Lead Opinion
Wе granted leave to appeal to consider whether witness testimony taken by two-way, interactive video was properly admitted during defendant’s trial. Our consideration implicates two issues: (1) whether defendant’s constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him was violated by the admission of video testimony, US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20, and (2) whether the admission of video testimony violated MCR 6.006(C). Because we conclude that defendant waived his right of confrontation under the United States and Michigan Constitutions and that the court rule was not violated, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand to that Court for consideration of defendant’s remaining issues.
I. FACTS AND HISTORY
Defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting BS and two female minors: LS, age 13, and DS, age 9. The assaults occurred on June 27, 2001, after BS, seeking to trade sex for cocaine, invited defendant into the apartment where she was babysitting LS and DS. In lieu оf the desired bargain, defendant held BS at gunpoint and raped her, LS, and DS. LS and DS were unable to identify the man who assaulted them, but at trial BS identified defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes.
Within hours of the assault, Dr. Vincent Palusci examined LS and DS. He found evidence “ ‘indicative of sexual conduct of direct trauma to the genitals, and in the case of [LS], also her anus, which were not explainable in any other manner than the histories provided’ ” by the children. People v Buie,
Wolfarth was unable to identify Donor 1 at the time but entered his results into a DNA database known as CODIS, an acronym for “Combined DNA Indexing System.” On February 1, 2005, CODIS matched defendant’s DNA to Donor 1, and he was arrested and charged with the crimes. Before trial, defense counsel consented to the use of video testimony by Palusci and Wolfarth, and at trial, they were permitted to testify by this method. People v Buie (After Remand), 291 Mich App 259, 267;
After a brief discussion between the court and the information technology staff concerning how the video equipment would operate, Palusci testified. Defendant was eventually convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) involving a victim under the age of 13, MCL 750.520b(l)(a); three counts of first-degree CSC invоlving the use of a weapon, MCL 750.520b(l)(e); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant appealed, arguing that the video testimony violated his constitutional right of confrontation and was not properly admitted under any statute or court rule.
The Court of Appeals adopted the test articulated in Maryland v Craig,
In light of defense counsel’s complete statement, I cannot conclude that “the nature” of that statement manifested anything other than consent. As a threshold matter, the complete statement of defense counsel is “consent” under the Court of Appeals own analysis of the dictionary definition of the term. When defense counsel stated “I’ll leave that to the Court’s discretion,” defendant essentially acquiesced to the taking of testimony using two-way interactive video technology. Defense counsel cannot acquiesce to the court’s handling of a matter at trial, only to later raise the issue as an error on appeal. A contrary result would run afoul of the well-established legal principle that a defendant must “raise objections at a time when the trial court has an opportunity to correct thе error” and cannot “harbor error as an appellate parachute.” [Id. at 1107 (citations omitted).]
On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. At that hearing, the prosecutor was asked:
Q. Now, do you recall specifically any conversation you may have had with defense counsel or the Court concerning the use of the video technology from these witnesses from remote locations?
*300 A. I don’t recall specifically what was said between [defense counsel] and myself. I do know, you know, thinking about that, that regarding Dr. Palusci’s testimony, that I don’t believe she objected to it being the video feed because she wanted-she knew the testimony-
I don’t remember [defense counsel’s] exact words, but she had indicated that Dr. Palusci-she believed Dr. Palusci’s testimony was going to be damaging, so she wanted him, whether it be live or on the screen, done with as quickly as possible.
Defense counsel agreеd that she had discussed the use of video testimony before trial. When asked whether she was “agreeable” to the use of video testimony by Palusci and Wolfarth, defense counsel explained:
Understanding that [the witnesses were not local] and the nature of this particular case and the fact that it had been dragging out for quite a while by this time, I felt — I was in agreement that this would be the best way to have [Palusci and Wolfarth] testify without subjecting them to being here physically.
When asked whether there was “a benefit to having the testimony by video rather than having testimony live,” defense counsel responded:
I didn’t think there was any problem. I wouldn’t call it a benefit or a burden. It was just two individuals testifying on a tele-on a big screen rather than sitting here. They were sworn as I was this afternoon. They were asked questions by the prosecution. They were cross-examined by me. There was some redirection. I believe I even re-сrossed on at least one of the witnesses. And it was done.
