958 N.W.2d 98
Mich.2020Background
- On Aug. 6, 2016, Ronald Stites was robbed at gunpoint after meeting Lisa Weber; Weber later identified Kristopher Hughes as the robber. Stites could not identify the perpetrator.
- Detective Gorman obtained a warrant to search Hughes’s residences, vehicle, and digital devices for evidence of drug trafficking (affidavit relied on a confidential informant and general statements that drug traffickers use phones).
- Police seized a cell phone from Hughes, extracted all data using Cellebrite, and produced a 600‑page report of calls, texts, and photos.
- About a month after the extraction (warrant focused on drugs), prosecutors asked a detective to run keyword/number searches of the extracted data for contacts and terms related to the armed robbery; those searches returned texts and calls between Hughes and Weber that were used at Hughes’s third trial.
- Hughes was convicted of armed robbery; he appealed claiming the second search exceeded the drug warrant’s scope and that counsel was ineffective for not objecting. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for reconsideration of the ineffective‑assistance claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a warrant authorizing a search of cell‑phone data for one crime (drug trafficking) permits later searches of the same extracted data for evidence of a different crime (armed robbery) without a new warrant | Authorized seizure/search for drugs extinguished Hughes’s privacy in all extracted data; reviewing the entire report to find drug evidence is permissible, so the robbery searches were within the warrant’s scope | The drug warrant did not authorize searches for armed‑robbery evidence; later keyword searches for Weber/Stites and robbery‑related terms exceeded the warrant and required a new warrant | A search of extracted cell‑phone data must be reasonably directed to the criminal activity described in the warrant; the later robbery‑focused searches exceeded the drug warrant and violated the Fourth Amendment |
| Whether seizure plus an initial warrant search entirely extinguishes privacy expectations in all seized digital data | Once a warrant authorizes seizure/search, the expectation of privacy over the seized data is extinguished for all practical purposes | A warrant permits only examination consistent with its scope; seizure does not eliminate privacy in unsearched parts of the data | Seizure/search pursuant to a warrant does not eliminate all privacy interests; officers may examine only to the extent reasonably consistent with the warrant’s scope |
| Standard for scope of digital searches under the Fourth Amendment | Officers may reasonably review the whole extracted dataset because digital evidence can be hidden/misfiled anywhere | Warrant particularity and Riley require searches to be reasonably directed at evidence of the offense alleged; broad searches risk becoming general warrants | A warrant to search digital data must be reasonably directed at uncovering evidence of the criminal activity alleged; broad or unrelated keyword searches exceed the warrant absent exception |
| Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the unlawfully obtained phone evidence | Objection would have been futile because the Court of Appeals previously upheld the searches | Counsel was ineffective for not objecting to a Fourth Amendment violation that rendered the evidence inadmissible | Court remanded to the Court of Appeals to reassess Hughes’s ineffective‑assistance claim in light of the Fourth Amendment ruling |
Key Cases Cited
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (cell‑phone data searches usually require a warrant; phones hold extensive sensitive information)
- United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (privacy expectations frustrated by a prior private search can limit Fourth Amendment protections; scope of subsequent government review is compared to the prior intrusion)
- Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (warrant execution must stay within bounds set by the warrant; distinguishing seizures and searches)
- Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (search‑incident‑to‑arrest limits and rationales)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (reasonable expectation of privacy test)
- Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (particularity requirement limits general searches)
- Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (particularity and nexus between items to be seized and alleged criminality)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (good‑faith exception to exclusionary rule)