2018 IL App (5th) 140556
Ill. App. Ct.2018Background
- Gabriel Boyd pled guilty to one count of armed robbery (Class X) on May 15, 2014 under a fully negotiated plea: 18 years' imprisonment and 3 years' MSR; three other counts were dismissed.
- After sentencing Boyd filed a pro se motion asserting excessive sentence and ineffective assistance of plea counsel; the court treated it as a postplea motion to withdraw the guilty plea and appointed counsel.
- Boyd alleged plea counsel promised or communicated eligibility for substantial "good time" or program credits (day-for-day, an initial six-month credit, and program-based reductions) that would reduce his effective time served.
- At an evidentiary hearing both Boyd and plea counsel testified: Boyd said counsel promised credits and that knowledge of ineligibility would have changed his decision to plead; counsel admitted discussing possible credits/programs and that credits might reduce time, but denied promising eligibility or guaranteed reductions.
- The trial court denied Boyd’s motion to withdraw, finding no improper promises induced the plea. The appellate court reversed: statutory law made Boyd ineligible for the credits counsel discussed, counsel’s incorrect advice was objectively unreasonable, and Boyd was prejudiced because he testified he would have acted differently.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Boyd) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Boyd's guilty plea was involuntary because plea counsel gave incorrect advice about eligibility for good-time/program credits, rendering counsel ineffective under Strickland | The trial court properly exercised discretion; denial of motion should stand. Even if counsel erred, Boyd failed to show prejudice (no claim of innocence or plausible defense). | Counsel told Boyd he may receive day-for-day, initial six-month, or program credits; Boyd relied on that and would not have pled if he knew he was ineligible. Counsel was ineffective, so plea was not knowing and voluntary. | Reversed: counsel’s advice about credits was objectively unreasonable (deficient) and there is a reasonable probability Boyd would have rejected the plea (prejudice). Plea vacated and remanded to allow Boyd to plead anew. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Manning, 227 Ill. 2d 403 (trial court has discretion to grant/deny plea-withdrawal motion)
- People v. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507 (same: review for abuse of discretion)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (counsel ineffective if deficient performance and prejudice)
- People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504 (Illinois adoption of Strickland standard)
- People v. Correa, 108 Ill. 2d 541 (erroneous advice about collateral consequences can render plea involuntary when relied upon)
- People v. Brown, 2017 IL 121681 (prejudice inquiry: must show rejecting plea would have been rational under circumstances)
- People v. Walston, 38 Ill. 2d 39 (plea-withdrawal standard)