*1 that I am still un- as no cases, surprise it will come those and birth” “wrongful claims why to understand able denigra- life” involve some sort paradoxical “wrongful I am still less able existence. the value of human tion of deprived an has injury a claim that why to understand love normal degree of the ability provide child more par- Is it any is “paradoxical.” and companionship ordinary personal injury in an for the plaintiff adoxical life has capacity enjoy that his own case to argue claim Any per- and suffering? diminished by pain been claim that the plain- sonal involves injury necessarily less is, respect, at least in some tiff’s own existence before, deserves plaintiff than “valuable” loss in to make for that value. up compensation self-created; are majority which perplex paradoxes us to compel deny compensa- cannot and should they oth- the carelessness of injured by tion to those actually ers. reasons, I concur.
For these specially (No. 65057. ILLINOIS, Appel OF OF THE STATE
THE PEOPLE lant, BATES, Appellee. v. FRANK 20, 1988.
Opinion June filed *2 General, of Springfield, Hartigan, Attorney Neil F. Chicago State’s Attorney, M. Daley, and Richard L. Rotert General, Mark Stewart, Solicitor Jones (Roma General, Madsen, Attorneys Assistant Terence M. and T. Zick, Kenneth Gainer, Jr., Steven J. Thomas V. and Donahoe, A. Fitzgerald Nancy E. James McCurry, counsel), all of Chicago, Attorneys, Assistant State’s for the People. Peter Defender, and Zaven Biebel, Jr., Public
Paul P. De- Public Alwin, P. Assistant and Ronald Tokatlian fenders, Chicago, appellee. court: opinion RYAN delivered the
JUSTICE *3 the this from a decision brings The State appeal Ill. 2d R. 23 order court, which, a Rule by appellate dis County’s the circuit court of Cook reversed 23), the Post-Convic under petition of the defendant’s missal 1985, 38, ch. 122—1 par. Stat. (Ill. tion Act Rev. Hearing order under Ill. 3d 1163 (unpublished et 152 seq.). App. Rule 23). Court Supreme 13, of murder on December was convicted
Defendant imprisonment. to 25 to 75 1972, years’ and sentenced (Peo court the affirmed by appellate His conviction was and this court 748), 3d 25 Ill. App. v. Bates ple to appeal. denied leave conviction, the post-
At the time of the defendant’s limi then in effect included 20-year statute conviction 38, 1.) 1971, ch. par. Rev. Stat. (Ill. tation period. 122— the Post-Convic 1, 1984, an amendment to January On limita- effect, shortened Act took which Hearing tion 84
tion Stat., to 10 Ill. years. Rev. ch. Supp., 38, par. 122 —1. se pro 6, 1984,
On February filed a pe- tition for relief. took post-conviction filing This place just over 11 conviction, after years defendant’s and ap- after proximately weeks the new limitation 10-year period became effective. The circuit court applied new and, limitation period dismissed the accordingly, pe- tition as untimely.
The court, district, appellate first reversed re manded to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing. The court held that when limitation statutes are short ened so as to petitions bar which fall instantaneously outside the new time period, affected must persons be given time within reasonable file. We granted State’s leave to 107 Ill. 2d R. appeal. The provision limitation 122—1 of the section Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 as follows: provides proceedings
“No under this Article shall be com menced more than 10 years judg after rendition of final ment, petitioner unless the facts alleges showing that the due to delay negligence.” (Ill. was not his culpable Rev. Stat., ch. Supp., par. 122— identical, preamendment provision was except the limitation period specified years.
The first we must address whether question shortened limitation period applied retroactively be may to convictions which its occurred enactment. The prior may, relying upon People appellate court held it Robinson 140 Ill. We agree 3d 29. with that App. and, below, conclusion as discussed largely adopt Robinson to this issue. *4 approach Orlicki
The logical starting point analysis for our v. McCarthy 4 Ill. In that (1954), case, 2d 342. an amendment had reduced the time an period filing Act, court consid- and this Dramshop action under retroac- the amendment could be applied ered whether that several answering affirmatively, In tively. question here. were stated which are of relevance principles First, legislature, having this court noted that Act, of had Dramshop created action under rights In other rights. to those power repeal corresponding in rem words, had no “vested” rights statutory persons Moreover, at (4 repeal edies. power to im enactments includes the lesser statutory power or time limitations for actions un pose modify bringing it that der such acts. Ill. 2d at was noted 353.) Finally, statutes of limitation have been classified historically character, amend in procedural procedural 4 Ill. 2d at ments are generally applied retroactively. 352-53, v. Industrial Comm’n citing, e.g., (1926), Smolen McQueen v. 32; (1944), 324 Ill. Connor Ill. in reiterated in a Orlicki have been principles of decisions. v. subsequent (See, e.g., Meegan
number 354; Park 52 Ill. 2d Moore v. Village Tinley of C.J., 95 Ill. Jackson Park 2d Hospital (Ryan, are also in accord with law concurring).) They accepted Sutherland, 2A A. Statutory in other See jurisdictions. §41.09, (4th 1986). Construction at 281 ed. however, these rules argues,
The defendant to the Post- should not the case amendments apply of cases in Conviction Act. He to a series Hearing points of an amend which we refused retroactive application of limita ment to the Act which lengthened Ill. 2d 247. Lansing (1966), tion. E.g., People However, was not based Lansing upon the decision Act Hearing Post-Conviction any peculiar aspect of amendments would retroactive application bar it, statutory rather on more general principles but interpretation.
