Penelope Morris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14261

Background

This case arose after the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes reversed nationwide class certification for gender-discrimination claims under Rule 23.
Former putative Dukes class members filed regional class suits; in Love v. Wal‑Mart the district court dismissed class claims as untimely under Eleventh Circuit precedent limiting tolling to individual (not additional class) claims.
Plaintiffs settled their individual claims and filed a joint stipulation of voluntary dismissal under FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) on October 16, which the district court did not need to convert into a separate order to be effective.
Unnamed would‑be class members (Appellants) filed to intervene on November 6 solely to appeal the district court’s dismissal of class claims; the district court denied intervention on November 19 and the Appellants filed a notice of appeal the same day, also appealing the class‑claim dismissal.
Wal‑Mart moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely; the panel first addressed timeliness because appellate jurisdiction depends on meeting Rule 4’s 30‑day deadline.
The Eleventh Circuit held the stipulated dismissal was self‑executing and thus started the 30‑day clock for appeals; the appeal of the class‑claim dismissal was filed 34 days after the stipulation and was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; the appeal of denial of intervention was timely but moot because intervention sought only to appeal the class dismissal.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does the 30‑day appeal clock under FRAP 4 begin after a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulated dismissal?	The clock begins on entry of the district court’s later docketed order (Oct 23), not the stipulation filing (Oct 16).	The stipulation is self‑executing and final on filing; the 30‑day clock begins on the stipulation date.	The court held the clock began on the date of the filed stipulation; appeal was untimely.
Can absent putative class members intervene after a stipulation dismissal to appeal denial of class certification?	Appellants sought leave to intervene to appeal and argued intervention was permissible post‑dismissal.	Wal‑Mart argued stipulation ended the case as to parties and foreclosed that avenue.	The court did not reach the broader jurisdictional question; it held the intervention appeal was moot because intervention was sought only to appeal the now‑untimely class dismissal.
Do Rule 23 concerns for absent class members alter the Rule 41/FRAP 4 timing analysis?	Appellants argued class/absent‑member rights require different treatment and delay of the clock.	Court: Rule 4/41 contains no class exception; Rule 23 only limits dismissals of certified classes, not uncertified ones.	Court rejected a class‑based exception; timing rules apply equally to uncertified class cases.
Do precedents like McDonald or Smith permit delaying the appeal period for absent class members?	Appellants relied on McDonald/Smith to argue absent‑member protections or post‑judgment intervention rights affect timeliness.	Wal‑Mart argued those cases do not control the FRAP 4 start date after a stipulation.	Court found McDonald and Smith inapposite to the Rule 41(a)(1) timing question and declined to adopt a different rule.

Key Cases Cited

Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (Sup. Ct.) (reversed nationwide class certification under Rule 23 commonality)
Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir.) (Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation is self‑executing and dismisses the case on filing)
State Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Cty. of Camden, 824 F.3d 399 (3d Cir.) (appeal timeliness measured from filing of stipulated dismissal)
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (Sup. Ct.) (putative class members may conditionally intervene after final judgment to appeal denial of class certification)
Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299 (Sup. Ct.) (limits on binding absent class members by judgments in related suits)
Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (Sup. Ct.) (appeal filing deadlines are jurisdictional)
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (Sup. Ct.) (finality requirement for appellate jurisdiction)
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (Sup. Ct.) (Rule 41 dismissals do not preclude district court powers like sanctions)