952 N.W.2d 394
Mich.2020Background
- In 1996 a sexual assault occurred; a rape kit was collected but remained unanalyzed until 2015.
- Samples were sent to an out-of-state lab (Sorensen); analyst Derek Cutler reported a male DNA contributor from a vaginal swab.
- Michigan State Police compared the Sorensen results to CODIS and linked the DNA to Arthur Jemison; he was charged and tried for first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
- The prosecution sought to have Cutler testify by two-way interactive video; the trial court allowed it over Jemison’s objection; Cutler testified he had not seen the kit and relied on other analysts’ notes.
- A jury convicted Jemison; the Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Maryland v. Craig and similar precedent to find confrontation protections adequate via video.
- The Michigan Supreme Court reversed: it held Crawford governs testimonial evidence, two-way video testimony of an available expert over objection violated the Confrontation Clause, and remanded for harmless-error and MCR 6.006(C) analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether two-way interactive video testimony from an available forensic analyst violated the Confrontation Clause | Video allowed live cross-examination and demeanor observation; preserves confrontation | Video denied face-to-face confrontation with an available, testimonial witness | Violated confrontation rights under Crawford; face-to-face required for testimonial evidence unless witness unavailable and prior cross-examination occurred |
| Whether an expert forensic analyst is exempt from ordinary confrontation concerns | Expert testimony poses fewer credibility concerns and can be treated differently | Expert is a witness against the defendant and must be confronted like any prosecution witness | Expert witnesses called by prosecution are subject to the Confrontation Clause (Melendez-Diaz) |
| Whether Craig (child-one-way-video) permits two-way video for non-child, non-victim experts due to reliability/public policy | Craig and Pesquera justify video as constitutionally sufficient because testimony can be reliable and observed | Craig is limited to its facts (child victims); Crawford displaced Roberts reliability-balancing | Craig does not control here; its rationale cannot be extended to permit video for available, testimonial experts; expense/convenience are inadequate justifications |
| Whether the trial court’s violation of MCR 6.006(C) and the Confrontation Clause can be harmless and what standard applies | The Court of Appeals treated the rule violation as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Defense sought reversal and remand for constitutional review and proper harmless-error analysis | Supreme Court directed remand to Court of Appeals to decide (1) whether MCR 6.006(C) error is subject to harmless review, (2) applicable standard, and (3) whether error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt |
Key Cases Cited
- Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (established pre-Crawford reliability-balancing test)
- Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (allowed one-way video for child witnesses under Roberts reliability framework)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (rejected Roberts; testimonial evidence requires face-to-face confrontation unless witness unavailable and prior cross-examination occurred)
- Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (prosecution’s expert/testifying analysts are witnesses against the defendant and subject to Confrontation Clause)
- Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (historical emphasis on face-to-face confrontation as central to the Clause)
- Delaware v. Van Arsdell, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (harmless-error principles for constitutional trial errors)
- People v. Pesquera, 244 Mich. App. 305 (2001) (Court of Appeals decision applying Craig to videotaped testimony)
- People v. Buie, 491 Mich. 294 (2012) (Michigan Supreme Court opinion that cited Craig in a different procedural context)
- Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (plurality decision addressing expert use of out-of-court statements)