Although defense counsel stated that “every conversation [she] had with [defendant] throughout [her] representation was done either in the lock-up area here
Defense counsel was then asked whether defendant himself had responded when informed that Palusci and Wolfarth would testify by video. She answered:
Oh, yeah, of course. [Defendant] objected to everything. It was-you know, it was classic Buie from beginning to end, “This is wrong. That is wrong.” But, you know, yeah. And I believe I made a statement on the record indicating [defendant’s] disdain for the two individuals testifying via video.
She was then asked:
Q. Okay. And where you said, “I understand this is this particular courtroom’s first attempt at this type of technological proceeding and my client is wanting to question the veracity of these proceedings, so I’ll leave that to the Court’s discretion,” is it fair to say then that that statement is you expressing [defendant’s] objection to the procedure?
A. Absolutely.
However, when questioned further about that statement, defense counsel explained:
A. [Defendant] was questioning the veracity of everything. It was just-it was a blanket James Buie, this is a farce, and that was pretty much his attitude from beginning to end.
Q. Okay. Was that specifically as regarding the use of the video testimony itself, or was this about everything?
*302 A. I didn’t take it as that. I took it as he had a problem with every piece of this case, every-from beginning to end up until the point that he was too cowardly to come into the courtroom at sentencing. So, no, I didn’t take it as specifically he had a problem with the-the — I mean I can’t get into his mind, but this was what I was dealing with from the — from the beginning to the end of this case, so I didn’t specifically take it as he had a problem with the videotape. It’s just he had a problem with the fact that he was on trial for raping two little girls.
At this point, the trial court had defense counsel read this Court’s order, Buie,
Q. According to Justice Corrigan, you never objected to the use of a two-way, interactive video technology for taking Dr. Pаlusci and Dr. Wolfarth’s testimony. Is that true or false?
A. I never — I never objected.
Q. So the statement of Justice Corrigan is true?
A. It is.
Defendant also testified at the evidentiary hearing. He explained that he and defense counsel did not get along and that he had requested a new attorney. He further claimed that he had no knowledge of the video testimony until it was about to happen. With regard to the video testimony, defendant explained:
A. I told [defense counsel] that I just didn’t-it just didn’t feel right. I said, “Shouldn’t they be in the witness chair?”
*303 Q. And what did [defense counsel] do after you told her that?
A. No, I told her — I told her I didn’t feel right about it, they should be in the witness chair, and she said, “Everything is going to be all right.” I said, “Well, I want you to get up and object to it because it just don’t seem right.”
Q. Okay. And did she get up and say something?
A. Yes.
Q. And what did she say?
A. She didn’t say the word object like I told her. She-
Q. But this statement that we’ve read at this hearing today about questioning the veracity of the proceedings, is that when she made that statement?
A. Yes.
Following this hearing, the trial court issued a written opinion and order holding that there was no error in permitting the video testimony. After hearing the witnesses’ testimony and evaluating their demeanor and credibility, the court found that “Defendant consented to the taking of testimony by video when his counsel stated on the record that Defendant wanted to question the veracity [of the] proceedings but left it to [the] trial court’s discretion whether to proceed” and “according to [defense counsel], Defendant did not object to the video testimony. His intent was to object to the proceedings in general because he disliked being prosecuted.” Because the Court of Appeals had retained jurisdiction, this case then returned to it. With the benefit of the supplemental record, the Court of Appeals concluded that (1) contrary to the trial court’s factual findings, defendant had objected to the video procedure, (2) the testimony had violated both the Confrontation Clause and MCR 6.006(C), and (3) the resultant error amounted to plain error. Buie II,
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error. People v Cress,
III. ANALYSIS
At issue in this case is how the waiver of the rights allowed defendants under the Confrontation Clauses of our state and federal constitutions is to be effected and whether the use of video testimony satisfied the requirements of MCR 6.006(C).
A. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
The Confrontation Clauses of our state and federal constitutions provide that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused has the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. The United States Supreme Court has held “that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defеndant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact,” Coy v Iowa,
B. GENERAL WAIVER PRINCIPLES
“Waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’ ” People v Carines,
Whether a particular right is waivable; whether the defendant must participate personаlly in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and whether the defendant’s choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at stake. See, e.g., 2 W LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 11.6 (1984) (allocation of authority between defendant and counsel); Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis, 55 Texas L. Rev. 193 (1977) (waivability and standards for waiver). [Olano,507 US at 733 .]
This Court has recognized that “[w]hile the defendant must personally make an informed waiver for certain fundamental rights such as the right to counsel or the right to plead not guilty, for other rights, waiver may be effected by action of counsel.” People v Carter,
“Although there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer has — and must have — full authority to manage the conduct of the trial.” Taylor v. Illinois,484 U.S. 400 , 417-418 [108 S Ct 646 ;98 L Ed 2d 798 ] (1988). As to mаny decisions pertaining to the conduct of the trial, the defendant is “deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have ‘notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.’ ” Link v. Wabash R. Co.,370 U.S. 626 , 634 [82 S Ct 1386 ;8 L Ed 2d 734 ] (1962) (quoting Smith v. Ayer,101 U.S. 320 , 326 [25 L Ed 955 ] (1880)). Thus, decisions by counsel are generally given effect as to what arguments to pursue, see Jones v. Barnes,463 U.S. 745 , 751 [103 S Ct 3308 ;77 L Ed 2d 987 ] (1983), what evidentiary objections to raise, see Henry v. Mississippi,379 U.S. 443 , 451 [85 S Ct 564 ;13 L Ed 2d 408 ] (1965), and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of evidence, see United States v. McGill,11 F. 3d 223 , 226-227 (CA1 1993). Absent a demonstration of ineffectiveness, counsel’s word on such matters is the last.
Additionally, we asserted in Carter,
“One who waives his rights under a rule may not then seek appellate review of a claimed deprivation of those rights, for his waiver has extinguished any error.” United States v Griffin,84 F3d 912 , 924 (CA 7, 1996), citing Olano, [507 US] at 733-734.
C. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE WAIVER
There is no doubt that the right of confrontation may be waived and that waiver may be accomplished by counsel. This fact was recently reaffirmed in Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts,
Among the cases cited in support of this conclusion, our decision in People v Murray,
A chief ground of error relied upon is that the prosecution was allowed to put in evidence certain depositions taken out of court of witnesses not present at the trial. The facts seem to be that the attorneys for the respective parties stipulated to put in certain depositions on both sides, and they were put in accordingly. This, it is said, was in violation of the respondent’s constitutional right to be confronted with his witnesses. But the court made no ruling in the matter; what was done was voluntarily done by the parties; the defendant had the benefit of the stipulation, and, for aught we can know, it may have been made chiefly in his interest. But however that may be, when the court has made no ruling we can have nothing to review. This Court cannot relieve a party from a criminal conviction because of his own voluntary action on the trial.
It is said the counsel for respondent was counsel assigned to him by the court and may not have been counsel of his choice. We do not know how the fact was, but we know it is customary to allow the respondent to choose for himself. But however that may be, the counsel acted for the respondent without objection, and without complaint that he did not do the best he could for him.
The defendant undoubtedly had a constitutional right to be confronted with his witnesses. He waived that right in this case, apparently for his own supposed advantage and to obtain evidence on his own behalf. It would have been a mere impertinence for the court to have interfered and precluded this stipulation being acted upon. But it would have been more than an impertinence; it would have been gross error. And it would be palpablе usurpation of power for us now to set aside a judgment for a neglect of the court not at the time complained of, but in respect to something where any other course would have been plain error.
Under the view taken by the respondent it would seem that when the evidence had been obtained under his stipulation, the court was put in position where it was*309 impossible to avoid error; for if the evidence was received, he might complain, as he does now, that his constitutional right was violated, and if the court refused to receive it when he was consenting, the respondent would be entitled to have the conviction set aside for that error.
