People v. Armstrong, 205 Cal. Rptr. 3d 518

Defendant Craigen Armstrong, a Crenshaw Mafia Gangsters member, was tried for three related 2001 incidents: (1) murder of Christopher Florence; (2) murders of Michael and Torry Florence and attempted murders of two others two days later; and (3) a 2002 torture/robbery/false-imprisonment incident involving Tyiska Webster, who had been told defendant admitted the shootings.
Ballistics linked a nine‑mm found in defendant’s brother’s possession to bullets recovered from both shooting scenes; defendant was arrested shortly after driving in a red Contour and found with gang clothing at home.
At trial the jury convicted on all counts, found multiple special‑circumstance and firearm‑use allegations true, and returned death verdicts for the three murders; the court later denied postverdict motions and sentenced defendant to death.
During guilt‑phase deliberations the court excused Juror No. 12 for implied bias (failing to disclose friendship with defendant’s cousin) and excused Juror No. 5 for alleged refusal to deliberate; alternates were seated and the jury then convicted.
On appeal the Supreme Court held the trial court abused its discretion in removing Juror No. 5 because the record did not show as a demonstrable reality that she was unable to perform her duty; the removal required reversal of the entire judgment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court properly excused a seated juror (Juror No. 5) for refusing to deliberate under Penal Code § 1089	State argued juror had stopped participating, displayed cell‑phone/book distractions, and thus could be removed for inability to perform duty	Armstrong argued the record lacked clear proof juror refused to deliberate; juror denied the allegations and foreperson’s complaints reflected mere disagreement	Reversed: court abused discretion — under the "demonstrable reality" standard, evidence did not manifestly support removal; error prejudicial requiring reversal
Whether denial of pretrial severance of three incident groups was reversible error	Prosecution: charges were connected (same gun, sequence, motive), cross‑admissible, and joinder promoted judicial economy	Armstrong: joinder prejudiced him, inflammatory evidence might spill over, and capital/noncapital joinder was improper	Affirmed as to severance: charges were properly joined and cross‑admissible; no abuse of discretion denying severance

People v. Cleveland, 25 Cal.4th 466 (discusses juror removal for refusal to deliberate)
People v. Barnwell, 41 Cal.4th 1038 (explains heightened "demonstrable reality" review for juror excusal)
People v. Compton, 6 Cal.3d 55 (origin of "demonstrable reality" phrasing)
People v. Lomax, 49 Cal.4th 530 (contrast of substantial‑evidence and demonstrable‑reality standards)
People v. Bowers, 87 Cal.App.4th 722 (a juror’s early firm conclusion alone is not automatic grounds for removal)
People v. Engelman, 28 Cal.4th 436 (juror disagreement with majority not grounds for discharge)
People v. Alcala, 43 Cal.4th 1205 (standards for severance and joinder under § 954)
People v. Soper, 45 Cal.4th 759 (cross‑admissibility analysis in severance context)
People v. Harrison, 35 Cal.4th 208 (consciousness‑of‑guilt evidence cross‑admissible to prove identity)
People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal.4th 380 (requirements for Evidence Code § 1101(b) identity evidence)