law, the majority of the court of appeals interpreted false capacity to mean a false "legal qualification, competency, power, or fitness." Montes-Rodriguezs,
The other subsections of the statute operate similarly. Subsection (1)(b) applies when one uses a false capacity to act as bail or
Common usage also supports the interpretation of capacity as the legal qualification, power, fitness, or role in which one performs an act. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines capacity as one's "legal qualification, competency, power, or fitness." Webster's Third New International Dictic-nary 8380 (2002). Black's Law Dictionary defines it as the "role in which one performs an act." Black's Law Dictionary 199 (7th ed. 1999).
Finally, Colorado case law supports this interpretation of capacity. In People v. Gonzales, we ruled that the defendant violated the criminal impersonation statute when he obtained a money order by falsely claiming that he was the husband of the named payee.
In Bauer, the court of appeals relied on a similar approach to hold that the defendant had assumed a false capacity by continuing to practice law after his bar license had been suspended.
The defendant in Bawer argued that he had not assumed a false capacity because he had the skill and knowledge of an attorney. Id. at 898. The court rejected this argument, explaining that "possessing the knowledge and skill to perform the functions of an attorney is not the equivalent of the capacity to act as an attorney." Id. The court of appeals reasoned that capacity, as used in the statute, does not refer to one's abilities but rather to one's legal quаlifications. Id. The court observed that, "[olnee [the] defendant's license was suspended, he no longer had the legal qualifications to act in the capacity of an attorney." Id. (emphasis added).
Considering the statutory scheme as a whole, the common meaning of the word, and the relevant case law, we hold that one assumes a false or fictitious capacity in violation of the criminal impersonation statute when he or she assumes a false legal qualification, power, fitness, or role.
B. False Identity
Having defined the element of false capacity, we now consider the element of false identity. We recently defined this term in Alvarado,
The court of appeals resorted to a similar definition of false identity in Jones,
Consistent with our definition of thе term in Alvarado and the court of appeals' opinion in Jones, we hold that one assumes a false identity under the statute by holding one's self out to a third party as being another person. We do not decide as a matter of law what factual cireumstances are sufficient to constitute holding one's self out as being another person.
V. Application
Having interpreted the terms false capacity and false identity under this statute, we apply them here. Initially, we consider whether Montes-Rodriguez's use of a false social security number constituted the assumption of a false capacity.
At trial, Hajek Chevrolet's financial director testified that the dealership requires social security numbers in order to perform online credit checks. The majority of the court of appeals concluded that Montes-Rod-riguez therefore assumed a false capacity to obtain the loan because he could not have done so without a social security number. The prosecution urges this rationale to us as well. This conclusion, however, confuses the lender's requirements to obtain a loan with the legal requirements to obtain a loan. Although Montes-Rodriguez may have lacked the practical capacity to obtain a loan through Hajek Chevrolet becаuse they could not check his credit without a social security number, he did not lack the legal capacity to obtain a loan. The prosecution presented no evidence that a social security number provided Montes-Rodriguez with the false legal qualification, power, or fitness to obtain a loan. As Judge Jones noted in his dissent, "[elxcept perhaps as to claiming Social Seeu-rity benefits, possessing a Social Security number does not give a person a legal status that he or she would not [otherwise] possess...." Montes-Rodrigues,
Likewise, the record does not support the majority of the court of appeals' conclusion that Montes-Rodriguez assumed a false capacity to receive a loan because he impliedly asserted his ability to work in this country legally. The prosecution did not present any evidence concerning a person's ability to work legally in this country or whether one must have a social security number to do so.
Because we conclude that Montes Rodriguez did not assume a false capacity, we next address the evidence concerning the element of false identity. Montes-Rodri-guez's social security number was but one of many pieces of identifying information listed on his loan application. He gavе his correct address, birth date, and place of employment. Most importantly, he gave his correct name. In the face of so much accurate identifying information, we cannot conclude that Montes-Rodriguez pretended to be another person in his loan application simply because he supplied a false social security number.
VI. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the court of appeals' opinion. We remand this case to that court so that it may be returned to the trial court for entry of a judgment of acquittal.
Notes
. Montes-Rodriguez was not convicted of using a false identity or capacity with the intent to "injure or defraud another," a circumstance listed in subsection (1)(e).
. Because we conclude that Montes-Rodriguez did not assume a false or fictitious identity or capacity, we do not decide whether he had the requisite intent to unlawfully gain a benefit.
. No evidеnce was presented that Montes-Rodri-guez knew C.F. or knew that the social security number he used actually belonged to another individual.
. We granted certiorari on the following issue: "Whether the court of appeals' opinion erred in its interpretation of the criminal impersonation statute, and its terms false or fictitious identity or capacity, thus conflicting with the applicable decisions of this court and of other divisions of the court of appeals."
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I not only believe the majority misconstrues the Criminal Impersonation statute and reaches the wrong result in this case; but by slicing, dicing, parsing, distinguishing, and generally over-analyzing (over the coursе of some thirty paragraphs) one short and relatively self-explanatory phrase, the majority manages to exclude from the statutory proscription conduct lying at its very heart. Because I consider the defendant's deliberate misrepresentation of the single most unique and important piece of identifying data for credit-transaction purposes to be precisely the kind of conduct meant to be proscribed as criminal by this statute, I respectfully dissent.
As relevant here the statute prohibits using a false or fictitious identity or capacity for the purpose of unlawfully gaining a benefit or defrauding someone else.
Contrary to the assertions of the majority, I do not believe its interpretation is in any way limited, or even guided, by our prior precedents. We have never yet attempted to comprehensively define the terms "identity" or "capacity" or suggest in any way that thеy are used in this statute as mutually exclusive alternatives. Quite the contrary, we have expressly characterized misrepresentation as the husband of another and receiving money "in that capacity" as "the assumed false or fictitious identity which enabled appellant to wrongfully obtain the funds which were not his." People v. Gonzales,
By the same token, when we held in Alvarado v. People,
Although it also has no precedential value for this court, a different panel of the court of appeals found, almost twenty years ago, that a social security number on a loan application was but one of a number of requested items of identification, and in light of other truthful disclosures, that giving a false social security number did not amount to assuming a false identity. See People v. Jones,
Criminal Impersonation is a relatively minor, inchoate offense. Using personal identifying information like a social security number without authority to obtain credit is now treated much mоre expressly and punished much more severely. See § 18-5-902, C.R.S. (2010) (Identity Theft). Although the majority opinion may therefore have little practical effect in future cases, I object to its approach of so narrowly parsing the individual terms chosen by the legislature that the type of conduct at which its proscription is most directly aimed ultimately falls through the cracks and remains unregulated. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice RICE and Justice EID join in this dissent.
. Although the majority's rationale for reversal appears to rest entirely on its understanding of the phrase, "assumes a false or fictitious identity or capacity," which аppears in subsection 113(1) of the statute, it nevertheless pointedly asserts that the defendant was not convicted according to the "injure or defraud" language in subsection 113(1)(e). Maj. op. at 925 n. 1 & 928. In a single short phrase, subsection (1)(e) prohibits falsifying one's identity or capacity with the intent to either unlawfully gain a benefit or defraud another, and the defendant was clearly charged with and convicted of violating section 18-5-113(1)(e). Unless the majority implies that falsifying a loan application does not harm the lender simultaneously with benefiting the borrower, and that the words "identity or capacity" somehow take on one meaning when the defendant's intent is to benefit himself and another when his intent is to cause loss, I fail to appreciate the significance of this disclaimer.