In Lansing, the defendant’s conviction occurred while the limitation under the period Act was five He years. filed a under the Act approximately years 5V2 later, which was dismissed as untimely. During pen- of his dency appeal, limitation period extended to 20 and the years, argued the amend- ment should apply his claim. In retroactively preserve rejecting contention, this this court quoted following language:
“ jurisdictions ‘In most general down, rule is laid that, without exception qualification, or after an action has by existing Limitations, become barred an Statute of subsequent legislation no will remove the bar or revive ” 250, the cause of Annot., action.’ Ill. 2d at quoting 297, (1930).) A.L.R. The court further Cardozo, Justice quoted who stated:
“ ‘Revival
is an extreme
legislative
exercise of
power.
The will to work it is not deduced from words of doubtful
meaning. Uncertainties
against
are resolved
consequences
”
250,
so drastic.’
quoting Hopkins v. Lincoln
35 Ill. 2d at
Trust Co.
213,
(1922),
215,
267,
233 N.Y.
135 N.E.
Thus,
cases,
our
and cases from other jurisdictions,
have drawn a distinction between the revival of a cause
of action
by extending
limitations,
statute of
and cut
off
ting
a cause of action
the limitation
by shortening
The denial
period.
of retroactive
application
former instance does not preclude such
in the
application
v.
latter.
People
Reed
(See also
169;
42 Ill. 2d
(1969),
v.
People
Thomas
The defendant’s final contention is that even if the new, shortened limitation period he nonetheless applies, is entitled to a time after its effective reasonable date within which to his action. This bring argument based from other upon language considering eases effect retroactive limita- application shortening amendments tion periods.
For Park example, Meegan Village Tinley 52 Ill. 2d we considered whether an amend ment adding a limitation to a zoning ordinance where no limitation had existed previously could apply This court retroactively. stated: long
“So presentation a reasonable time exists for the *6 aof claim of after enactment a statute the shortening in time which suit may brought, legislature may be the validly shorten the time to pre-existing as causes of action.” 52 2d at Ill. 359.
More we recently, these to an applied principles amendment which the shortened of for period repose medical bringing malpractice actions. v. (Mega Holy Cross Hospital 111 2d (1986), 416.) Ill. We stated: general rule,
“Under in the wake of a statute shortening a period limitations or providing one where did not one exist a previously, plaintiff whose cause of action arose that before date will be a allowed reasonable of which bring time in his 111 at action.” Ill. 2d 420, citing Gray 78; Hupp Meegan, 354; 2d Ill. Trustees Schools v. 6 Ill. 2d Batdorf The thrust of these is that decisions shortened stat- limitations, utes retroactive, even if not ap- will be to bar plied right an of action. instantaneously existing The “reasonable time” rule is a created judicially “safety Thus, which valve” that result from prevents occurring. he argues that is at least entitled to a deter- mination whether his was a petition filed within reason- able time after the of the effective date amendment. is, however,
There an distinction between important the limitation at issue here and the statutes in- provision in terpreted cases such as Meegan, Mega Hupp. in the Act Hearing limitation Post-Conviction provision that no action be more than 10 provides may brought rendition of final years judgment, peti after “unless tioner facts not due alleges showing delay was Stat., to his (Ill. Supp., Rev. culpable negligence.” ch. statutes The limitations involved par. 122 — do not such a other cases discussed contain qualifica a tion. In our this creates judgment, language special valve,” Hearing to the Post-Conviction “safety unique Act, as imposed which acts a substitute judicially time” “reasonable rule. view, this the defendant’s cause action was
Under enactment by not barred instantaneously To he need effect, shortened limitation avoid its period. Be- delay filing. have facts only alleged justifying alle- cause not such by his petition accompanied any as find his must be dismissed gations, we untimely. admittedly
We note that while interpretation, this defendant, this could benefitting conceivably provide relief than post-conviction more expansive right rule, time” this might. lengthy rule Under “reasonable unreasonable, would be delays likely rejected alle- excusable if factual supported adequate be may by *7 gations. Meegan, Hupp and
It here to note that is appropriate amend to the latest Mega statutory were decided prior laws. constitu ment to the effective date of Our relating law for the to provide by tion directs General Assembly 1 to July for passed prior a uniform effective date laws IV, Pursu 1970, §10.) art. of a calendar Const. year. (Ill. en mandate, legislature to ant this constitutional a which acted, signed, provided bill and Governor and to of a calendar July year, that a 1 prior law passed on October 30, 1971, shall become effective after June terms, it law, unless, spe- its its becoming by following cifically provides (Ill. different effective date. Rev. 1971, 131, Stat. ch. This par. 21.) is statute which the effective date of the governed amendments consid in Mega. Thus, ered and without the cre Hupp judicially ated rule, “reasonable time” the amendment considered in those cases could terminate a scant rights three after months its and a shorter of time passage period af it is, ter became law, that the date on which the Gover nor signed bill. Ill. Const. amendatory (See 1970, art. A IV, §9.) bill becomes a to law sections 8 pursuant and 9 of article IV of the Constitution. Rev. (Ill. 1985, Stat. 1, par. ch. “It therefore is not to important con fuse the date on which the bill ‘becomes a law’ with the on date which that law effective; becomes the two need not coincide.” City Springfield Allphin 117,