I shall always be ready to preserve in its integrity every constitutional right; but I do not understand that the Constitution is an instrument to play fast and loose with in criminal cases any more than in any other, or that it is the business of courts to be astute in the disсovery of technical difficulties in the punishment of parties for their criminal conduct. [Murray,52 Mich at 290-291 .]
For more than a century Murray has stood for two propositions in this state: (1) the right of confrontation may be waived
The majority of courts that have addressed this issue have concluded that the right of confrontation may be waived, and that the waiver may be effected by counsel, as long as counsel’s decision constitutes reasonable trial strategy and the defendant does not object to the waiver.
It is also implicit in Murray that any objection a defendant may have must be made on the record. This is supported by Justice COOLEY’S statement that “when the court has made no ruling we can have nothing to review,” Murray,
Defense counsel cannot acquiesce to the court’s handling of a matter at trial, only to later raise the issue as an error on appeal. A contrary result would run afoul of the well-established legal principle that a defendant must “raise objections at a time when the trial court has an opportunity to correct the error” [People v Grant,445 Mich 535 , 551;520 NW2d 124 (1994)] and cannot “harbor error as an appellate parachute.” [People v Carter,462 Mich 206 , 214;612 NW2d 144 (2000).] [Buie,485 Mich at 1107 (CORRIGAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).]
Other courts have indicated that objections must be made on the record. For instance, they have found waiver where the defendant failed to “manifest” dissent,
Further, Murray itself underscored the practical concern that allowing a defendant to object to defense counsel’s consent off the record provides a defendant with “an appellate parachute.” Under such a rule, a defendant might acquiesce in or even expressly agree with defense counsel’s waiver outside of court and then claim to have objected behind closed doors, or even in his own mind, when he does not enjoy the outcome he desires. In light of the obvious impracticalities of such a rule, we reaffirm the rule applied in Murray, and consonant with the rule applied in a majority of state and federal courts, that where the decision constitutes reasonable trial strategy, which is presumed, the right of confrontation may be waived by defense counsel as long as the defendant does not object on the record.
In reaffirming this rule, we also clarify that the right of confrontаtion is not a right that must be personally waived by the defendant in Michigan, despite our Court of Appeals’ decision in People v Lawson,
The res gestae rule in Michigan strengthens the confrontation clause’s guarantees. However, it is not as integral a part as cross-examination, the oath, and demeanor. As such, a defense counsel can waive this particular right for a defendant. On the other hand, the more integral rights of the confrontation clause must be personally-waived by the defendant. In Brookhart [v Janis,384 US 1 ;86 S Ct 1245 ;16 L Ed 2d 314 (1966)], the Supreme Court*314 reversed the defendant’s conviction because the record did not clearly show that the defendant himself (rather than defense counsel) waived his confrontation right to cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Lawson’s conclusion that “the more integral rights of the confrontation clause must be personally waived by the defendant” is incompatible with Murray and with the widely accepted rule that counsel may waive the right of confrontation. Further, Lawson misread Brookhart, its primary authority for the personal-waiver requirement. Although Brookhart discussed confrontation, the dispositive issue in that case concerned
whether counsel has power to enter a plea which is inconsistent with his client’s expressed desire and thereby waive his client’s constitutional right to plead not guilty and have a trial in which he can confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. [Brookhart,384 US at 7 .]
Thus, Brookhart merely dealt with waiver of the right to plead not guilty, not waiver of the right of confrontation. Accordingly, Brookhart does not stand for the proposition that a defendant must personally waive the right of confrontation.
As the Court of Appeals below correctly indicated, “the personal waiver rule articulated by [Lawson] is dictum and is, therefore, not binding.” Buie II,
In sum, we adopt the following rule to govern the waiver of the right of confrontation by counsel in Michigan: if the decision constitutes reasonable trial strategy, which is presumed, the right of confrontation may be waived by defense counsel as long as the defendant does not object on the record.
E. APPLICATION OF WAIVER
Clear error is present when the reviewing court is left with a “definite and firm conviction” that an error
Immediately before Palusci testified, defense counsel stated:
I understand this is this particular courtroom’s first attempt at this type of technological proceeding, and my client has-wanted to question the veracity of these proceedings, so I’ll leave that to the Court’s discretion.
