2020 COA 23
Colo. Ct. App.2020Background
- On the morning of the offenses Stone, appearing intoxicated, stole multiple vehicles (one with a 4‑year‑old inside), led police on high‑speed pursuits, hit and seriously injured an officer, and was arrested.
- Prosecutors charged Stone with multiple general‑intent crimes (attempted manslaughter, first‑degree assault, vehicular eluding, etc.); the solitary specific‑intent theft count was dismissed before trial.
- Stone sought to present evidence and expert testimony of voluntary (self‑induced) intoxication to contest culpability; the prosecution moved to bar that evidence under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18‑1‑804(1).
- The trial court ruled voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the charged general‑intent crimes and instructed the jury accordingly; Stone was convicted on the general‑intent counts.
- On appeal Stone argued § 18‑1‑804(1) is facially and as‑applied unconstitutional (denying due process and the right to present a defense) and that the jury instruction was erroneous; the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Stone’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Facial constitutionality of § 18‑1‑804(1) (voluntary intoxication barred as defense to general‑intent crimes) | Legislature may define elements of offenses; statute is a permissible redefinition of culpability and does not relieve prosecution of proving elements beyond a reasonable doubt (Egelhoff). | Statute is an evidentiary rule that unconstitutionally excludes relevant, exculpatory evidence and lessens the State’s burden to prove mens rea. | Statute constitutional; follows Egelhoff and Colorado precedent — legislature may treat voluntary intoxication as not excusing general‑intent conduct. |
| As‑applied challenge that statute allowed prosecution to use intoxication evidence but barred defense | Issue was not preserved at trial; no adequate factual record for an as‑applied decision. | Statute is unconstitutional as applied because it permitted prosecution to exploit intoxication evidence while denying defendant the same evidence to negate mens rea. | Not considered on appeal — claim not preserved. |
| Jury instruction that "self‑induced intoxication is not a defense" | Evidence at trial (officer observations, found baggie, witness descriptions, defendant’s demeanor) raised intoxication and supported instruction; instruction tracked statute. | No sufficient evidence of intoxication; instruction risked creating an impermissible presumption of guilt and infringed defendant’s rights. | Instruction proper and supported by the record; did not relieve prosecution of burden when instructions are read as a whole. |
| Relevance of intoxication evidence after dismissal of the specific‑intent count | With no specific‑intent counts remaining, intoxication evidence is irrelevant to negate intent for general‑intent offenses under the statute. | Defendant should be allowed to present intoxication evidence to contest any element or to present a defense. | Trial court correctly excluded voluntary‑intoxication defense once only general‑intent crimes remained. |
Key Cases Cited
- Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (U.S. 1996) (upheld state law barring voluntary‑intoxication evidence as a permissible legislative redefinition of mental‑state element)
- People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743 (Colo. 2005) (voluntary intoxication may negate specific intent only; involuntary intoxication is an affirmative defense)
- Brown v. People, 239 P.3d 764 (Colo. 2010) (voluntary intoxication is a partial defense; courts must find sufficient evidence before issuing intoxication instruction)
- Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982) (self‑induced intoxication involves moral culpability and supports barring it as a defense to general‑intent crimes)
- People v. Harlan, 8 P.3d 448 (Colo. 2000) (characterized intoxication rule as evidentiary in specific‑intent context)
- People v. Quintana, 996 P.2d 146 (Colo. App. 1998) (trial court may instruct that intoxication is not a defense to general‑intent crimes when evidence permits inference of intoxication)
- Kaufman v. People, 202 P.3d 542 (Colo. 2009) (jury instructions must be read as a whole and the prosecution retains the reasonable‑doubt burden)