Pennsylvania v. Trump
351 F. Supp. 3d 791
E.D. Pa.2019Background
- Plaintiffs (Pennsylvania and New Jersey) challenge two 2018 HHS/Treasury/Labor Final Rules (which finalized October 2017 Interim Final Rules) that expand religious and moral exemptions to the ACA contraceptive-coverage mandate and make the accommodation optional and notice-free.
- The ACA's Women's Health Amendment requires specified group health plans and issuers to cover HRSA-defined preventive services for women (including contraceptives) without cost-sharing; HRSA set those guidelines in 2011.
- Agencies previously created a limited religious employer exemption and an accommodation mechanism (self-certification or insurer notice) after notice-and-comment; Supreme Court decisions (Hobby Lobby, Wheaton College, Zubik) prompted further regulatory revisions and litigation.
- The 2017 IFRs broadened exemptions (religious and new moral exemptions), expanded accommodation eligibility, made accommodation optional, and removed notice/certification requirements; the Court enjoined those IFRs previously.
- Agencies issued substantively similar Final Rules in Nov. 2018; Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction arguing APA procedural and substantive violations, Title VII, Equal Protection, and Establishment Clause claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing | States will incur increased fiscal costs and quasi-sovereign harms from more residents losing contraceptive coverage. | Defendants dispute cognizable injury. | States have Article III standing (special solicitude + injury, causation, redressability). |
| Venue | Eastern District of PA proper because Pennsylvania "resides" throughout its borders. | Defendants argue state counts as an "entity" and thus resides only in its principal-place district. | Venue is proper; states reside in every district within their borders. |
| APA procedural (notice-and-comment) | Final Rules fail APA because IFRs were issued without prior notice-and-comment, and that tainted the finalization; post-promulgation comment did not cure prejudice. | Agencies argue they cured defects via later notice-and-comment and/or had good cause for IFRs. | Court likely: plaintiffs will succeed — IFRs' procedural defects fatally taint Final Rules despite later comment. |
| APA substantive (statutory authority & RFRA) | Final Rules exceed agencies' statutory authority under ACA and sweep beyond what RFRA requires; thus arbitrary/capricious and ultra vires. | Agencies claim ACA delegation plus RFRA permit or require broad religious/moral exemptions. | Court held Final Rules exceed authority under the ACA and cannot be justified by RFRA; likelihood of success for States on merits. |
Key Cases Cited
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (RFRA analysis: contraceptive mandate violated as applied to closely held corporations; accommodation relevant to least-restrictive-means inquiry)
- Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (Sup. Ct. 2016) (per curiam) (declined to decide RFRA merits; remanded to explore ways to provide coverage without burdening religious claimants)
- Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (States entitled to special solicitude in standing analysis under certain conditions)
- Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (states entitled to special solicitude; standing based on projected fiscal burdens)
- NRDC v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1982) (post-promulgation notice-and-comment does not necessarily cure a procedurally invalid interim action; subsequent final rule may be tainted)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (framework for judicial review of agency statutory interpretation)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (constitutional standing requirements)
- MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (statutory delegation limits; agencies cannot make fundamental changes absent clear congressional authorization)
- Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (injunctive relief should be no more burdensome than necessary to provide complete relief)
