People ex rel. Alvarez v. Howard
2016 IL 120729
| Ill. | 2016Background
- In 2013 Luis Montano, born September 4, 1997 (age 15 at the time), was indicted in criminal court for multiple counts including first‑degree murder and attempted murder arising from March 29, 2013 shootings.
- At indictment the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2014)) mandated automatic prosecution as an adult for certain enumerated offenses committed by minors age 15 or older.
- Public Act 99‑258 (approved Aug. 4, 2015; eff. Jan. 1, 2016) amended section 5‑130 to raise the automatic transfer age from 15 to 16 and eliminated some enumerated offenses; it contained no savings clause for that change.
- Montano moved to transfer the pending criminal case to juvenile court for a discretionary transfer hearing; the trial judge granted the motion, relying on the default temporal‑reach rule in section 4 of the Statute on Statutes and Illinois retroactivity precedent.
- The State sought a writ of mandamus or prohibition from the Illinois Supreme Court to rescind the transfer order, arguing the amendment should apply prospectively (relying on the Effective Date Act and Landgraf analysis) and that the transfer was unauthorized.
- The Supreme Court denied the writ: it held the amendment was procedural, section 4 supplies retroactive application to pending proceedings, and transferring the case to juvenile court was lawful (the State can seek discretionary transfer back from juvenile court).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Montano/Respondent) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the amendment raising automatic transfer age from 15 to 16 applies retroactively to pending cases | Delayed effective date (Effective Date Act) indicates prospective application; Landgraf presumption of prospectivity applies | Amendment is procedural; legislature gave no temporal reach so section 4 of the Statute on Statutes mandates retroactivity | Held retroactive under section 4; transfer to juvenile court lawful |
| Whether the State’s remedy should be an original mandamus/prohibition instead of an appeal | State had an appeal route under Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) for orders with substantive effect of dismissal | Transfer order did not dismiss charges; it only changed forum and contemplated further proceedings in juvenile court | Held mandamus/prohibition not procedurally barred; original relief was permissible to seek but not granted on merits |
| Whether the Effective Date Act determines temporal reach when an amendment lacks a savings clause | Effective Date Act delay signals legislative preference for prospectivity | Section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, not the Effective Date Act, controls temporal reach when amendment is silent | Held Effective Date Act does not supplant section 4; section 4 controls temporal reach |
| Whether retroactive application is impracticable because case has been pending in criminal court for years | Retroactive transfer would be disruptive and impracticable given multiyear criminal‑court proceedings | “Practicable” means feasible, not merely convenient; transfer is feasible and within legislative design | Held retroactive transfer is practicable and not constitutionally barred |
Key Cases Cited
- Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (establishes two‑step retroactivity framework)
- Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27 (2001) (adopts Landgraf approach in Illinois)
- Caveney v. Bower, 207 Ill. 2d 82 (2003) (section 4 of the Statute on Statutes supplies default temporal reach)
- Glisson v. City of Joliet, 202 Ill. 2d 499 (2002) (distinction between procedural and substantive amendments under section 4)
- People v. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d 81 (1988) (procedural statutory amendments may be retroactive even when effective date was delayed)
- Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas, 234 Ill. 2d 393 (2009) (legislature’s temporal‑reach choices are found either in the enactment or by default in section 4)