People v. Adams
239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 2
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2018Background
- Defendants Davon Moreland (juvenile at offense) and Kevin Adams (adult) were convicted by jury of multiple violent offenses including forcible rape and forcible oral copulation in concert, aggravated kidnapping, robbery, and attempted murder; numerous enhancements (gang, firearm, great bodily injury) were found true.
- DNA from saliva matched Adams; condom-wrapper DNA had victim as major contributor and possibly Moreland as minor contributor; eyewitness and surveillance evidence tied defendants to the white car used in the crimes.
- Trial court sentenced Adams and Moreland to lengthy indeterminate terms under Penal Code §667.61 and imposed consecutive terms for sex offenses; Moreland received a 35-year parole-eligibility term (due to juvenile status and prior disposition).
- On appeal the court corrected presentence custody credits, held defendants ineligible for presentence conduct credits under the post-2006 §667.61 amendment, and determined the aggravated kidnapping (Pen. Code §209(b)) sentence must be stayed under §209(d) when the same act also supports punishment under §667.61.
- The Supreme Court granted review and transferred for reconsideration in light of People v. Contreras; the appellate court vacated Moreland’s sentence and remanded for resentencing consistent with Contreras (considering juvenile mitigating factors and setting a parole-seek time).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Prosecution) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resentencing Moreland under Eighth Amendment/Contreras | Contreras does not require materially different sentence; original 35‑year parole‑eligibility lawful | Moreland (appellant) argued his juvenile status and mitigating life factors require reconsideration under Contreras | Court remanded for resentencing of Moreland: trial court must consider Contreras factors, mitigating circumstances, new legislation/regulations, and set a parole‑seek timing; court did not dictate outcome magnitude |
| Presentence custody credits calculation | Court should correct clerical errors to reflect actual days in custody | Defendants accepted corrected day counts | Modified judgments: Adams 563 days; Moreland 611 days; abstracts corrected |
| Presentence conduct credits under §667.61 (post‑2006 amendment) | Legislature intended 2006 amendment to eliminate conduct/work credits for one‑strike (§667.61) inmates | Defendants argued eligibility for conduct credit; parties briefed statutory construction | Court interpreted amendment and legislative history to hold defendants sentenced under §667.61 are not entitled to presentence conduct credits; abstracts amended to delete conduct credits |
| Punishment for §209(b) aggravated kidnapping and §667.61 for same act (§209(d)) | Prosecution: can charge both but may not punish for both as to the same act; imposed both sentences in judgment | Defendants argued they should not be punished twice for the same act | Court held §209(d) requires the punishment for aggravated kidnapping (count 4) be stayed where the same kidnapping act also supports punishment under §667.61; modified judgments to stay count 4 punishment |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Contreras, 4 Cal.5th 349 (California 2018) (Eighth Amendment juvenile nonhomicide sentencing standards)
- People v. Rajanayagam, 211 Cal.App.4th 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (presentence custody credit includes arrest and sentencing days)
- People v. Morgain, 177 Cal.App.4th 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (same as to custody credit computation)
- People v. Jones, 58 Cal.App.4th 693 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (§667.61(d)(2) kidnapping‑qualifier elements discussion)
- People v. Mil, 53 Cal.4th 400 (California 2012) (harmlessness where omitted sentencing element uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1999) (standard for harmless‑error review of omitted jury element)
- People v. Caballero, 55 Cal.4th 262 (California 2012) (juvenile sentencing authority and parole‑eligibility considerations)