In 1978, the legislature amended the statute relating to effective date of It laws. is provided now by amendment that a passed bill of a prior July calen dar year provide does not for an effective date in its terms shall become effective on 1 of January the fol or lowing year, law, its upon whichever is becoming (Ill. 1985, later. Rev. Stat. ch. 1201.) Thus the par. amendment to the Post-Conviction Act Hearing shorten the time to 10 within ing which must years be did not filed become effective until six months after its and a passage somewhat shorter after it became law, when the depending upon Governor signed act. The amendatory defendant here then had three months after the longer of the amendment and passage its before effective within date act to protect interests that be affected the amendment than may by parties did in reason Hupp Mega. The for the ju created dicially “reasonable time” valve alluded to safety Hupp and now as it Mega compelling the laws under involved those cases. *8 reasons, the judgment
For we reverse all above of the cir- judgment court and affirm of the appellate County. cuit court of Cook reversed; court
Appellate circuit court affirmed. CLARK, dissenting: JUSTICE notes, our court has consist- As the majority properly of a shortened the retroactive application ently upheld are al- as long potential litigants statute of limitations an action time” in to bring a “reasonable which lowed Village v. (Meegan a enactment statute. following Gray (1978), v. Hupp Park Tinley 354; 52 Ill. 2d (1972), our court’s However, acknowledging while 73 Ill. 2d right today negates this court position, past is based reasoning on it. The court’s defendant to rely negli that “culpable on the tenuous proposition is an statute valve the post-conviction gence” safety time” standard. for the “reasonable substitute adequate reliance on the culpa contends Indeed, the majority conceivably provide standard “could ble negligence than a relief more right post-conviction expansive at al 88), might” (124 time’ rule ‘reasonable for this offers no belief. support though majority the utter case law indicates of the pertinent Review research My reasoning. inherent in the majority’s fallacy court case supreme one or appellate to find even failed on allowed based was a post-conviction *** culpable was not due delay “showing 38, 122 —1. par. Stat. ch. Ill. Rev. negligence.” v. Reed 169, the allegation In People 42 Ill. 2d “to show that enough “numerous errors” was the result of culpable was not file the petition failure to 172.) People Diefenbaugh Ill. 2d at negligence.” se the pro 73, held that 40 Ill. 2d that at the fact despite from culpability not excused *9 trial he following court level offered the specifically for filing: (1) only three reasons he had sixth- delay and aware of the grade regarding education was not law he was in had no post-conviction and proceedings; (2) jail (3) available funds with which to retain an attorney; counsel not after the of limi appointed was until statute (40 74.) tations had run. Ill. 2d at Our court indicated of that these are to demon reasons sufficient “[n]one strate a lack of Ill. 2d at culpable negligence” (40 74), before it went on also to find that failure of the trial court to to documented for respond repeated requests of transcripts proceedings was to show a enough lack of the culpable negligence part on of the defendant (40 75). Ill. at2d
The
of what
sufficient
question
is
to show a
proof
lack of
negligence
again
was
before our court in
culpable
People
As these cases indicate, criteria necessary show a lack “culpable negligence” have been con strued I no quite narrowly. see reason to from depart our on stand prior positions both the “reasonable time” ard “culpable and the standard. To negligence” deny in the instant case his reliance on the “reason able time” standard because “he need alleged have only facts at filing” (124 88) justifying delay misstate the holdings. our patently scope prior is no substitute substi-
majority’s “culpable negligence” tute at all. this I indicated majority note
Additionally, in Peo court’s court appellate approach adoption v. Robinson 140 Ill. 3d 29. Ill. 2d at ple App. decision, it I this while puzzling find because the retroac holdings upholding noted our court’s prior limitations, of a shortened statute of de tive application hearing petition nied the defendant’s late post-conviction time” it was not filed within a “reasonable because only to shorten the statute of after the statute was amended limitation. departure
I find no justification majority’s Be- time” standard. well-accepted from our “reasonable *10 filed five weeks of cause defendant’s within statute, I would re- the effective date of the amended I to the circuit court for a post-conviction hearing. mand the unan- dissent and would affirm therefore respectfully court. holding imous appellate STAMOS this dissent. joins JUSTICE