People v. Aguirremariano CA4/2
E076194
| Cal. Ct. App. | May 3, 2022Background
- Defendant Victor Manuel Aguirremariano, a Mexican national and lawful permanent resident since 2000, pleaded guilty to drug offenses in 2008 (misdemeanors) and 2014 (felony later reduced to misdemeanor) and was placed on Proposition 36 treatment-based probation in both cases.
- Plea forms in both cases contained immigration-advisement language which Aguirremariano read, initialed, and signed; he later testified he understood completion of Proposition 36 would make the convictions "go away for all purposes," including immigration.
- After completing treatment the court set aside and dismissed the convictions under Prop. 36–related statutes; in 2015 immigration authorities detained him and commenced removal proceedings based on those convictions.
- In June 2020 Aguirremariano moved under Penal Code §1473.7 to vacate his pleas and convictions, arguing he did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his pleas (he believed dismissal would eliminate immigration consequences).
- The trial court credited his testimony, granted the §1473.7 motions (relying in part on the statutory presumption in §1473.7(e)(2) for Prop. 36 dispositions), and dismissed the cases under §1385; the People appealed.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed, applying independent review for §1473.7 claims, concluding Aguirremariano proved prejudicial error under §1473.7(a)(1) and that dismissal in the interest of justice was not an abuse of discretion.
Issues
| Issue | People (Plaintiff) Argument | Aguirremariano (Defendant) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court erred in granting §1473.7 motions vacating pleas because defendant was correctly informed and failed to show prejudicial error | Defendant was properly advised (signed/initialed plea forms and was admonished); People say he failed to prove contemporaneous objective evidence of prejudice | He reasonably believed Prop. 36 dismissal removed immigration consequences and therefore did not meaningfully understand the plea’s immigration impact; contemporaneous ties and documents corroborate his mindset | Affirmed: court credited testimony and contemporaneous evidence; under Vivar/Mejia standards defendant showed a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea if he’d understood immigration consequences, meeting §1473.7(a)(1) burden |
| Whether §1473.7(e)(2) presumption of legal invalidity (for statutes deeming conviction "never occurred" after compliance) is unconstitutional and improperly displaces presumptions of correctness | People argue the statutory presumption conflicts with the historic presumption of correctness for superior court judgments and may violate separation of powers | Defendant relies on the statutory text and its remedial purpose to correct immigration-misunderstanding harms | Court did not decide constitutionality; held relief would be warranted even without applying the presumption because the record independently established prejudicial error under §1473.7(a)(1) |
| Whether ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standards are required to obtain §1473.7 relief | People contended defendant must prove IAC (Strickland) and the Strickland prejudice standard | Defendant argued amended §1473.7 removed the IAC requirement and allows a different, totality-based prejudice inquiry | Rejected People’s IAC requirement: statutory amendment and Vivar confirm §1473.7 does not require proving IAC; courts apply a totality-of-circumstances prejudice analysis (reasonable probability defendant would have declined plea knowing immigration consequences) |
| Whether dismissal under §1385 after vacatur was procedurally or substantively improper (notice, jurisdiction, interest of justice) | People assert dismissal was post-judgment without proper notice/hearing, lacked stated reasons, and was not in the interest of justice | Court found People had notice and opportunity to be heard (motion and reconsideration hearings), and dismissal was warranted given defendant completed the program, had paid his debt, and strong ties to U.S. | Affirmed: court had jurisdiction to act in the §1473.7 proceeding, provided reasons on the record at reconsideration, and did not abuse discretion in dismissing under §1385 in the interest of justice |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Vivar, 11 Cal.5th 510 (clarifies independent appellate review and prejudice inquiry under §1473.7)
- People v. Mejia, 36 Cal.App.5th 859 (section 1473.7 prejudice analysis focuses on defendant's understanding and contemporaneous corroboration)
- People v. Camacho, 32 Cal.App.5th 998 (discusses §1473.7 scope and relation to IAC standards)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (IAC standard—distinguished as not required under amended §1473.7)
- Jae Lee v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 1958 (Supreme Court discussion of plea decisions when deportation is determinative)
- People v. Jung, 59 Cal.App.5th 842 (applies Mejia reasoning; defendant’s mindset and corroborating evidence control)
- People v. Ogunmowo, 23 Cal.App.5th 67 (contemporaneous evidence required to substantiate post-hoc claims about plea decisions)
- People v. Picklesimer, 48 Cal.4th 330 (limits on post-judgment motions and statutory exceptions)
- People v. Orin, 13 Cal.3d 937 (§1385 may permit dismissal before, during, after trial)
- People v. Hatch, 22 Cal.4th 260 (factors and standards for §1385 dismissal in furtherance of justice)