A review of the record indicates that this statement did not constitute an objection for several obvious reasons. First, the statement is not phrased as an objection, and indeed the word “objection” is altogether missing. Second, as Justice CORRIGAN explained, “When defense counsel stated Til leave that to the Court’s discretion,’ defendant essentially acquiesced to the taking of testimony using two-way interactive video technology.” Buie,
Given the testimony of both defendant and defense counsel at the evidentiary hearing on remand, we cannot conclude that defendant consented to the video procedure through counsel. To the contrary, defendant objected to the use of the technology and had counsel place his objection on the record. Because defendant expressly objected to the use of the technology, defense counsel’s agreement with its use does not qualify as a waiver .... [Buie II,291 Mich App at 274 .][14]
Although the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court’s factual findings, it failed to articulate how those findings constituted clear error. That is, it did not explain how it was left with a “definite and firm conviction” that an error had occurred. Tuttle,
F. MCR 6.006(C)
Defendant also challenges the admission of the video testimony on the basis that it occurred in violation of MCR 6.006(C), which governs the use of video and audio technology injudicial proceedings. MCR 6.006(C) provides, in pertinent part:
Defendant in the Courtroom — Other Procеedings. As long as the defendant is either present in the courtroom or has waived the right to be present, upon a showing of good cause, district and circuit courts may use two-way interactive video technology to take testimony from a person at another location in the following proceedings:
(1) evidentiary hearings, competency hearings, sentencings, probation revocation proceedings, and proceedings to revoke a sentence that does not entail an adjudication of guilt, such as youthful trainee status;
(2) with the consent of the parties, trials. A party who does not consent to the use of two-way interactive video technology to take testimony from a person at trial shall not be required to articulate any reason for not consenting. [Emphasis added.]
MCR 6.006(C)(2) only allows video testimony “with the consent of the parties.” MCR 6.003(1) defines “party,” as it applies in MCR 6.006, to include the “lawyer representing the party.” Thus, “parties” in MCR
Defendant also argues that the use of “good cause” in MCR 6.006(C) imports the constitutional standard from Craig for dispensing with confrontation, to wit, that the “cause” be “necessary to further an important public policy” or “state interest.” We reject this argument. The court rule does not refer to Craig or its standard. There is a substantive distinction between “good cause” and “necessary to further an important state interest,” and we have adopted only the former language. “Good cause” simply means a “satisfactory,” “sound or valid” “reason,” whereas “necessary” means “essential” or “indispensible.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). Moreover, under the court rule there is no need to identify a corresponding state interest;-any sound reason is sufficient.
Because a trial court “may use two-way interactive video technology to take testimony from a person at another location,” MCR 6.006(C) (emphasis added), the decision to do so is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The use of the word “may” makes clear that the decision
IV CONCLUSION
This case presents two issues: (1) whether defendant’s constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him was violated by the admission of video testimony and (2) whether the admission of video testimony violated MCR 6.006(C). Because we conclude that defendant waived his right of confrontation under the United States and Michigan Constitutions and that the court rule was not violated, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand to that Court for consideration of defendant’s remaining issues.
Notes
Diaz involved crimes committed in the Philippine Islands while the United States was its sovereign. Thus, the right of confrontation at issue arose under the Philippine Civil Government Act, which provided defendants the right “ ‘to meet the witnesses face to face.’ ” Diaz,
That earlier trial involved an assault and battery that caused injuries to which the victim had succumbed by the time of the conviction at issue in Diaz.
See, e.g., People v Miller,
A defendant is free to waive objections to evidence by stipulation, perhaps “to obtain evidence on his own behalf” or in return for other concessions from the prosecution. Diaz, [223 US at 451 ] (quoting [Murray,52 Mich at 290 ]). In such contexts, admitting the stipulated evidence is so far from being error that it would be an “impertinence” and “gross error” for a court to interfere with the stipulation. [Diaz, 223 US] at 452.
