Penobscot Nation v. Mills
861 F.3d 324
| 1st Cir. | 2017Background
- Penobscot Nation sued the State of Maine and officials after the Maine Attorney General (Schneider) opined the Nation may regulate activities on reservation islands but not the Penobscot River Main Stem; United States intervened for the Nation; private parties intervened for the State.
- The Nation sought declaratory relief that the Settlement Acts (MIA and MICSA) define the Penobscot Reservation to include the Main Stem (bank-to-bank) and that its sustenance-fishing rights extend across the Main Stem.
- The district court held (1) the statutory definition of "Penobscot Indian Reservation" includes the islands in the Main Stem but not the surrounding waters/submerged lands, and (2) the Nation has sustenance-fishing rights throughout the Main Stem.
- On cross-appeal the First Circuit affirmed the islands-only interpretation but vacated and dismissed the sustenance-fishing judgment for lack of Article III jurisdiction (ripeness and standing).
- The panel majority grounded the islands-only holding on plain statutory text and ordinary dictionary meanings, declining to apply the Indian canon where the language is unambiguous; it found the sustenance-fishing claim speculative because Maine had not threatened enforcement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of "Penobscot Indian Reservation" in 30 M.R.S.A. § 6203(8) / 25 U.S.C. § 1722(i) | The definition incorporates treaty context and state common law; "lands" and "islands" include submerged lands/waters (Main Stem bank-to-bank or at least to thread/midline). | The statute plainly says "islands in the Penobscot River" and "lands" excludes water; definitions and other statutory provisions separately address waters and submerged lands. | Affirmed for defendants: Reservation consists of specified islands only; not the Main Stem or submerged lands. |
| Interaction of reservation definition with sustenance-fishing provision (30 M.R.S.A. § 6207(4)) | Section 6207(4) (right to take fish within reservation boundaries) shows Congress intended the reservation to include waters needed for fishing; plain-text reading would nullify fishing rights. | The MIA allows context to control; § 6207(4) does not rewrite the clear islands-only definition and uses different terms when referring to water/natural resources. | Majority: No conflict; plain meaning controls. (But court did not resolve substantive fishing right on the merits due to jurisdictional defects.) |
| Use of Indian canons and legislative history (role of Alaska Pacific and Johnson) | Ambiguities exist; Indian-canons and Alaska Pacific Fisheries compel construing reservations to include adjacent waters; prior court statements (Johnson) and historical practice support waters being part of the reservation. | Canon inapplicable if statute unambiguous; Alaska Pacific involves different language and circumstances and is not controlling; Johnson did not decide the precise boundary issue. | Majority: Canon not applied because text is unambiguous; Alaska Pacific distinguished. Dissent: disagreed, would apply Alaska Pacific and Indian canon to include Main Stem. |
| Justiciability of claim for a declaratory judgment on sustenance-fishing rights | Nation: Schneider Opinion threatens their sovereign fishing rights; declaratory relief appropriate. | State: Schneider Opinion did not threaten enforcement; Maine has an informal policy of not interfering with sustenance fishing; plaintiffs lack concrete injury. | Reversed district court on fishing claim: vacated and dismissed for lack of standing and ripeness (no imminent injury; claim speculative). |
Key Cases Cited
- Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918) (holding a congressional reservation of certain islands included adjacent waters and submerged lands; relied on by dissent to support inclusion of river).
- South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498 (1986) (Indian-canon of construction does not apply where statutory language is unambiguous).
- Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (courts must enforce unambiguous statutory text; cited to limit application of canons).
- Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369 (2013) (start statutory interpretation with the text; cited for interpretive methodology).
- Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004) (when statute's language is plain and not absurd, courts enforce text; cited for plain-meaning rule).