See also Belt v United States, 4 App DC 25, 31 (1894) (citing Murray for the same proposition).
See, e.g., People v Baker,
Defense counsel, after the prosecutor made this statement here complained of, corroborated the prosecutor’s statement by replying: ‘That’s correct.’ Defense counsel is an able and experienced practitioner who has tried many cases in the criminal courts in this jurisdiction. He was undoubtedly aware that his client had a constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses. There is no reversible error present in this second issue. Cf. [Murray]52 Mich 288 .
[S]ince the statute limiting the use of testimony taken at a former hearing is designed to protеct defendant’s right to confrontation, and this right may be waived, [Murray,52 Mich 288 ], it inexorably follows that the stipulation by defendant’s counsel to allow the trial judge to read the transcript could constitute a conscious choice of trial strategy on the part of defendant’s attorney ....
Regarding federal courts, see, e.g., Janosky v St Amand,
Regarding state courts, see, e.g., People v Campbell, 208 Ill 2d 203, 217;
Murray,
See Cruzado, 210 F2d at 791 (“When an accused is represented by counsel, it is generally to be assumed that counsel adapts his trial tactics to what in his judgment is for the best interests of the accused. If the accused, being present, manifests no dissent, it is usually fair to assume that he approves of, or at least acquiesces in, the decisions taken in open court in his behalf by his counsel.”).
See Hawkins,
See Joseph, 333 F2d at 1013 (holding that the right to confrontation “may be effectively waived by counsel in open court in the presence of an accused who indicates no dissent”).
This rule is largely in agreement with the rаle articulated by the Court of Appeals below that “defense counsel may only waive a defendant’s right of confrontation if the waiver is a legitimate trial tactic or strategy and the defendant does not object to the decision.” Buie II,
See, e.g., People v Farquharson,
Defendant claims that People v Saffold,
Although the dissent concedes that “defense counsel failed to communicate a cognizable objection” at trial, it takes issue with our requirement that a defendant’s objection must be “on the record.” Post at 322-323. The dissent concludes that our opinion “allows a defense attorney to waive a criminal defendant’s right of confrontation despite the defendant’s unequivocal objection to the attorney” if an attorney “fails to voice a proper objection____” Post at 323. However, a counsel’s failure to object may result in the waiver of a defendant’s rights in many instances. The dissent overlooks that a defendant may seek relief in such instances by establishing that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Strickland v Washington,
14 When the Court of Appeals stated earlier in its opinion that “defendant failed to object to the use of the video technology on the grounds he raises on appeal,” it was presumably indicating that defendant did not object on the record. Buie II,
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which vacated defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial.
I would hold first that the public policies or state interests that the trial court relied on to justify allowing the two-way, interactive video testimony did not outweigh defendant’s right of confrontation, as guaranteed by the United States and Michigan Constitutions. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. Pursuant to Maryland v Craig,
In my view, the majority improperly avoids the aforementioned issue under Craig by concluding that defen
The majority acknowledges that an attorney cannot waive a client’s core constitutional right of confronta
Additionally, while I agree with the majority opinion that the good-cause standard for use of two-way video testimony in MCR 6.006(C) is not synonymous with the Craig standard of “necessary to further an important public policy” or “state interest,” I do not agree with the majority that defendant consented under MCR 6.006(C)(2). The same facts that support my conclusion that defendant did not waive his right of confrontation support my conclusion that defendant did not consent to the video testimony. Therefore, I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment and hold that the video testimony was not properly admitted under MCR 6.006(C).
Finally, I agree with the Court of Appeals that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings because the chain of evidence for the DNA could not have been established without the foundational testimony provided by Palusci and Wolfarth.
Because both Dr. Vincent Palusci and Rodney Wolfarth took the oath to testify truthfully, were subject to cross-examination, and could be observed by the jury when testifying, I agree that the use of the two-way, interactive video technology in this case implicates only the “physical presence” requirement of the Confrontation Clause. See Craig,
In my view, the meaning of this statement is so inscrutable that the trial court should have inquired further to determine whether defendant was objecting.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring in the result). I concur in the result only in this factually unique case.